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1. INTRODUCTION 
There are separate literatures on normative models of capital 
accumulation, fisheries management, and reservoir operation. However, 
generic models of each type share a common mathematical structure. The 
models often include uncertainty in the length of time to which planning 
should apply and in the future consequences of present decisions. 
The present paper investigates the structure of optimal decision making 
under uncertainty for general single sector growth models, for individual 
optimal consumption and savings models, for models of a single fish species 
with pooled age classes, and for models of a single reservoir. The results 
extend and unify some of those of Amir (1967), Bewley (1977), Levhari and 
Srinvinasan (1969), Hakaanson (1970), Mirman (1971), Brock and Mirman 
(1972, 1973), Miller (1974), Sobel (1975), Whitt (1975a), Schechtman 
(1976), Schechtman and Escudero (1977), and Yaari (1976). Also we 
present new and simpler proofs for most of the theorems which generalize 
results of the authors above. 
For brevity, we use the terminology of capital accumulation. Let the first 
consumption and reinvestment decisions be made in period n and the last 
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ones in period 1. At the beginning of each period t (t = 1, 2,...) let x denote 
the capital on hand in units of dollars or physical quantities as the context 
dictates. The decisions in period t are y 1 , namely the amount of x, that is 
reinvested, and z, = x, — y 1 , the amount consumed. Let 
.y E Y(x,) 	(t = 1, 2,...) 	 (1.1) 
constrain the reinvestment and consumption decisions. The connection 
between reinvestment decisions and accumulated capital is 
x,,, = s(y„ D,), 	 (1.2) 
where D„ D 2 ,..., D„ are assumed to be independent random variables that 
are distributed as the generic random variable D. We assume for each t that 
x 1 lies in a convex reference set X and that C y): y E Y(x), x E X} is a 
convex set. 
Let G(x„ yi ) denote the utility in period t of having an initial capital x, 
and reinvesting y,. Let a denote the single-period discount factor. The 
generic problem is maximization of expected discounted utility, namely 
E , a'G(x„ yi ), where n < co. With a consumption horizon of n 
periods until termination, let A ,,(x) denote an optimal reinvestment decision 
and x — A n (x) an optimal consumption decision. (For a fishery model, 
x — n (x) is the amount harvested, and A „(x) is the population size after 
harvesting ceases. For a reservoir model, x is the amount of water in the 
reservoir, and x — n (x) is the amount discharged.) 
The real line is indicated by R, and R, denotes [0, co). If z E R then (z)+ 
denotes max(0, z). Derivatives (partial or regular) are from the left when 
necessary. If w(•, • ) is a function of two variables, then w (1) (u, v) and 
w (2) (u, v) denote the partial derivatives with respect to the first and second 
arguments. If a E R and b E R, then a A b denotes min(a, b). 
Suppose w is a real-valued concave function on R and D is a random 
variable for which the expectations r(z)= Ew(z — D) and Ew'(z — D) both 
exist. Then r'(z)= Ew' (z — D) can be justified by the monotonicity in S of 
[w(z — D) — w(z — D — (5)VS (because w is concave) and the Dominated 
Convergence Theorem (Royden 1963). 
2. NEW FEATURES OF THE MODEL 
The results in this paper relax the assumptions of the previously cited 
papers in five important ways. First, many of our results do not assume that 
single-period utility depends only on consumption, that is G(x, y) = g(x — y). 
In renewable resource models, the benefits of a harvest x, —y 1  are offset by 
harvesting costs that typically depend separately on the stock size x, and the 
amount harvested x, — y,. 
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Second, when the utility function does depend only on consumption, we 
assume neither g'(0)= +co nor strict concavity of g(•). Neither assumption 
is salient for many renewable resource models. However, one or both of the 
assumptions is found in most of the cited references, most particularly 
Bewley (1977), Brock and Mirman (1972), Mirman and Zilcha (1975), and 
Schechtman (1976). Thus their models fail to encompass either linear 
utilities or quadratic utilities, or both. These cases are empirically useful. 
Third, we avoid assumptions about se , •) (ins (1.2)) that would block 
applications to renewable resource models. The Inada condition 
sr 1 (0, .) 	+ co, 	.5 111 (00, •),_-_- 
are not imposed. Note that the simple case s(y, d) = py + d violates the 
Inada condition as do quadratic functions. For several of the results it is not 
assumed that s(•, d) is nondecreasing for each fixed value d of D 1 . We avoid 
continuity and ordering assumptions about s(y, •) such as are found in 
Brock and Mirman (1972), Schechtman (1976), and Bewley (1977). When 
G(x, y) = p • (x — y), new results are presented that assume only pseudocon-
cavity of se , d) for each fixed value d of D ( . This last assumption is often 
made in models of renewable resources. 
Fourth, effective constraints are allowed in the model. We do not assume 
existence of interior solutions. In renewable resource models, the absence of 
Inada conditions typically causes some constraints to be active at an 
optimum. This makes the analysis more complex because it is no longar 
possible to assume that the derivative of an optimal value function equals 
g' (x, x — A ,,(x)). The methods of proof, therefore, differ significantly from 
those in previously cited papers. 
Finally, a unified treatment is presented for both the finite and infinite 
horizon problems. Our proof that the infinite horizon optimal policy A(x) is 
the limit of the A n (x)'s is more straightforward than those of Schechtman 
and Escudero (1977) (who assume s(y„ D,)= py, + Di ) and Brock and 
Mirman (1972) (who assume strict concavity, interior solutions and impose 
other restrictive conditions) although our model is sufficiently general to 
encompass renewable resource applications. 
Also, we present a straightforward short proof that a unique stationary 
distribution of wealth exists. The proof uses a result of Rosenblatt (1967) 
and is much shorter and simpler than proofs of essentially the same theorem 
by Brock and Mirman (1972), Brock and Majumdar (1975), and Mirman 
and Zilcha (1975). 
The model in Bewley (1977) is richer probabilistically than ours. 
Although his model requires G(x, y) = g(x — y) and s(y, d) y + d, g is 
stochastic with {(g„ D 1 ) being a stationary stochastic process. 
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3. ASSUMPTIONS 
The following assumptions are made in various combinations. 
(3.1) G is finite, concave, and continuous on C; 
(3.2) for each y, G(•, y) is nondecreasing on {x: (x, y) E C}; 
(3.3) G(x, y + y) — G(x, y) G(x + A, y + y) — G(x + A, y) for all 
y > 0, > 0 with all arguments in C; 
(3.4) G is nonnegative and continuous on C; 
(3.5) for each d, 	, d) is continuous and concave on the set 
Y U,E x Y(x); 
(3.6) for each d, s(., d) is continuous and concave on the set [0, y°(d)1 
and convex on the set [ y° (d), co); 
(3.7) for each d, 	, d) is nondecreasing on Y; 
(3.8) G(x, y) = p • (x — y), p 0; 
(3.9) Y(x) = 10, x ), x E X. 
Assumption (3.4) is slightly deceptive because several articles, including 
Phelps (1962), Hakaason (1970), and Miller (1974), have G(x, y) = 
log(x —y), for x -y > > 0. However, nonnegativity of G is equivalent to 
having a uniform lower bound. Suppose, for example, that G(x, y) —B if 
(x, y) E B (B > 0), and let G* (x, y) = G(x, y) + B. Then a policy is optimal 
with utility function G* if and only if it is optimal also for G. Moreover, G* 
is nonnegative on C. Assumption (3.3) is equivalent to supermodularity of G 
on C. Topkis (1978) discusses supermodularity and its consequences for 
optimization. 
4. OPTIMAL POLICIES 
From standard dynamic programming arguments, the generic problem of 
maximizing E 	, ce E 'G(x„ y,) leads to the recursion 
f„(x) = sup{J„(x, y): y E Y(x)}, 	x E X, 	 (4.1) 
y)= G(x, y) + aEf,,_,(s1 y, D1), 	y E Y(x), x E X 	(4.2) 
for n = 1, 2,... with f0(.) 0. The proofs of most results will exploit the 
following diminishing returns property of fn(•). 
THEOREM 4.1. Assumptions (3.1), (3.2), (3.5), and (3.9) imply for each 
n that f„(-) is continuous, concave, and nondecreasing on X. 
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Proof. The proof that L(- ) inherits concavity and is nondecreasing is 
well known and will not be reproved. Our proof of continuity is new and 
simpler than related proofs in Brock and Mirman (1972) and Schechtman 
(1976). 
Let p be a metric on the space in which X lies. To initiate a contrapositive 
proof, suppose f„ experiences a discontinuity at x ° E X. Then there is a 
y° E Y(x° ) and a real number y > 0 with the property that for all real 
numbers S> 0 there exists x E X such that 
P(x, x ° ) < S 	and 	J„(x, Y) 'Y + 	Y° ), 	yE Y(x). (4.3) 
(Concavity precludes the reverse inequality for J). Because C is a convex set 
it is possible to select a subsequence (xi, yi) satisfying (4.3) and (xi , yi) 
(x°, y°). Therefore, contrary to assumption, J„ is discontinuous at (x°, y°). 
Continuity of n (x, .) on Y(x) for each x E X follows from (3.1), (3.5), 
and continuity of f,,_,(•) via Theorem 4.1. Compactness of Y(x) via (3.9), 
therefore, implies attainment of the supremum in (4.1) for each x E X and 
existence of an optimal policy. 
The next two theorems describe the dependence of A „(x) on x. They lead 
(in Corollary 4.2) to sufficient conditions for 0 < 1 dx < 1. Many 
authors have proved at least one side of this inequality for special cases of 
our model. 
THEOREM 4.2. Assumptions (3.1)—(3.3), (3.5), and (3.9) imply for each n 
that there exists A „( ) with the property 
	
A „(x') > A „(x) 	if x' > x. 	 (4.4) 
Proof The theorem would be true if, for 6 > 0, 
J,,(x' , A „(x)) — J,,(x), A „(x) — 6) > J„(x, A „(x)) — J „(x, A „(x) — 6) > 0. 
The right inequality is implied by the optimality of A „(x). The left inequality 
would be implied by 421 (•, y) being nondecreasing on ix: (x, y) E C}. From 
(4.2), 
421 (x, y) = G E2I (x, y) + E 	i (s[ y, 	sIll(y, D) 
so (3.3) completes the proof. 1 
Theorem 4.2 requires neither G(x, 	g(x — y) nor strict concavity. It 
assumes concavity of se , d) but not monotonicity. Theorem 4.3 obtains a 
further result when G(x, y) _=_ g(x — y) and Y(x) 10, xi. 
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THEOREM 4.3. Assumptions (3.1)—(3.3), (3.5), (3.9), and G(x, y) 
g(x — y) imply for each n that there exists A „(•) with the property 
0 <A„(x')—A„(x)...<x' —x 	if x<x' 	 (4.5) 
Proof The left inequality is (4.4). To prove the right one, let z = x — y 
and rewrite (4.1) and (4.2) as 
f„(x)= 	„(x, z): 0 <z <xi, 	x E X, 
H „(x, z) = g(z) + aEf,, ,(s[x — z, DJ). 
The right side of (4.5) would be valid if 
0 < I/121 (x + 6, z) — H „12 (x, z) 
= aE(f'„_,(s[x — z, 	sul(x — z, D) 
— f;,_,(slx + 6 — z, 	si l 1 (x + — z, D)J 	(4.6) 
for 6 > 0 as will be shown. 
Concavity of s(•, d) implies 
si l i(x + — z, d) < s111 (x — z, d). 
If 51 ' 1 (x + (5— z, d) 0 then concavity implies s(x — z, d) < s(x + (5 — z, d) 
so 0 ,>.-f'(slx + 6—z, cip <f'(s[x — z, di) and 
f„ ,(s[x + 6 — z, 	.9 111 (x + — z, d)..<f,,_,(s[x — z, d]) s 11 (x — z, d). (4.7) 
If 51 ' 1 (x + 6 — z, d) < 0 < s [11 (x— z, d) then (4.7) is trivial. If 0 > 
s 111 (x — z, d) ,>„ s" 11 (x — z + (5, d) then s(x— z, d) > s(x + 6 — z, d) because 
s(•, d) is concave. Concavity and monotonicity of f„_,(•) and these 
inequalities yield 
0 <f;,_1(s[x — z, di) 	i(sk + — z, 
o > sril(x — z, d) s 111 (x + 6 — z, d) 
and, therefore, (4.7), which proves (4.6). 1 
COROLLARY 4.1. The assumptions of Theorem 4.3 and 0 < A„(x 1 ) < x' 
for some x' > 0 imply 0 <A n(x) for all x > x'. 
COROLLARY 4.2. The assumptions of Theorem 4.3 imply 
0 < dA „(x)Idx < 1, 	x E , 	 (4.8) 
where _X ° denotes the interior of X. 
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Proof. From Theorem 4.4, A n (- ) is nondecreasing so its discontinuities, if 
any, are upward jumps. These jumps are precluded by A , i (x)— x being 
nonincreasing so A,,(•) is continuous. Monotonicity of A„(•) implies differen-
tiability except, possibly, on a set of measure zero where one-sided 
derivatives exist, so (4.6) implies (4.8). 1 
Corollary 4.2 treats a more general problem than Schechtman (1976) does 
and its proof seems more straightforward. 
An optimal policy, A „(x) can be described in further detail if 
Y(x) [0, x] and G(x, y) = p • (x — y) for p > 0. After substitution and 
rearrangement of terms, the optimization problem becomes: 
maximize E 	 +p 	a'1 (as[y„ Dr ] — 
r-r 
subject to 0 <y,<x,, t = 1,..., T. The first term, px„ is fixed. The second 
term, —a t-1y,, has y r =7.- 0 for an optimal policy (if a > 0). Therefore, an 
equivalent problem, in the sense of having the same optimal policy for all 
n > 1, is given by the following recursion: 
fn (x)=- sup {J,,(y): 0 <y <x}, 
where J„(y) = G(y) + aEfn _ i (s{y, D1) and G(y) = p • (aEs( y, D1 — y). 
Let 4, denote a global maximum of Jn (y). For x,, 4, it is optimal to 
consume x,, -4. If .1„(•) is pseudoconcave for all n, then it is 
straightforward to prove that an optimal policy is given by: 
A„(x)= x A x°. 
What conditions ensure pseudoconcavity of J„(y)? Corollary 4.3 is an 
immediate extension of Theorem 4.1. 
COROLLARY 4.3. Assumptions (3.4), (3.5), (3.8), and (3.9), imply: 
(i) J„(y) is concave and continuous, 
(ii) A „(x)=- x A 
Suppose 
s(y, 	= dc)(Y), 	P ID 0} = 1, 	 (4.9) 
and 
0(•) is pseudoconcave and continuous with mode at y,„. 
When both (3.6) and (4.9) are valid, y ° (- ) y ° y„, . 
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THEOREM 4.4. Assumptions (3.6), (3.9) and (4.9) imply 
A „(x) = x A x°, 
is optimal. 
Proof. Let p = E(D). At n = 1, x7=- inf[ y: 0'(y) < (al) 	<y° . 
We use f0 (.)1-_-- 0. The inductive assumption is that L _ ,(.) is concave 
nondecreasing on X. In 
J;,(1)) = P(alab' tyi — 1) + a01 (y) E (Df - Ii 1)0(Y)1) , 
the first term is nonpositive if y 	x; and the second term is nonpositive 
if y ,>-ym because then q)'(y)< 0 (while f'(•),>. 0 and P(D >>.- 0}= 1). 
Therefore, 4 < so A „(x) = x A x`,: and fn(x) = „(x A 4). It follows that 
L(-) is concave nondecreasing if J„(•) is concave on 10,41, which is now 
verified. 
J„( y) = 	— y) + 	- ID0(y)J ),  
whose first term is concave on [0, x °,2 ] because 0e) is concave on [0, y ° 1 and 
x °, <ym <y° . Concavity of the second term is implied by the inductive 
assumption, 0(y) being concave nondecreasing on [0, x °„1, and 
P{D _>.0} =1. 1 
Theorem 4.4 shows that, if s(y, d) = d0(y), the shape of OH beyond its 
mode doesn't effect an optimal policy in any significant way because an 
optimal policy always returns the state to the concave part of the curve. 
The properties assumed for s(., •) can be relaxed by making further 
assumptions about the distribution of D. A stochastic kernel K(x,y) is TP, 
if, for all x, < x, and y, < y2 , K(x„ y,) K(x, , y 2 ) > K(x .1' 1) K(x - y 2 ). TP, 
kernels include the exponential and range families of densities which contain 
the binomial, Poisson, gamma, and normal (with fixed variance) densities. 
THEOREM 4.5. Assumptions 	(3.9), 	(3.8) 	with 	p > 0, 	d) 
pseudoconcave and continuous for each d, and D with a continuous density 
function that is TP 2 implies: 
A „(x) = x A 
Proof. This theorem and Theorem 4.1 have similar proofs except it must 
be shown (a) that a convex combination (expectation) of pseudoconcave 
functions using a random variable with a TP, density is again 
pseudoconcave, and (b) that a nondecreasing nonnegative pseudoconcave 
function of a pseudoconcave function is again pseudoconcave. 
The first claim is Theorem 5.1 of Chapter 3 in Karlin (1968). The second 
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claim is proven here for differentiable functions. From the definition of 
pseudoconcave functions, f (0[• ]) is pseudoconcave if 
r(0[Y])0'(Y)(Y' — .Y)<.. 0 	implies f(y') <f(y) 
First, f'(•) 0 so the only pertinent case is O'(y)(y' y) < 0. The 
pseudoconcavity of 0(•) implies $(y') < (6( y). However, f•) is nondecreasing 
and pseudoconcave, so f(¢[ Y' I) f (01_ Y D. I 
5. EFFECTS OF THE CONSUMPTION HORIZON 
This section investigates the impact of the consumption horizon on the 
structure of an optimal policy and on its valuation. The following result 
presents sufficient conditions for a longer consumption horizon to induce a 
higher valuation, greater accumulation, and higher incremental benefits per 
unit of added capital. 
THEOREM 5.5. For each n and x E X: 
(a) Assumption (3.4) implies 
fn(x) <17, i(x); 	 (5.1) 
(b) Assumptions' (3.2), (3.3), (3.4), (3.7) and (3.9) imply 
A „(x) < A „, ,(x); 	 (5.2) 
n(x, Y + y) — Jn(x- Y) < In+ 	Y + y) 	n +1(x, 3) ) , 
y > 0 	f (x, y) E C and (x, y + y)E C; 	(5.3) 
fr,(x + y) f n (x) <f„ ,(x + y) f, „(x) 	if x + y E X, y>o.(5.4) 
Proof (a) f0 (•) -m- 0 initiates a straightforward inductive proof of (5.1) 
that uses (3.4). 
(b) Observe that (5.3) is supermodularity (cf. Topkins (1978)) of 
y) in (y, n) for each x, and (5.4) is supermodularity of f,,(x) in (x, n). If 
r(a, b) is supermodular in (a, b) and M(•) is nondecreasing then r(a, mIbl) 
also is supermodular in (a, b). Hence, if f, i (x) is supermodular in (x, k) for 
all k < n — 1 then (4.2) and (3.7) imply supermodularity of .1,(x, y) in (y, k) 
for all k < n. 
If Jk (x, y) is supermodular in (x, y, k) for all k < n and if C is a lattice 
Instead of (3.9) and convexity of X, it is sufficient to assume that Y(x) is a compact 
lattice for each x, C and X are lattices, and Y(x) is ascending on X. 
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then Theorem 6.2 in Topkis (1978) implies A _ ,(x) < k (x) for all k < n. 
Assumption (3.9) and convexity of X imply that C is a lattice so it remains 
to establish (5.4). 
Assumption (3.2) implies f,(x y)-f,(x) 0 (Theorem 1) so f0(•) 0 
implies (5.4) is valid for n = 0. Inductively, if (5.4) is valid for all n <k - 1 
then (5.3) is valid for all n <k. Then Theorem 4.3 in Topkis (1978) implies 
(5.4) for all n <k. 
We are grateful to Donald M. Topkis of Bell Laboratories for suggesting 
this line of proof. Our earlier version of Theorem 5.1(b) contained super-
fluous assumptions including concavity of G. 
The next result concerns the limiting behavior of fn and 	as n -> co. 
Suppose 
0 < a <1; (5.7) 
GH 1 (x, y) < co, 	(x, Y) E C; (5.8) 
G(x, •) is nonincreasing on Y(x), 	x E X; 
cc 




THEOREM 5.2. (a) Assumptions (3.1)-(3.5), (3.7), and (3.9) imply for 
each x E X existence of 
A(x)= lim A n(x). 	 (5.11) 
If G(x, y) = g(x - y) then 
0 <A(x 1 )- A(x)<x' - x, 	x < x. 	 (5.12) 
(b) Assumptions (3.1), (3.2), (3.4), (3.5), (3.7), (3.9), and (5.7)-(5.10) 
imply for each x E X existence of 
lim f,(x) 	 (5.13) 
II -.GC, 
with f(•) being concave and nondecreasing on X. 
Proof. (a) From (5.2) A „(x)<A„,_,(x)<x for every n and x. Hence, 
monotone convergence yields (5.11) and, via Theorem 4.3, it yields (5.12). 
(b) Optimality of A n (x), (5.9), (3.7), and fn 	nondecreasing imply 
fn(x) = G(x, „(x)) aEf,_,(s[A n (x), D „I) 
< G(x, 0) + aEf„ _ ,(s(x, D„)) 
< 	at-L EG(r,(x),0). 
;71 
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Concavity of G implies 
G(u, v) < G(u°, 	+ [Gt"(u° , 	G' 21 (0, v ° )1 v — 
for all (u ° , v ° ) and (u, v) E C. However, G(2) < 0 from (5.9) so 
.fn(x) < 	a"E[G(x, 0) + GI "(x, 0)(r t(x) x)] 
t-1 
CO 
EG(x, 0) — x0 11 (x, 0)11[1 — a] + 0 11 (x, 0) 11, at  rt (x), 
which is finite from (5.8) and (5.10). Therefore, f,(x),f 2 (x),..., is a bounded 
monotone sequence which implies (5.13). Monotone convergence implies 
that f,(•),f,(•),..., endow f(.) with their properties of concavity and 
monotonicity. I 
The next result uses a familiar argument from inventory theory (Sobel 
1970a) to prove that f(•) satisfies a functional equation analogous to (4.1). 
Let 
J(x, y) = G(x, y) + aEf(s[ y, D1), 
which exists by virtue of the following proof. The proof is much simpler than 
those of similar theorems in Brock and Mirman (1972) and Schechtman 
(1976). 
THEOREM 5.3. Assumptions (3.1), (3.2), (3.4), (3.5), (3.7), (3.9), and 
(5.7)—(5.10) imply 
f(x) = sup {J(x, y): y E Y(x)}, 	x E X, 
J(x, A[x]). 
	 (5.14) 
Proof For all x and n, fn 1 (x) <f„ (x) so 
- 	Y) 	Y) .f(x) B(x) < co, 	y e Y(x), x E x, 
where B(x) is the bound developed in the proof of (b) in Theorem 5.2. 
Therefore, 1./ n (x, y) } is a bounded monotone sequence so J n (x, y) < J(x, y) 
and 
fn (x) = sup iJ,7 (x, y): y E Y(x)} < sup{./(x, y): y E Y(x)}. 
Convergence of fn to f implies 
f (x) < sup {J(x, y): y E Y(x) 1, 	x E X, 
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so the theorem will have been proved after establishing 
f (x) sup {. 1 (x , y): y E Y(x)}, 	x E X. 
	(5.15) 
Monotone convergence implies 
f(x) > fn (x) = sup1./ „(x, y): y E Y(x)1, 
f(x) > lim sup 1J n (x, y): y E Y(x)1, 
n +co 
whereas the right side of (5.15) is 
sup{ lim J„(x, y): y E Y(x)1. 
n 
Therefore, for (5.15) it is sufficient to prove 
lim suPqn(x, Y): y  E Y(x)1 = sup{ lim J ,,(x, y): y E Y(x)}. 	(5.16) 
—.cc 	 rt "GO 
The existence of the limit on the left side of (5.16) is implied by (5.13). For 
each n, J „(x, •) is continuous on Y(x) = 10, xl so J „(x, J(x, •) uniformly 
on 10, x] because the Dominated Convergence Theorem implies 
Ef„ ,(st. , Di) Ef(si•, Di). Therefore, 
0 = lim sup{./(x, y) 	y): 0 y G xl, 
which implies (5.16) and, consequently, (5.15). 1 
A (.) inherits the properties of O n (.)). 
COROLLARY 5.1. The assumptions of Theorem 5.2(a) imply 
0 < A' (x) <1. 	 (5.17) 
6. ACCUMULATION USING A STATIONARY POLICY 
Suppose the same policy A (.), arbitrary and possibly suboptimal, but 
satisfying (5.12), is used each period. Then reinvestment and consumption 
each period t are given by A(x,) and x,—A(x,), where x, denotes the random 
asset level at the beginning of period t. Successive asset levels are connected 
by 
x, , = slA(x,), D,1, 	t= 1, 2,..., 	 (6.1) 
or, equivalently, by a kernel K(A(x), F) which is the probability of being in 
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X if A(x) is the action taken at state x E X (cf. Feller (1971)). More 
formally, consider the state space X with a Borel field of subsets B. Then 
K( , •) is a probability kernel if K(x, •) is a probability measure on B for 
each x E X and K(•, F) is a B-measurable function for each F E /3. 
Whether or not the Markov processes x, converge to a stationary 
distribution is an important question. Convergence results in certain cases 
are given in Brock and Mirman (1972), Brock and Majumdar (1975), 
Mirman and Zilcha (1975), Schechtman (1976), and Schechtman and 
Escudero (1977). By comparison with these papers, the approach here relies 
on properties of the stochastic kernel K(., •). Therefore, the proofs are more 
direct and do not in any essential way depend on scalar properties of x, and 
y, (although the theorems are presented only for this case). 
K( , •) induces the following operator T which takes bounded measurable 
functions h into bounded measurable functions: 
(Th)(x)= I K(x,dy) h(y). 	 (6.2) 
There is a dual representation which takes probability measures Q into 
probability measures; namely, for each F c X, 
(VT)(F)= Q(dx) K(x, F) 	 (6.3) 
(Rosenblatt 1967). The operator T is equicontinuous if it maps continuous 
functions into continuous function. For the remainder of this section, 
suppose X is a compact set, 0 E X, and s(•, d) is continuous; note that (5.12) 
implies continuity of A(.). Therefore, it is straightforward to show that 
K( , •) induces an equicontinuous family of transformations. Consider the 
following three conditions: 
(A) K(x, I) > 0 for all open intervals / c X. 
(B) There exists a compact subset L of X, such that for each x E L, 
K(x, L) = 1 and the operator T defined in (6.3) is irreducible on L in the 
sense of Rosenblatt (1967, p. 476). 
(C) Neither (A) nor (B) holds. 
Condition (A) is satisfied, for example, by models where s(•, •) is linear, 
as in Schechtman and Escudero (1977), where s(y, d) = ry + d. 
Condition (B) is often proven as a preliminary result, as in Section 3 of 
Brock and Mirman (1972). Condition (C) is important when determining if a 
stationary distribution concentrates all its mass at a single point. The three 
conditions separate the question of the existence of a unique stationary 
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distribution from the question of the existence of at least one, perhaps many, 
invariant measures on the set X, given some policy A(x). Some of the 
literature confuses the two questions. 
THEOREM 6.1. If X is compact and K•, .) induces an equicontinuous 
family of transformatrions, then: 
(i) There .iS at least one invariant measure on X. 
(ii) (A) implies there is only one invariant measure on X and it is the 
unique positive stationary distribution on X. 
(iii) (B) implies there is a unique invariant measure for each closed 
irreducible subset L of X, and this measure is the unique positive stationary 
distribution on L. 
(iv) Suppose also, for some y > 0, P{s(A[x}, D),> x} = 1 for all 
x E 10. y]. Let x* = sup{x: x E X} and suppose L = {x: y <x <x*} is 
irreducible. Then there is a unique stationary measure on X which has 
positive probability only on open intervals that intersect with L. 
(v) If 0 is an absorbing state then (C) implies that there is a unique 
stationary distribution concentrated at 0 (so P{lim inf xi = 0} = 1 and the 
process tends to gets arbitrarily close to 0). 
Proof. Part (ii) is Theorem 2 in Feller (1971, p. 272). Parts (i), (iii), (iv), 
and (v) are implied by Theorems 3 and 4 in Rosenblatt (1967) and 
Theorem 2.4 in Jamison (1964). I 
Boylan (1977) proves theorems similar to (iv) and (v) although his 
approach is different. Two examples illustrate the power of the theorem. 
First, for the models in Schechtman (1976) and Schechtman and Escudero 
(1977), part (ii) of the theorem immediately implies convergence to a unique 
stationary distribution. Second, the model in Brock and Mirman (1972) has 
an equicontinuous kernel on a compact set so it necessarily possesses an 
invariant measure. This avoids the lengthy argument in Section 4 of Brock 
and Mirman's paper. Moreover, our results depend on irreducibility of an 
operator on a subset of the set of states so one can focus on states that 
"communicate" rather than on fixed points of growth functions. This permits 
simplified proofs of the results in Section 3 of Brock and Mirman's paper. 
Boylan (1977) gives such a simplified proof. 
7. EXTENSIONS 
The results thus far concern a model whose structure is stationary over 
time and in which growth does not occur. These restrictions can be relaxed. 
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Suppose, for example, that utility alters with age or time as well as with 
wealth. Let Gk (x, y) denote the utility function appropriate to consumption at 
age n — k. Then all results in Section 4 and Theorem 5.1 remain valid if G is 
replaced by G, in the assumptions in Section 3. As one example that 
generalizes Hakaanson (1973), let Gk •, 0 if k > 1. 
If the random variables D„,D„_,,...,D,,D, exhibit a dependence, let 
D„_„ 3 denote a statistic of D,,..., D,_„, that is sufficient for 
D,. Let 0k  be a function which maps (T„, D„_,) into ,. Such functions 
must exist, because the entire past history is a sufficient statistic. Then the 
results in Sections 4 and 5 through Theorem 5.1 remained unchanged if each 
Y „(x) is a convex set and Y,(x) Y „(x') if x' > x for each n. If Y,(x) is 
appropriately convergent in n for each x, then generalization of 
Theorems 3.2, 5.3, and Corollary 5.1 can be obtained. 
Exogenous price processes arise when there is a random sequence of prices 
p„ p2 , such that 
G(x, y, p)= u(p[x — y]) 
and the constraint set is now Y(x, p) for each fixed value p of p. If the 
assumptions in Section 3 are valid for each fixed value p of p, then the results 
in Sections 4 and 5 are true for each fixed p. For example, Theorem 5.1 
becomes f„ _ ,(x, p) f„(x, p), A „ _ ,(x, p) <„ A „(x, p), etc. 
Undiscounted Utilities 
The results in Section 4, Theorems 5.1 and 6.1 are true for all values of 
the discount factor a > 0. If a 1 then generally f„(x) co as n co so 
Theorems 5.2b and 5.3 are uninteresting. The validity of Theorem 5.2a is an 
intriguing issue when a = 1. 
The overtaking criterion (see Brock and Mirman (1973); Brock and 
Majumdar (1975) and their references to the work of Von Weizsacker, Gale, 
and Gale's students; Denardo and Rothblum (1979)) is currently in vogue 
when utilities are undiscounted. Consider, instead, the average gain criterion 
from the theory of Markov decision processes, namely, 
F(ZI x) = lim 	G(xf , yi)IT 
T -■00 j = 
(7.2) 
and search for a gain-optimal policy Z* such that 
1-(Z* ix) = st.zm F(Z I x) 	for all x E X. 
It can be shown that a policy is gain optimal if it is overtaking optimal 
(using lim in the definition). The converse is generally false so gain 
optimality is a weaker criterion than overtaking optimality. 
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Blackwell (1962), Derman (1962), and subsequent writers have explored 
the connection between the discounted criterion as a I 1 and the gain 
criterion. In order to apply Derman (1962) as in Sobel (1970b), suppose X is 
a finite set and Y(x) is a finite set for each x E X. Then C is a finite set so 
the set A, of mappings from X to Y (i.e., x is mapped into Y(x) for each 
x E X) is finite. Let A denote the finite subset of A, that comprises mappings 
satisfying (5.12). Thus A is finite too. 
If a < 1, Theorem 5.2(a) asserts the existence of an optimal policy that is 
a member of A. Let A(x, a) denote the dependence on a < 1 of such a policy 
and let a„a2 ,... satisfy a, <1 for all k and a,—■ 1. Then A(•, a,) is an 
element of A, a finite set, so the sequence A(•,a,),A(•,a,),..., must contain a 
subsequence all of whose members are the same element of A. Let A(•)E A 
denote the policy corresponding to such a subsequence a„( , ) , a„( , ) ,..., i.e., 
A(.) Ae, a . Then the argument in Derman (1962) 
establishes 	
n(2)) 	 • • • 
1"(A(•)1x)= lim (1 — a ,, ( , ) )fix, a n( „) ), 	x E X, 
k 
1-(A (•)1 x) = sLzip T(Z, x), 	 x E X, 
where f(x, a) makes explicit the dependence of f ( • ) on the value of a < 1. 
Therefore, A(.) is gain optimal. But A(•) E A so A(.) satisfies (7.3). 
Let N denote the set of natural numbers {0, 1, 2,...}. Then the preceding 
argument justifies the following claim. 
THEOREM 7.1. If X = 40, 1, 2,..., a} for some a E N and Y(x) = 
1[0, xj n N }, x E X then the assumptions of Theorem (5.2a) imply existence 
of a gain-optimal policy that satisfies (5.12). 
It would be interesting to verify Theorem 7.1 without restricting X and 
Y(x) for each x to be finite sets. If only X is finite, then the problem still 
seems surprisingly delicate. Suppose in this case there exists 
A (x) lim A (x, a), 	x E X. 	 (7.4) 
n 
Results of Fox (1967) show that A() may not be gain optimal unless the 
Markov chain structure induced by A(.) is also the chain structure induced 
by every one of A(•, a,), k = 1, 2,..., where a, T  1. 
The difficulty of establishing (7.4) is another obstacle to generalizing 
Theorem 7.1. The difficulty does not seem to stem from finiteness of X. One 
might conjecture that optimal consumption is a nonincreasing function of a 
so that A (x, •) is nondecreasing for each x E X. Then the limit in (7.4) would 
exist because A (x, a) E Y(x) so A (x, a) x from Y(x) 10, and A (x, -) 
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would be a bounded monotone function. To establish monotonicity of A (x, -) 
one might exploit Theorem 5.2(a) and first establish monotonicity of A n (x, •) 
for all n (let the dependence on a of A n (x) and fn(x) be explicit). A 
straightforward inductive proof shows for each n that fri (x, a) is concave and 
nondecreasing as a function of a. However, this property does not ensure 
monotonicity for A n (x, •). An argument similar to the proof of Theorem 4.2 
shows that a sufficient condition would be 43) (x, y, a) nondecreasing in a 
(for each n, x, and y). In turn, J„(2) (x, y, •) would be nondecreasing if 
fn
(1) i (x, a) were a nondecreasing function of a (for each x). This last step has 
not been accomplished nor is there a counter example. 
Bewley (1977) proves, essentially, that A(x, -) is nondecreasing for each 
x E X when X = R , Y(x) = [0, xi, s(y, d) y + d, and G(x, g(x y) is 
differentiable and strictly concave. The steps of his proof are similar to those 
above which we had previously outlined. 
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Stochastic Games, Oligopoly Theory, and 
Competitive Resource Allocation 
MARTIN SHUBIK AND MATTHEW J. SOBEL 
1. Introduction 
An oligopolistic market is one with only a few firms that supply the 
commodity being purchased. Oligopoly theory, until recently, evolved 
without regard to the institutional details encountered in specific markets 
and without addressing the role played by time. Oligopoly models were 
treated statically, or at best, conversationally dynamically. However, 
dynamic oligopoly models have been analyzed with increasing frequency 
in recent years and some of these analyses are responsive to institutional 
details. 
Here we compare the literature on dynamic models of oligopoly with 
our intepretation of the objectives of oligopoly theory. We use discrete 
time-sequential games, sometimes called "stochastic games," as a canoni-
cal form in which to discuss the issues. The stochastic game model 
encompasses many interesting oligopoly models and it seems to offer an 
appropriate level of generality to address research needs. Incidentally, we 
do not believe that there is any importance to economic theory associated 
with the distinction between continuous and discrete time models, i.e., 
between stochastic games and differential games. In principle, the discus- 
MARTIN SHUBIK • Cowles Foundation, Yale University, New Haven, Connecticut. 
MA 1'1 HEW J. SOBEL College of Industrial Management, Georgia Institute of Tech-
nology, Atlanta, Georgia. 
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sion could be couched in terms of continuous time models instead of 
stochastic games. 
We believe that the primary objective of oligopoly theory is to 
provide an understanding of pricing and resource allocation over time in 
large firms, and the consequent market behavior of such firms. We begin 
by enumerating some issues involving dynamics that are inherent in this 
goal. We sketch a general stochastic game model and use the model to 
address the task of constructing satisfactory dynamic oligopoly models. 
This effort in part becomes a specification of research needs and oppor-
tunities in stochastic game theory and oligopoly theory. At this stage in 
the development of both subjects, it is useful to identify problems rather 
than only describe past accomplishments. Section 5 cites specific recent 
results, and Section 6 presents a blending of problems in optimization and 
survival. 
2. Dynamical Issues in Oligopoly 
What are some characteristics of the dynamics of pricing and re-
source allocation in large firms, and their consequent market behavior? 
Here, we mention three kinds of problems. First, there are the dynamics 
of the composition of the set of firms in the market. This "entry and exit" 
problem in oligopoly is the subject of current research but most analyses 
have either been static or ignored the multiplicity of "players" in such 
games. A closely related problem is how to distinguish "competition 
among the few" from "competition among the many." The modeling 
issue is how large must a market become in order for gamelike individual 
behavior to become unimportant. Second, in a given oligopolistic market, 
why do prices fluctuate as they do? In most markets, the prices fluctuate 
more slowly than the prices of the factors comprising the inputs in the 
production process. This phenomenon of "sticky prices" is widely recog-
nized but has hardly been analyzed in a dynamic oligopoly model. Lastly, 
in some oligopolistic markets, there is one firm that acts as a leader in 
changing the price level. Why? Why is there price leadership behavior in 
some markets but not in others? Why might a firm act passively as a 
follower under some conditions but bolt the pack under other conditions? 
Another collection of dynamical issues concerns the role of informa-
tion in market behavior. How do firms tacitly communicate their objec-
tives, strategies, and threats to one another? How do divisions of a large 
firm communicate with one another so that their decentralized actions are 
mutually supportive of the overall goals of the firm. This is the general 
problem of managerial control. Furthermore, how do accounting conven- 
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tions affect firm and market behavior? Technically, this question can be 
posed in terms of alternative aggregations of information. Lastly, what 
are the effects of imperfections in information, particularly those due to 
delays in transmission of information? Little progress has been made on a 
general treatment of this last issue and the prior one has been analyzed in 
some detail only in static models (Ref. 1). 
What are the effects of market size? Most facets of this issue are not 
particularly dynamical in nature but we should know how to analyze them 
in dynamic models. As one example, what is the effect on product quality 
of the number and size of firms that are competing? An issue that is 
primarily dynamical is the dependence of the number of firms in the 
market upon the time rate at which information spreads, and vice versa. 
Preference structures have been treated somewhat incidentally in 
oligopoly theory. Important research on intertemporal preference order-
ings is currently being done (Ref. 2) for models of individual decision-
making over time. Comparable investigations of dynamic multiperson 
decision models have not yet begun. The situation becomes even more 
complicated if we construct "behavioral models of the firm" (Refs. 3 and 
4) that discard the notion of a single monolithic "decision maker" making 
all the decisions in each firm. The models in "team theory," for example, 
can be construed as noncooperative games among players having the 
same preference ordering over outcomes but differing in the information 
and the actions available to each. We have yet to see an investigation of 
sequential models of this kind. Lastly, the dynamic oligopoly models 
analyzed thus far are predicated on a scalar objective such as each firm's 
discounted operating profit. However, various economists argue that 
managers in firms behave as if they were maximizing vector objectives. 
Components other than profit might include rate of growth in sales, 
number of employees, share of the market, and survival. An important 
first step has been taken in the analysis of sequential games with vector 
payoffs (Ref. 5) but this general theory has yet to be applied to a dynamic 
oligopoly model. 
We now turn to some issues of constructing satisfactory dynamic 
oligopoly models. The canonical form of a general stochastic game will be 
useful for that purpose. The next section briefly defines a stochastic game 
and enumerates some notions on the "solution" of such a model. 
3. Stochastic Games 
Let I be a set of players, S a set of states, and As a set of actions 
available to player i E I when the process is in state s E S. These sets are 
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assumed to be nonempty. The composite action of all the players, when 
the process is in state s, must be an element of C5 = X ,„ A's. We write 
a =(a') E Cs . An outcome of a stochastic game is a sequence 
s 1 , a 1 , s2 , a2, , where a, E Cs , for all t. Let W= {(s, a): a E C„ s e 
The dynamics are determined by the decision rules used by the 
players to choose their actions and by a collection {q(• I s, a): (s, a) E 
of probability measures on B„ the Borel subsets of S. For any period t 
and H E Bs , if s, = s and a, = a then q(H I s, a) is the probability that 
s,+ 1 E H. 
A two-person zero-sum matrix game is a special case of a stochastic 
game where S is a singleton. It is easy to see that in such a game, in 
general, one may wish to admit randomized strategies. This complicates 
the measurability and integrability issues that are already embedded in 
the one-person stochastic game, namely, the Markov decision process. 
Our exposition suppresses these issues, which are the subject of some 
current research on stochastic games. The interested reader should read 
the fine survey by Parthasarathy and Stern (Ref. 6) and the excellent 
recent paper by Whitt (Ref. 7). 
With the preceding caveat, let 71-' denote the set of player i's 
nonanticipative decision rules (including rules that are history dependent 
and randomized) for choosing a:, for each t, on the basis of the outcome 
to date, namely, s 1 , a 1 , , s,__ 1 , a,_,, s,. The stationary policies are 
particularly interesting decision rules. Let DS be the set of probability 
measures on the Borel subsets of A. An element of Ds' can be used to 
choose a randomized action when the game is in state s. Let A' = 
X seS Ds, A = X iel A', and 7r = X , E , IT ' . An element of 7T is a policy. A 
policy y E 7 is stationary if there exists S E A such that y = (8, 8, 8, ...) so 
5(s,) for all t. We write y = 8 - in this case. Let A- denote the subset 
of stationary policies in 7T. Finally, it is convenient to represent any y c 7 
as (y', y - '), where y -` E 7'. 
There has been some research on the ergodic properties of {(s„ a t )} 
induced by stationary policies (cf. Refs. 8 and 9) but most literature 
concerns real-valued payoff functions. Let r'(s, a) denote the (expected) 
immediate reward to player i in any period t if the state s, is s and the 
composite action a, is a E Cs, . Let 0, be player i's single-period discount 
factor and let 
V' (y I  s)= 	13:-1 e(s„ a,) 
t=i 
v'(-y I s)= EV' (y s) 
denote the total discounted payoff and its expectation when y e 7T is the 
policy and s 1 = s is the initial state. Some literature concerns the average 
payoff per period rather than the discounted payoff but the latter is more 
(1) 
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appropriate for oligopoly and other open (or partial equilibrium) 
economic models. 
A policy y E 7r is said to be an equilibrium point relative to H S iff 
v`(y 1 s) = sup 11.)'(p, y -1 ): p 	s E H, iEI. 	(2) 
We say simply that y is an equilibrium point if it is an equilibrium point 
relative to S. An equilibrium point relative to H is noncollusively optimal 
for every initial state in H and every player. Shapley (Ref. 10), in a 
magnificent early paper, established existence of an equilibrium point 
amongst stationary policies in a two-player model with U seS AS being a 
finite set for each player and r' (• , •) + r2(•, •) = 0. More general existence 
results concern nonzero sum games played by more than two players 
(Refs. 6, 7, 11, 12). Also, Henig (Ref. 5) has recently established the 
existence of an equilibrium point for games where r i (., -) is vector-valued. 
4. Modeling Issues 
We have observed that the extent theory fails to explain why price 
leadership occurs and which firms are likely to be followers while others 
are leaders. More generally, there is no satisfactory sequential analogue 
to "cooperative" theory for static games. The primitive element in most 
of the cooperative static theory is the coalition, namely, a subset of the 
players who join together for mutual benefit. However, a satisfactory 
dynamic theory must admit changes in coalition composition as time 
passes, but the present theory does not include this feature. 
Another modeling issue stems from the embarrassment of riches 
provided by the size of the set of equilibrium points. It is known that the 
size of this set increases as information conditions in a game proliferate 
(cf. Ref. 13). Therefore, oligopoly models that strive to include the design 
of information systems and managerial control may induce distressingly 
many equilibrium points. The problem is to decide which one, more 
generally which subset, is the appropriate object for analysis. We believe 
that the solution to this problem should vary depending upon the context 
which motivates the model. In other words, behavioral considerations and 
institutional details should direct our definition of "the appropriate object 
for analysis." 
It has already been mentioned that no satisfactory canonical model 
exists to analyze the effects of imperfections in information due to delays 
in transmission. Indeed, the intricacy of the analysis in a relatively simple 
case analyzed by Scarf and Shapley (Ref. 14) is alarming. We doubt that a 
Bayesian approach is appropriate here although one of us has explored 
this elsewhere (Ref. 8). The extant theory of stochastic games would 
94 	 Martin Shubik and Matthew J. Sobel 
oblige us to assume that each firm knows the prior distribution held by 
every other firm. 
Careful modeling of many industries leads to the explicit inclusion of 
bankruptcy conditions in a model. Such conditions exemplify "exit fees" 
in the class of Markov decision processes called stopping problems. There 
are several interesting qualitative results concerning the structure of 
optimal policies in stopping problems. As yet, there is no comparable 
theory for "stopped sequential games." The development of such a 
theory might have a payoff for oligopoly theory by offering a deeper 
understanding of the effects of alternative bankruptcy laws and the 
dynamics associated with the entry and exit of firms from an industry. 
One of us has suggested a class of "games of economic survival" to pick 
up the ruin posibilities (cf. Section 6; Refs 15 and 16). 
This list of modeling issues is necessarily brief and we have not 
discussed some pertinent material. Aumann (Ref. 17) has developed 
results for "supergames." A supergame is a sequence of static games in 
which the nature of the static games is not contingent on players' past 
actions. The case of the same static game at each point (in the sequence) 
has been investigated more than any other. This case is a stochastic game 
with iS! = 1. Friedman (Ref. 18) analyzes this case in oligopoly models. 
He focuses on "reaction function" strategies; each player's present deci-
sion is contingent on the opponent's preceding decision. Such decision 
rules induce a stochastic game in which S is the set of player's possible 
single-game decisions. Recently, Rosenthal (Ref. 19) has investigated 
sequences of games with varying opponents. His point of view may be 
useful for construction of dynamic models of entry and exit in oligopoly. 
Shefrin (Ref. 20) has interesting results for dynamic market games with 
incomplete information. 
5. Specific Results 
Stochastic game models of oligopoly, even with the limitations enum-
erated above, are forbiddingly complex. Nevertheless, some progress has 
been made either by reducing the potential complexity or by building a 
model for a particular kind of industry and then posing correspondingly 
special questions. First, we discuss the reduction of complexity. 
Stochastic game models are difficult to analyze because the number 
of players is greater than one, so the players interact with one another, 
and because the game process extends over time and each player indulges 
in a variety of intertemporal tradeoffs. Several writers (see Ref. 21 and 
references therein) have suppressed the complexity owing to the interac-
tion of firms by analyzing models of leader—follower behavior where the 
identities of the leader and followers are known at the outset. The 
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problem is then the selection of an optimal dynamic policy by the leader 
and this latter problem is a (one-person) Markov decision process which 
is much less complex than a stochastic game. 
Another suppression of complexity has been obtained by preserving 
a multiplicity of players (firms) but reducing the original dynamic game to 
a static game. Specifically, an equilibrium point of a stochastic game is 
said to be myopic if it consists of the ad infinitum repetition of an 
equilibrium point of a static game. The principal sufficient conditions 
(Ref. 22), satisfied by various dynamic oligopoly models, are: 
for each i E I and (s, a) E W, r'(s, a) depends additively on the state 
s and action a, i.e., there are functions K' and L' such that 
r'(s, a) = K'(a) + L'(s); 	 (3a) 
transition probabilities depend on the actions taken but not on the 
state from which transition occurs, i.e., 
q(H I s, a) = p(H I a) 	for all H E B, and (s, a) c W; (3b) 
suppose the static game r, defined below, has an equilibrium point 
a* in pure strategies and let S * = {s: s E S, a * E C.J. Then 
p(H a*) = 1 for all H E B, having S * c H, i.e., if S I E S* then a* 
is repeatable ad infinitum (with probability one). (3c) 
Let 6(a) be a random variable with the measure p(. I a) in (3b). Then I is 
the set of players in the static Nash game F, player i's payoff function is 
K'(a) + 0,E[L'((a))1, a E H teI Ai, and player i has available the set of 
moves A' = H —sEs A. If a* is randomized then there is an assumption 
comparable to (3c). It follows from (3) that a, = a* for all t is an 
equilibrium point [in the stochastic game sense of (2)] relative to S*. 
Numerous Markov decision processes in the literature satisfy (3) but 
the myopia of their optimal policies was either overlooked or deduced by 
special and sometimes intricate arguments. Also, various oligopoly mod-
els satisfy (3). Kirman and Sobel (Ref. 23) assume that firms make 
production and pricing decisions each period and that they have linear 
production costs and arbitrary single-period inventory-related costs. The 
oligopoly model in Sobel (Ref. 24) focuses on advertising decisions. It is 
assumed there that each firm's demand each period is a random variable 
whose distribution depends on all firms' "goodwill." The goodwill is an 
exponentially weighted moving average of past amounts spent on adver-
tising. Myopia has been applied to other oligopoly models where the 
competition involves expenditures on research and development, expan-
sion of capacity, and the harvesting of interacting fish species in a coastal 
fishing industry (Ref. 25). 
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6. Games of Economic or Social Survival 
The goals of profit maximization or cost minimization are present in 
many economic models. Games of survival, as characterized by Shubik 
(Ref. 15), stress the binary outcomes of survival or nonsurvival. Yet in 
many social, ecological, and economic processes the goals include both 
survival and optimization of the quality of life for the survivor. 
Below we describe a general class of games of social or economic 
survival. With notational changes, they can be recast as stochastic games. 
An n-person game of economic survival is described as follows by 
a' (t); W, ; B; ;SI;LI; klr; ; and V', 
where 
a'(t), i =1, . . . , n, are the single-period payoffs faced by the players 
at time t. The payoffs depend on actions described below and will in 
general depend upon time. 
W„ i = 1, . . , n and t = 1, 2, ... , are the wealths of the players at 
the start of time 1. Initial assets Wi and Viq are given as parameters. 
B' are the ruin conditions, bankruptcy levels or "absorbing barriers,” 
for the player; i.e., if the assets (or strength or viability) of a player i drop 
to below B', that individual is out of the game. 
S' are the survival values; i.e., if individual i is the sole survivor in 
the game, S i is the present value of the remaining one-person game. 
L' are the liquidation values. If an individual i is ruined, he may still 
have residual assets at the point of ruin. The value of these assets is given 
by U. 
‘If' are discount factors. We assume that each individual has a 
discount factor on future consumption. The If' could be dependent upon 
the age of the individual, thus reflecting life-cycle considerations. 
T is the time at which bankruptcy (if any) occurs: 
T = inf {t: (W:, 14/) z (B', B 2 )}. 
V' is the payoff function to player i. It cannot be fully specified until 
the strategies and the relationship among income, consumption, and 
survival are specified. 
Two versions are given, the game where pure survival is the goal and 
the game where the maximization of expected discounted consumption 
[or utility 4)`(•) of consumption] is optimized. 
At the start of any time t an individual i has W;. A Markov strategy 
by an individual i is a plan for the selection of an investment amount x; 
and a consumption amount b't dependent upon W, = , W7). 
= 
	W;+ a'( x:, 	x;`) — 	— x;], 
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where 0 < x; + b; < W; and 6,, 62, . are independent and identically 
distributed random variables. 
For the game of pure survival, 
f 1 	if W; > B' for t = 1, 2, ... , 
t 0 otherwise. 





> 	t = 1, . . . , oc, 
and game continues indefinitely 
t 
E (4,;),_,4),(bf) 	('Ii)Ts7 	> 	t = 1, ... T, 
and game continues until T 
E ory-10.(N) + (41') TL', 	> B', t = 1, . . . , T — 1, 
WT B k , and game continues 
until T — 1. 
For either criterion, let J indicate which player (if either) is ruined: 
J = 
0 	if T = oc, 
j if Wir ar. 
Then, for either criterion, consider the vector (V', V 2 , T, J). The 
adoption of a policy by the players induces a (joint) probability distribu-
tion of this vector and we may compare the distributions induced by 
alternative policies. An obvious comparison is according to v' = E(V'). 
For example, in the pure survival criterion, v` = 	V' = 	= 
Although we shall not pursue the matter here, the two criteria can be 
treated in a unified manner by first defining an appropriate stochastic 
game. 
6.1. A "Guns or Butter" Example 
A two-player example illustrates the tradeoff between consumption 
and survival. Let b, and x, denote player l's consumption and investment 
in period t and let d, and y, denote the same amounts for player 2. 
Let 
A 	xi 	if x, + y, > 0, 
a l(t) 	 Y` 
0 	if x, = y, 	0, 
A 	if x, + y, > 0, 
a 2(t) = 	xi + Yi 
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Let WI- = M; 	= m; 13 1 = B2 = L 1 = L2 = 0, S 1 = S2 = A/(1 - xlf); 
Ti (c) = c; Alf 1 = x1f2 = 111 , where 0 < I < 1. Say 	b, and 	d„ 
If the goals are pure survival then x, = y, = b, = d, = 0 gives 
= Olt > 0, nit-F1 = 	> 0, where 6 > 0 is a random variable. 
If the goals are maximization of expected consumption then if a 
solution with joint survival is feasible, player 1 wishes to 
CO 
max E E (Ar)t -i b„ 	b, 0, 	x, ?0 
b,,x 	t=1 
subject to 0 	b„ 0 	x„ 
Lit + 
and 
= 	- b, + A ( 	x,1 x, + y, 
and player 2 wishes to 
CO 
max E E (11r) t-I d, 
t= 1 
subject to 0 	d„ 0 	y„ 
d, + y, < m, 
and 
171 N-1 	— d, + A ( 	)1' ) 	yd. + y, 
Let 11 = E[ 1 ]. If 4' .t 	1 and P{ 	IlftL/21 = 1 (for which 
Pif 	= 1 is sufficient) then we can show that there is a myopic 
equilibrium point with respect to {(M 1 , 	(M1, ml) TPA/4 ( 1 , 1 )} 
given by 
x, = y, = 	Alf/4, 	 for t = 1,2, ..., 
b, = d, = A(4-1 - Tii)/4, 	for t = 2, 3, 	, 
	
b, = M1 - 	 d 1 = m 1 - ptak1/14 
and expected payoffs are 
CO 
= M1 - Attlif/4 + E 	- 
t= 2 
= M1 + Ai.011/[4(1 - 111)], 
v 2 = rrt, + Attlif/[4(1 - 111)]. 
If P{fi < 111g/2} > 0, or (M1 , m i) Ti2A/4(1, 1), or Tit > 1 then the 
analysis and solution become complicated. 
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The "net earnings" or gains from competition are given by the terms 
x, 
A 
x, + y, 
These portray the resource struggle or the "battle conditions." The 
payoffs involve only the b„ i.e., the resources drawn off for consumption. 
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Part II 
Dynamical Theory of the Economics of 
Extractive Natural Resources 
Naturally growing extractive resources are renewable or nonrenewable, 
depending on whether they are regenerated at significant rates over time. 
Examples of renewable resources are fisheries, forests, and ground water; 
of nonrenewable resources, hard minerals and the hydrocarbon fuels. 
While Hotelling applied the calculus of variation to the nonrenewa-
ble resource problem as early as 1931, systematic though simplistic 
treatment of the inherently dynamic model problems did not begin until 
the late 1950s. Recent years have witnessed a flourishing body of 
economic literature applying modern control theory to extractive re-
sou. ,:es. 
The recent energy crisis and the extension of jurisdiction over marine 
fish stocks have given rise to numerous concerns in the public sector. 
Principal among the concerns are the resource scarcity and exploration, 
production efficiency and distribution under alternative market structures 
and institutional arrangements, and optimal policies to achieve various 
social goals. The five papers in this part treat various aspects of these 
important issues. 
The essence of the extractive resource problem is a differential 
equation of the form 
F(x) — h(t), 	 (1) 
where x(t) is the size of resource stock at time 1, F(e) is the rate of natural 
growth, and h(t) is the rate of extraction. For nonrenewable resources, 
the growth rate is negligible and F(•) = 0. The typical problem is to 
optimize some functional subject to (1) and examine the intertemporal 
path of h(t) and possibly other control variables. 
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As Clark has pointed out, harvesting of renewable resources is a 
problem of managing a flow of goods and can be studied on a capital-
theoretic framework. In this respect, the problem is analogous to that of 
economic growth. Stability of a steady-state solution is often one of the 
most crucial points in the analysis of such a problem, because it pertains 
to the question of whether a species could be sustained at a certain level 
under some harvesting policy. Clark's book on optimal management of 
renewable resources contains a comprehensive treatment of many aspects 
of the problem. 
In this part, Clark extends his results on optimal harvesting policies 
for sole ownership of a fishery resource property to the case of multi-
ownership of a common property. The problem is formulated as an 
N-person nonzero-sum differential game. Under the assumption that 
competition exists among all agents, a Nash equilibrium solution is 
obtained. With such a solution, the more "efficient" agent may be able to 
eliminate his competitors if the level of stock is reduced to an appropriate 
level. He may even be able to operate at the optimum level of sole 
ownership if the effective advantage is large. A more general model of 
restricting each agent's input level is also discussed. With relatively simple 
models and mathematical analysis, this paper presents and discusses many 
economic issues in the exploitation of common property fishery resources 
by using the game-theoretic approach. 
For an exhaustible resource, the differential equation describing the 
process of exploitation is simpler, since F(•) = 0. But despite the simplic-
ity of the equation, the problem is often complicated by many factors. For 
one thing, the amount of reserve is usually not exactly known and 
remains to be determined as exploitation goes on. This requires stochastic 
and adaptive control techniques. When stochastic models are used, the 
firm's policies are very much dependent on its attitude toward risk (risk 
taking or risk averse) and the degree of uncertainties as measured by 
some statistical parameters. The mathematical complexities increase as 
more economic aspects are taken into consideration. Basically, this is a 
bounded state control problem in which the steady-state solution no 
longer has the significance of a dynamic equilibrium; rather, it yields the 
final levels of accumulated extractions and determines whether the re-
source will be depleted. 
In Liu's paper, the problem of exploitation of exhaustible resources 
is tackled from a mathematical point of view. Some techniques for 
obtaining the optimum extraction rate for a firm over an infinite horizon 
are discussed. A general profit function and cost function associated with 
extraction are assumed. Uncertainty in the amount of reserve is also 
considered. He shows that at a fixed amount of accumulated extraction, 
the optimum extraction rate is always lower with uncertainty than without 
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uncertainty. A significant feature of the analysis is the use of the transver-
sality condition at infinity, from which the final level of accumulated 
extraction can be determined. Moreover, for n-firm exploitation, the 
transversality condition leads to an equilibrium condition among n firms 
under Pareto optimality. Different levels of accumulated extraction for 
different firms can also be obtained. 
Arrow and Chang employ a model that includes both exploration 
and consumption of uncertain natural resources. The resource is assumed 
to be Poisson distributed throughout a relevant area. The amount of 
(unknown) reserve and the unexplored area at any time are the state 
variables, while the rate of consumption and the exploratory effort are the 
control variables. The economy seeks to maximize the integral of a utility 
function minus the cost of exploration. This is an optimal control problem 
with a jump process. Using the method of dynamic programming, they 
derive the equivalent of Bellman's equation. From that equation, the 
optimal policy and the optimum return function are characterized. The 
optimum exploratory effort almost always alternates between zero and 
infinity, and the impact of such an alternation is examined. 
Lewis and Schmalensee investigate the implication of two inter-
mediate market structures for supplier behavior. The first is a market 
dominated by a cartel that maximizes its profit subject to the price-taking 
behavior of a competitive fringe of many suppliers. An interesting result 
of their analysis is that when allowed to misrepresent the true extent of its 
reserve holdings, the cartel's optimal policy is not to lie but to tell the 
truth. 
Lewis and Schmalensee also present a model of a Cournot—Nash 
oligopoly in which each firm is large enough to have some control over 
price. Existence and uniqueness of an equilibrium are established, and 
some comparative dynamic results are obtained under conditions of 
perfect information and homogeneous reserve holdings and extraction 
costs. 
It has been long recognized in resource economics that risk taking 
plays an important role in a competitive market and affects resource 
allocation. Sutinen examines the implications of royalties for production 
over time. He notes that producers of petroleum and other exhaustible 
resources typically do not own the resource but rather purchase a lease 
giving them the right to extract the resource. A common feature of 
such leases is payment to the owner a royalty plus a fixed amount 
of payment. 
Sutinen constructs a competitive model of the market for extractive 
rights, with resource owners being the suppliers and the producing firm 
the demander of the rights. Demand by consumers of the final product is 
assumed stochastic in all periods. Under these conditions, two sets of 
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leasing arrangements are analyzed: a fixed rental and a class of risk-
sharing arrangements involving royalty payments. The resulting sequence 
of production is characterized for each set of leasing arrangements and 
compared with the optimal production sequence. When both owners and 
firms are risk averse, Sutinen finds that royalties yield a production 
sequence superior to that of a fixed rental lease. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
This paper defines a class of incentive mechanisms for decentralized 
organizations when communication between the members of the organi- 
zation must, a priori, be iterative in nature. Payoff functions for the members 
of the organization are defined and these functions along with the set of 
possible member strategies are viewed as defining an N-person game. We 
define a solution concept for this game that has the following properties: 
the members of the organization (nontrivially) maximize their payoffs at 
a "solution" and the overall organizational goals are achieved by any 
"solution." 
Acting in accordance with the behavioral rules of the organization, i.e., 
"telling the truth," is shown to be among the "solutions" to the game. 
Thus, the members of the organization are shown to have an incentive to 
follow these rules, since doing so is an individually optimal strategy that is, 
in some sense, easy to calculate. . 
Arrow [ [] has defined the problem of organizational control as consisting 
of two parts: (1) the choice of operating (behavioral) rules, i.e., communi-
cation and decision making rules and (2) the choice of enforcement rules, 
i.e., rules that induce the members of the organization to follow the operating 
rules.' There is a vast literature in economics concerned with the definition 
and/or analysis of operating rules for decentralized organizations, theoretical 
planning procedures being the most obvious [2, I4, 181. 2 These various 
* This paper contains results from my Ph.D. thesis submitted to Northwestern Univers-
ity. I want to thank my advisor Theodore Groves for his encouragement and help. This 
paper has benefited greatly from comments by Matthew Sobel, David Nachman, and an 
anonymous referee. All errors, of course, remain my own. 
' Obviously, the enforcement rules defined for a particular organization must be tied 
to individual members' preferences, either directly or indirectly. 
2 The mathematical programming literature contains many different algorithmic proced-
ures whose economic interpretations are as decentralized planning procedures: e.g., the 
Dantzig—Wolfe decomposition algorithm [4]. In addition many economic planning 
procedures are based on mathematical programming algorithms: for example, Malinvaud's 
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literatures are concerned with normative analyses: Do procedures exist that 
have certain desirable properties.. 3 The procedures defined in the literature 
have several important characteristics in common: they inevitably involve 
iterative communication and they generally involve decentralized decision 
making, due to the size of the problems considered. None of these pro-
cedures deal with the provision of incentives (the definition of enforcement 
rules) to ensure that the operating rules are followed; they thus ignore the 
second part of the organizational design question. 
An important question is thus raised: Are there enforcement rules that 
make compliance with the behavioral rules in the best interests of the members 
of the organization.. If the answer to this question is no, then it is not 
necessarily true that these procedures will lead to a solution of the organi-
zation's overall problem. 
Until recently, very little work has been done on the specification of the 
enforcement rules, referred to in other contexts as the incentive problem. 
The existing work has examined the properties of classes of incentive mecha-
nisms [8, 13], investigated incentives in a team [9], and solved the "free rider" 
problem in a general equilibrium model with both public and private goods 
[12]. In all of this work, communication is noniterative in nature.' 
The model and analyses developed in this paper are in the same spirit 
as the model and analyses of Groves [10, 11] and Groves and Loeb [13]. 
These latter models will be referred to as "Groves schemes." Implementation 
of a Groves scheme requires each member of the organization to have suffi-
cient computational, storage (memory), and communcation capabilities 
both to determine the graph of the function it must transmit to the central 
decision maker and to make this transmission (without error) as a single 
message. The informational capabilities of most economic decision making 
units are severely limited in reality. The purpose of this paper is the explo-
ration of the economic implications of these limitations on the production 
and communication of information. 
As a first step in this exploration, this paper examines the incentive pro-
perties of a particular (rather general) scheme in which communication is 
iterative. This scheme implicitly reflects some limitations on computational 
capacity, memory, and communication capabilities of the members of the 
organization. It is only necessary that the members be able to calculate the 
"Procedure Implying Mathematical Programming at the Center" [18] is an inner-lineariza-
tion algorithm for a concave programming problem. For a discussion of some of the 
economic procedures, see [14]; of the mathematical programming algorithms, see [6]. 
"Nice" properties may be of the following type: efficient use of information, monoton-
icity, feasibility, etc. (see [14J). 
4 Groves and Loeb [13] use an iterative procedure to reconstruct functions (at least 
locally) by a Taylor series expansion. Dreze and de la Vallee Poussin [5] have dealt with 
incentives in a tatonnement-type procedure. 
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value of the function of interest at a particular point in its domain, and com-
municate an associated message. The iterative nature of the communication 
process implicitly captures the fact that the members of the organization 
can do no more than that without incurring real economic or time costs 
that may change the nature of the function itself. This would change the 
nature of the organization's problem, since information production and com-
munication efforts would have to be considered explicitly. 
The results obtained in this paper can be applied to establish the incentive 
properties of some decentralized planning procedures. Malinvaud's [18] 
"Procedure Implying Mathematical Programming at the Center" is a case 
in point. The firms in the economy compute and transmit, to a central 
authority, well-chosen points in their production possibilities sets in response 
to well-chosen price vectors sent by the central authority. It is easily shown 
that this procedure is a special case of the procedure developed in this paper 
(see Cohen [3]). While it is straightforwqrd to contract Malinvaud's pro-
cedure into a Groves scheme, this action would require the firms to have 
a communicable description of their entire production possibilities sets. 
In practice, however, knowledge of production possibilities is very often 
limited to the ability to determine outputs or an input—output vector for a 
given vector of prices. Hence, the use of an iterative scheme becomes feasible 
as well as prudent. Over an extended period of time, assuming fixed tech-
nology, it is possible that some firms may have more or less complete knowl-
ledge of some portions of their production possibilities sets. However, for 
a Groves scheme to be implemented, every firm must have complete, com-
municable knowledge of all of its production possibilities set. 
That the consequences of these informational limitations are not trivial 
is demonstrated by a comparison of the properties of a Groves scheme 
and the iterative scheme developed here. The existence of dominant strategy 
equilibria can be shown for a Groves scheme. In addition, "telling the 
truth" is one such equilibrium. Even though the iterative scheme developed 
in this paper is under certain circumstances informationally equivalent to 
a Groves scheme, one must settle for weaker results. 
In Section II, a model of a decentralized organization is defined. Strictly 
for ease of exposition, the analysis in this paper is couched in terms of a 
multidivisional firm that seeks to maximize overall firm profit. 
Given the iterative operating rules, the organizational design problem 
is defined in Section III as one of finding enforcement rules that lead to 
compliance with the operating rules. We then define (in Section IV) the 
problem for any member of the organization as the choice of messages to 
be sent to the central decision maker (the Center) at each iteration of the 
communication process, i.e., the choice of a strategy. The operating and 
enforcement rules and the set of possible member strategies are viewed 
as defining an N-person (non-zero sum) game in normal form. 
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It is assumed that this game is played noncooperatively. There are two 
possible ways of viewing the game. It could be viewed as a game in which 
payoff can be received only when the communication process has been run 
to its end and terminal decisions have been taken and/or implemented. 
This formulation does not allow us to deal with truncated communication 
and suboptimal decision making. Alternatively, one could view the game as 
one in which decisions can be taken and payoff recieved at any iteration. 
As a first attempt at an analysis of incentives when communication is 
iterative, we view the game as being of the first type. A natural solution con-
cept for such an N-person noncooperative game is that of the Nash equi-
librium. From a normative, or design, point of view, just knowing that a 
Nash equilibrium exists is not enough; in addition, one would like to know 
whether such an equilibrium will be attained. Thus, we might ask for the 
existence of a dominant strategy equilibrium that is, in some sense, easy to 
calculate. As was noted above, the iterative nature of communication pre-
cludes demonstrating the existence of such equilibria for the present game. In 
Section V, a "solution" to the game is defined as a Nash equilibrium that 
weakly dominates in the class of Nash equilibria; this definition avoids some 
of the possible ambiguities of multiple Nash points. 
In Section VI, a general class of operating rules is defined, and we demon-
strate the existence of enforcement rules with certain desirable properties. 
It is shown that any "solution" for the game, defined by these operating 
and enforcement rules, leads to a decision solving the organization's 
overall problem. In addition, a dominant strategy equilibrium is shown to 
exist for a restricted set of player strategies. Moreover, the equivalence class 
of "truthful" strategies is shown to be a subset of the class of restricted 
dominant strategy equilibria, as well as a subset of the set of "solutions." 
Finally, in Section VII, we discuss the applicability of our operating 
rules to existing decentralized planning procedures and mathematical pro-
gramming algorithms. 
II. A MODEL OF A MULTIDIVISIONAL FIRM WITH N-DIVISIONS 
Consider a multidivisional firm with N divisions and a corporate center 
(the Center). Each division has a profit contribution function Hp), where 
Hi(x) is the profit contribution by division i given the decisions x. 5 The 
Center's direct contribution to profit is denoted by the function 14(•). 6 
5 It is not specified, as yet, who makes the decisions. 
It has been pointed out that inclusion of the Center's contribution function does not 
preclude the application of a Groves (noniterative) mechanism, and that is indeed the case. 
The purpose of the present work is to investigate the incentive properties of mechanisms 
in which communication must be iterative. The /7„(•) function is included because, es-
pecially in the context of the multidivisional firm, one can envision situations in which the 
Center contributes to overall profit directly. 
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The L-dimensional vector x may represent an input vector of resources or 
x may be the level of a "public good" used by all the divisions and the 
Center. The total profit of the firm is the sum of each division's, and the 
Center's, profit contribution; i.e., total profit = E 2N—, He) ± He). The 
Center's problem is to choose the vector x, subject to constraints, to maxi-
mize the firm's profit. Formally, the Center's problem is assumed to be to 
solve 
(A) 	 Max E 111(x) ± T10(x) 	s.t. x E X 
where H : EfIL 	0:k is concave for all i = 0, 	N and X is a convex, 
compact set. More realistic models of decentralized organizations would 
permit nonconvexities in X and departures from concavity in the {H i(•)} 
but (A) is a reasonable starting point to develop a theory of control with 
iterative communication. 
Suppose that each division of the firm knows' its own profit contribution 
function Hi •), but not the functions of the other divisions. Also, suppose 
that these functions are not known by the Center either; however, it does 
know that they are concave. Only the Center knows that function H 0(.) and 
the set X. 
Since the Center does not know the divisions' H i(.) functions, it must 
seek some information from the divisions about them. Once the Center 
has this information, it must make a decision, i.e., choose a "good" x vector. 
III. THE CONTROL MECHANISM 
A control mechanism is defined by a complete specification of both 
operating and enforcement rules. These rules are known explicitly by the 
Center. For the iterative procedures considered here, the operating rules 
consist of a message set for the divisions, a message rule for the Center 
for each possible iteration, and a decision rule for the Center. 8 Thus, an 
iterative control mechanism for problem (A) is defined by a quadruple: 
The first component is the message set for the divisions; that is, a set from 
which a division at each iteration may select a message to be sent to the 
Center. The second component is a sequence of rules for messages sent by 
the Center, specifying at every iteration the message to be sent to the divisions 
given the messages received from the divisions at all previous iterations. 
The third component is the Center's decision rule. Given the messages 
7 Where "know" means that for each x, division i can calculate 77,(x). 
8 For a discussion of control mechanisms for noniterative procedures, see Groves [101 
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received from the divisions at all iterations, this rule specifies the Center's 
decision. The final component of the quadruple is an N-tuple of evaluation 
measures, one for each division. Each division's evaluation, as specified 
by these measures, will depend on its realized contribution Hi , which we 
assume can be observed ex post by the Center, and on the messages of all 
the divisions. This last component of the quadruple implicitly specifies 
the enforcement rules for the control mechanism; i.e., maximization of a 
division's evaluation measure enforces the use of the prescribed operating 
rules. 
Formally, an iterative control mechanism C is defined by 
C = (4v, { 	, x(*), <Et(*)›t.4), 	 ( 1 ) 
where 
(a) C {finite-dimensional Euclidean space} is the message set of 
the divisions. m it e di is the message of division i at iteration t. 
mt — (mit 9 . ••/ MAU), 
Mt 	0711 	mt), 
mi t ----- ma ,-,ma)- 
(b) y i : dieN(t-1) 	Y is the message rule of the Center for t >--- 2. 
yl is a given, fixed element of Y. 
(c) x: dr° 	X is the Center's decision rules 
(d) Ei : R x Jrc 	R is division i's evaluation measure. 
Under certain iterative procedures, the Center may be able to take a "good" 
decision after a finite number of iterations. Since x is defined only for an 
infinite string of messages, it would appear that the control mechanism 
cannot handle situations in which the Center has collected sufficient infor-
mation for optimal decision making after a finite number of iterations of 
the communication process. That is, if (la)-(lc) are viewed as partially 
defining a (decentralized) nonlinear programming algorithm, what happens 
if the algorithm converges to a solution of (A) in a finite number of iterations ? 
For the procedures considered here it will suffice to assume that the Center 
acts as though the final message of each division has been repeated an 
infinite number of times. Formally, 
x: 	x (m t x m t x ••.) 	X. 	 (2) 
A stopping criterion is associated with any iterative procedure: if this criterion 
is satisfied at iteration t, the Center's decision is x(mt, (m, x m, x •••)). 
8 	is the Cartesian product of .4' with itself an infinite number of times. 
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It would then remain to be shown for a particular procedure that, if the 
stopping criterion is satisfied at iteration t, the decision x(tife, (m t x tut x • ")) 
is optimal. 
IV. THE DIVISION'S PROBLEM 
Once the control mechanism C has been specified, the problem for each 
division is to decide how to choose the messages m it e di to be sent to the 
Center at each iteration. Each division wants to send messages to the Center 
that induce the Center to take a decision that maximizes the division's 
evaluation. Thus it chooses, for each iteration t, a response rule, or a function 
uit , that determines at iteration t how it should respond to the messages 
( from the Center (and implicitly to the past messages of the other 
divisions, since each y 1 , for t > 2, depends on the messages of all divisions 
for all previous iterations). 
ti t ,: )( Y 	.ft 	 (3) 
A strategy ui is an infinite sequence of response rules, one for each possible 
iteration of the communication process: 
ut = futtrt--1 • 
	 (4) 
Each message of any division can be expressed in terms of the messages 
(and thus the response rules) of all the divisions at previous iterations, 
the response rule of the division at the current iteration, the messages of 
the Center at previous iterations, and the starting point y 1 . Since associated 
with each control mechanism is a unique starting point yi and a set of message 
rules yt•) for t > 2, a control mechanism C and the N-tuple of divisional 
strategies u = (u1 uN) uniquely determine the infinite sequence of 
messages that the Center will receive. The available strategies for a division 
to choose among are members of the set 
U 	{the space of infinite sequences defined by (3) and (4)). 	(5) 
Given the joint strategy u = (u, 	uN), the infinite string of messages can 
be defined recursively as follows (where the dependence on the control 
mechanism C is suppressed): 
m it : UN 	 (6) 
where 
mii(u) 	ui1(Y 1), 
mi2(u) .Y 1 , Y 2( 711(u))), 
mts(u) = utt( Y 1, 	Am t-1(u))), 




m w(u) 	(m11(u),..., mNl(u), rn 	mN2(u),...). 
The payoff for division i, as a function of the vector of strategies u, is 
division i's evaluation when the messages are m°'(u): 10 
WW [u] —= Ei(11,(x(m0(u))), rrequ)). 	 (7) 
V. DEFINITION OF OPTIMALITY 
The choice of divisional strategies can be thought of in game-theoretic 
terms. The payoff functions Kid•] and the set of divisional strategies U 
define an N-person (non-zero sum) game in normal form, which we assume 
is played noncooperatively. 
A vector of strategies u* will be called a "solution" to the game defined 
by the payoff functions W1 [•] and the set of strategies U if 
u* is a Nash equilibrium and W2 [0] ,>- W[u] for any 
other Nash equilibrium u, for all 1.11'12 	 (8) 
An iterative control mechanism will be called optimal if a "solution" 
u* exists and if any "solution" leads the Center to take a decision that solves 
problem (A). Formally, the iterative control mechanism 
C* 	(J1*, { y"0}7-, , x *('), <E7(')>!;!--1) 	 (9) 
is an optimal control mechanism if the following two properties are satisfied: 
Decisiveness: There exists a u* satisfying (8). 
Efficiency: If u* satisfies (8) then x*(rn°1u*)) solves problem (A). 
At first glance problem (A) might seem limited in its applicability, since 
the only decisions are made by the Center. However, it is easily extended to 
10 Since each u generates a sequence of messages nes(u), x(•) can be calculated for every 
u, since x:.,41°' —. X. 
" a is a Nash equilibrium iff 	W,[a/u,] for all u, E U, for all i. 
12 Since, in general, intermixtures (fi„ 	 fiN) of Nash equilibria a and 
u* are not Nash equilibria, to avoid ambiguity the divisions should be able to choose 
among multiple Nash points. The solution concept for this game is thus strengthened by 
requiring the existence of a best Nash equilibrium. 
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cover models in which both the Center and the divisions must take decisions, 
when it is assumed that the Center takes its decision first and that the divisions 
take their decisions on the basis of the Center's decision." (For a complete 
demonstration of this fact, see Cohen [3].) 
VI. DEFINITION OF A CLASS OF OPTIMAL CONTROL MECHANISMS—W * 
In this section a special class of control mechanisms is examined. The 
specification of this class requires a few preliminary definitions: 
MCP={Hi Hi :68L 	i41}, 
{H I H, E .YE' and Hi is concave}. 
A strategy u, was defined as an infinite sequence of functions u it , where 
uti : X ; = 1 
t Y Y. A particular type of strategy is one in which u" : Y .1te 
for all t and It" is identical for all t, i.e., ui , = uis for all t, s E [1, CO). The 
strategy u i is thus a stationary strategy, in the language of dynamic pro-
gramming. 
----_ {ui 	U, uit : Y 	di and utt 	uis for all t,sE[1, 00)}. 
(The tth element of the infinite sequence ui , when 	u„ for all t, s E [1, c0), 
will be referred to as u , . Therefore ut(  yt) should be interpreted as utt( .Y9.) 
The class of control mechanisms considered can first be characterized 
by their operating rules. In the previous work on incentive mechanisms, 
most notably that of Groves [10] and Groves and Ledyard [12], the following 
question is never addressed: How does the Center actually calculate the 
vector x once it has received the divisions' reported profit contribution func-
tions. It is implicitly assumed that the Center can find a solution to the 
resultant mathematical programming problem. Under such an implicit 
assumption, it is immediate that the Center can find a solution to its overall 
" If the divisions and the Center make their respective decisions simultaneously, the 
Center's problem will not necessarily be solved by these decisions. Suppose that the de-
cisions were taken simultaneously. It would not necessarily be true that each division's 
decision and the Center's decision would be jointly feasible for that division. If the divisions 
take their decisions first there will not necessarily be one decision for the Center that is 
jointly feasible with the local decisions of all the divisions. When the Center takes its 
decision first, local decisions of the divisions and the Center's decision will be jointly 
feasible for all divisions. Sequencing of decision making allows sufficient information to be 
exchanged so that the Center's problem can be solved. Groves [9] deals with the problem 
of simultaneous decision making by the Center and the divisions as a problem in decision 
making under uncertainty. 
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problem if the divisions report their true profit contribution functions. 
With iterative communication, the calculation of the vector x is an inherent 
part of the control problem. Restriction 1 merely ensures the existence of 
divisional strategies that will lead the Center to calculate the solution to 
problem (A). 
Restriction 1. Given the iterative control mechanism C, there exists 
a non-empty-valued mapping 
Vf: 
such that if H, e 0 C dr for all i, then for any u, E 7"[H,], 
X(M` ° (0) maximizes E Hi(x) 110(x) subject to x E X. 
A truthful strategy for i will be any ui E WV/J. 
In order to prove the dominant strategy property of "telling the truth" 
(i.e., reporting true profit contribution functions) the work on noniterative 
procedures requires the Center to be able to calculate the value of reported 
profit at the Center's decision x. This calculation is straightforward since the 
Center knows the entire reported profit contribution function of each division. 
When communication is iterative, the Center can only approximate this 
function. Restriction 2 ensures that when the decision x(•) is taken, the Center 
has an exact approximation of each division's reported profit contribution 
at x•). The rules defined below in Restriction 2 are approximation rules 
for the reported profit contribution functions of the divisions. 
Restriction 2. Given the iterative control mechanism C, there exist 
rules Pi : X x .11°' -+ O such that 
If u, E W[Hi], where H, e 	, then for all 
u\u, E WN -1), P z (x(mcqu)), m,°'(u)) = H,(x(m'qu))), 
where m a(u) = uz( yt(mt -i(u))) for all t, and all i. 14 
It cannot be assumed that a division will play a particular type of strategy; 
it must be shown that playing this type of strategy is in the best interests 
of the division. Evaluation measures are used to provide the divisions with 
an incentive to play a particular type of strategy. What can be required is 
that the messages sent to the Center by the divisions obey some consistency 
requirements. 
Given an iterative control mechanism C satisfying 
Restriction 1, the infinite sequence of messages min 	(10) 
14 (u\Uj) 	,•••, 	 •••1 UN)• 
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is said to be consistent with 11 1 • given ytgi 1 if 
there exists a u, E U such that 
(a) u,ET[Pli] and 
(b) mot = ut( yt) for all t. 
Thus, the sequence of messages min  is consistent with a concave function 
given { y'} t°_, if there exist a concave function Hi and a strategy u, satisfying 
(10) . 15.1.6 
Restriction 3. Given the iterative control mechanism C satisfying 
Restrictions 1 and 2, Ei(17i , ?Iva) ==_ FARAH, , m°°)), where 
+ 	P,(x(In`9, 	110(x(m`l) 
1#z 
RAH, , ne) 
	
if mice  is consistent with a concave function 
given { 	; and Hi > Pi(x(e3), 
	
— co 	otherwise 
and Fi : lf8 	predetermined and strictly increasing." 
Since Ei(•) must be defined for all mc°, whether or not the rules of the game 
have been followed, the P t(.) functions must be defined for all mi. The 
inclusion of the condition that actual profit contributions be at least as 
large as reported profit contribution is not as innocuous as it may seem at 
first glance. This condition creates a discontinuity in the evaluation measure, 
since any deviation (even a small one) downward from reported profits 
will cause the division to have an evaluation of — oo. This definition also 
requires ex post observation by the Center of divisional contribution. Thus, 
given Restriction 2, these evaluations are a type of "profit sharing." Why 
not just define Ei •) to be some fixed fraction of actual profit, i.e., define 
, oti(E17,(x(m1)), 0 < ai < 1 ? Evaluations of the type defined 
by Restriction 3 are not dependent upon the local decisions of the other 
divisions. Thus the optimal strategy for division i does not depend on the 
rationality of the other divisions. Profit sharing does not have the inde-
pendence property. Since this model is easily generalizable to situations that 
include divisional decision making, profit sharing is not a viable alternative. 
" In general, given {yt}: ° , , 	may be consistent with many different H„ some in 
./fo and some not. It is thus not possible in general to determine if i is playing according to 
some H, e fe. by observing only »tic° and {yt}::, . 
" If nt,c° is consistent with a function 11, E dr, for all sequences ty'1,`° , , where yt E Y, 
then division i must be playing according to the strategy u, c T[H,], where Indy') = 
" It may not be decidable in general whether or not a particular infinite string of messages 
m,'"' is consistent with some H,,(•) given {P},7 1 . Thus, Restriction 3 implicitly excludes 
mechanisms for which this is not decidable. 
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The class of iterative control mechanisms defined by Restrictions 1-3 
will be denoted by W*: 
{C C is an iterative control mechanism 
and C satisfies Restrictions 1-3}. 
VII. PROPERTIES OF THE CLASS W * 
An optimal control mechanism has been defined as a control mechanism 
for which: 
(a) there exists a "best" Nash equilibrium that dominates (in terms of 
divisional payoff) all other Nash equilibria for every division; and 
(b) any "best" Nash equilibrium leads to an optimal decision by the 
Center. 
The class of mechanisms W* can be shown to be optimal. ft is not possible 
to show the existence of a dominant strategy equilibrium. However, if all 
players are restricted, a priori, to playing strategies associated with concave 
functions Hi , i.e., u, e Widro] = 0*, not only does a best Nash equilibrium 
exist, but this best Nash equilibrium is also a dominant strategy equilibrium 
for the restricted class. 
We define the equivalence class of truthful strategies for division i as the 
set of strategies 4?/7 , where 
W[I7 	ci] 	for all constants ci 	 (11) 
A restricted equivalence class of truthful strategies for division i is defined 
by restricting I1() to the domain X. If 17, is the restricted form of Hi , then 
W[17, --F c i ] 	for all constants ci . 
The following lemma is immediate from Restrictions I and 3 and (11), 
and is given without proof. Unless otherwise stated, the proofs of all sub-
sequent lemmas and theorems appear in the Appendix. 
LEMMA 1. Given any iterative control mechanism C satisfying Restrictions 
1 and 3, if 
14 1 , 
then 
Wi [uluil] = Wi [ului2 ] 	for all u\ui c Uov-i), 	for all i.18 
" 111 tli 	 _1 	Ui+1 ,• ••, UN). 
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THEOREM 1. Given a control mechanism C e W*, for all u\u i e 0*(N-1) 
 W i[1#14] 	Wi [u] 	for all ui e 0* iff u,* e 
Thus, a dominant strategy equilibrium exists when the divisions are 
restricted to playing strategies in 0*. Does there exist a strategy in 0* 
that is best against a particular (N — I)-tuple of strategies that is in Uov --" 
but not in 0*4N-1) ? If division i wishes to maximize its payoff, it must send 
messages tn ic° to the Center that are consistent with a concave function given 
)111 1 ; this ensures the existence of a best strategy in 0* for division i. 
The following is straightforward, and is given without proof: 
LEMMA 2. Given a control mechanism C e V', for each u\u,. E Cluv -13 there 
exists a particular ili c 0* such that 
Wi fulfid ,>--- W.[u] 	Vu, c U. 	 (12) 
The proof of the (if) part of Theorem 1, i.e., the proof that for 
all u\ui E 17*(N-1)9  W Ain W Al for all ui E 0*, relies on the following 
two conditions: 
(a) x(nl'Iu/uP)) maximizes 
17/(x) 	Hi(x) 	170(x) over X; 	 (13) 
)7, 1 
(b) Pi(x(rwc(u/ut)), m7(u/ut)) = Hi(x(mc°(u/ut))) 
If u\ui 0*(N-1) the conditions in .(I 3) do not necessarily hold. Therefore 
it is not possible to prove that for any wp i E U (N-1) condition (12) holds. 
Theorem 1 establishes the fact that the "truth" is a Nash equilibrium, 
and in addition that the "truth" is the best concave Nash equilibrium. 
Lemma 1 establishes that there exists, for each particular (N 1)-tuple of 
divisional strategies, a best concave strategy ? (This is the result of the divisions 
sending messages consistent with a concave strategy.) 
Is there reason to believe that the divisions will play the particular Nash 
equilibrium of "truthful" strategies ? The answer is in the affiffirmative 
for the following reasons: first, the divisions already know their respective 
"truthful" strategies, and playing one of those strategies requires no addi-
tional calculation on their part. Second, to play any other Nash equilibrium 
vector of strategies, each division must know what the other divisions are 
doing, in order to calculate the best strategy in the particular situation. Thus, 
the N-tuple of "truthful" strategies is the only Nash equilibrium that is 
"independent" of the other divisions' strategies. 
LEMMA 3. For any control mechanism C E 	any N-tuple of strategies 
u*, where LIP E 0/4 vi, is a Nash equilibrium. 
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LEMMA 4. For any control mechanism C e W* any Nash equilibrium le, 
where 14' e 	Vi, is a "solution," i.e., 
W,[ul 	Wa [u] 	V Nash equilibria u, Vi. 
LEMMA 5. For any control mechanism C e W*, if a is a "solution," then 
x(m` .(a)) solves problem (A). 
The major result of this section is stated in the following theorem: 
THEOREM 2. Any control mechanism C in the class V* is optimal. 
In the previous work that has been done on incentive mechanisms no 
specific assumptions have been made about the Center's ex post knowledge 
of actual divisional profit contribution. The divisions are assumed to send 
entire profit contribution functions, and it can be shown that the N-tuple 
of "truthful" strategies is a dominant strategy equilibrium. As was pointed 
out above, it is assumed in the previous work that the Center possesses 
some method of solving the mathematical programming problem it receives 
from the divisions. The important point is that the Center knows eachdivision's 
entire strategy, and thus can calculate a global solution to the reported 
problem. When communication is iterative in nature, the Center knows 
only a local approximation of the strategies near the decision x, and is not 
guaranteed a global solution. Thus, if some of the divisions play strategies 
that do not ensure convergence to a solution (i.e., nonconcave strategies), 
the truth may not be the best strategy for the remaining divisions. The lack 
of complete information about strategies ex post leads to a weaker result 
than can be obtained about the "complete information," or noniterative, 
mechanisms. 
Finally, we must give an interpretation of the evaluation measures Ei •). 
One alternative would be to view the functions R ie) as providing an index 
number and the transformation Fe) as translating that number into the 
argument of the division manager's utility function. For example, the manager 
of division i may receive satisfaction from paid vacation days, while the 
manager of division j wants to maximize the probability of receiving a 
key to the executive lavatory. 
Alternatively, the evaluation measures and thus the payoff functions, 
may represent real resource flows. In that case, one must worry about the 
question of a "balanced budget" at any equlilibrium. 
LEMMA 6. If F,e) ==. as for all i, where 0 < a s < I and Li% ai = 1, 
then, at any Nash equilibrium u, 
Ili(x(m"(u))) 	Wi[u]. 
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VIII. APPLICATIONS 
One may rightfully ask the following question: Is the set W* of optimal 
control mechanisms nonempty ? If so, how exclusionary are Restrictions 1 
and 2 on the class of admissible operating rules ? 
The answer to the first question is yes; it is straightforward to verify 
that the Dantzig—Wolfe decomposition algorithm [4], as well as Malinvaud's 
"Procedure Implying Mathematical Programming at the Center" [18] 
satisfy Restrictions 1 and 2 (see Cohen [3]). It can also be shown that two 
simple nonlinear algorithms satisfy the restrictions: an outer-linearization 
algorithm and an inner-linearization (price decomposition) algorithm 
(see Cohen [3]). (Both the Dantzig—Wolfe algorithm and Malinvaud's 
procedure are special cases of the latter.) 
Restriction 1 requires only that the operating rules actually define a 
convergent algorithm for solving a nonlinear concave programming problem. 
Restriction 2 limits attention to procedures that calculate the value of the 
objective function at the solution. The inner- and outer-linearization algo-
rithms cited above satisfy Restriction 2, thus leading one to postulate that 
a wide range of algorithms satisfy the restriction. 
APPENDIX 
For ease of exposition, we make the following definitions: 
x(m°'(u)) = x(u), 
A i(x) = F (11,(x) 	E P;(x, m ± 119(x)), 
B i(x) = Fi (17 i(x) 	fj(x) + 110(x)), 
Joi 
ci(x) = Fi (H.,(x) + E 17 i(x) 17,(x)). 
Then by definition 
Wi[u] = A i(x(u)). 
(Bars over A i •), .13,•, and C,(•) denote a bar over 11,•). 
Proof of Theorem 1. (If) Let 4 e 	J. From Lemma 1, W,[u/u:] 
W,[u/uP] for all u E 	. We therefore need only prove the theorem for 4 . 
From Restriction 2, 
A,(x(uluP)) = 131(x(uluP)). 
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From Restriction 1 and Fi(•) strictly increasing, 
Bi(x(u/uP)) 	Bi(x) 	Vx E X. 
Since Hi(x) = 17i(x) Vx E X, 
Bi(x(tilun) = Bi(x(uluP)) 	B i(x) = Bi(x) 	Vx e X. 
In particular, 
Bi(x(ulur)) 	Bi(x(u)) 	Vu i e U. 
Since u; e (7* for all j 	i, Restriction 2 gives 
Bi(x(u)) = A i(x(u)) 	Vu i E U. 
Therefore for all u\ui  E 0*(N-1) 
W i [u/un 	Wi[u] 	Vui e U. 
(Only if) Let ai e (7* be such that for all u\ui E 0* ( N-1) 
	
= Wi [u/un >- Wi [u] 	Vui E U 
(where ut c W[Hi]). 
We must show that u i e 	. From the (if) part of this theorem, its proof, 
and Restriction 2 we get 
Wi luJiii] = 	 Bi(x) 	Vx c X. 
Restriction 1 yields x(m°D(u/ii i)) as the maximizer of 
Ri(x) 	1-1;(x) + 'lax) 
	
s.t. x e X, 
For the assertion of the theorem to be true for all u\ui associated with concave 
functions, it must be true for all u\u i associated with strictly concave, differen-
tiable functions. If Dry =—= {x 117i(x) is differentiable} and DR. Dno are 
defined similarly, then concavity of H. , Pi  , and 14 implies that 
(a) Dn i , D . , and M. (where C denotes complement) are all sets 
of measure zero; and 
(b) i , and Dno are each contained in the interior domain 
of their respective functions of definition. (See Rockafellar [21, p. 246, 
Theorem 25.5].) 
Therefore, 
(D1) , n DR,n Dnof = (Df7j u D,c.7. j u Df4) 
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is a set of measure zero. For each x E D n DA. n DIT0 n X define the 
strategies a\u, such that ti; e T[R,] and 
E R;(•) is strictly concave and differentiable; 
E go') = 	— VH000. 	 (14) 
(To show the existence of such strategies we need only show the existence 
of the 11",(•), which is obvious.) A necessary and sufficient condition for a 
unique interior maximum of a strictly concave, differentiable function 
f (•) at x* is that V f(x*) = 0. Since 
vil i( 50 + V 	Vrlo(i) = 0 
is the unique maximizer of Hi(x) E;,,RAx) 110(x) over X. In addition, 
x a {interior domain of 14)} and x maximizes EN  gi(x) + 110(x) over X. 
Therefore, 
N 
E RO) + WU:0 = 0. 
i=1 
This gives the result that 
= 
	
Since functions 14), j 	i, satisfying (14) can be defined for each x e D . n 
n DI-70 n X, 
V10) = VH(i) 	a.e. in X. 
Since Hi(•) and ii(•) are concave and defined over all of X, they are necessarily 
continuous over X (see Rockafellar [21, p. 83, Corollary 10.11]). Therefore, 
= Hi(x) 	ci 	for all x a X, where c i is a constant. 
This gives the result that 
as E 	. 
Proof of Lemma 3. From the (if) part of the proof of Theorem 1 and 
Restriction 2, for all ut E U 
Wi[0] >-- Ci(x(u * lui)) = A i(x(u* lu i)) = Wi [u*lui]. 1 
Proof of Lemma 4. Let a be any Nash equilibrium. Then for any i 
(1) m;(0) is consistent with a concave function given { 	; and 
(2) Hi y Pi(x( 17), m°(0)• 
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Thus, for all i, if of e W[ll i] for all i, 
Wirul = Ci(x(u*)) 	Ci(x(a)) A i(x(10) = wi [a]• 
Proof of Lemma 5. Since any u*, such that ut E 4 Vi, is a solution, 
	
Wi raj = Wirul 	Vi. 
Assume x(ii) does not solve problem (A), i.e., that 
E Hi(x(u*)) > E i(x(a)), 
i-o 	 i=o 
where 	E 71[17j. 
From the proof of Theorem 1, Fi(•) strictly increasing, Restriction 1, 
and a a Nash equilibrium (and thus Ili > Pi(x(ii), 174'(u)) for all i) we get 
= Wikel = Ci(x(u*)) > Ci(x(11)) 	A i(x(12)) = Wi [17], 
which is a contradiction. 
Therefore, x(ii) must solve problem (A). 1 
Proof of Lemma 6. Let u be a Nash equilibrium. Then 
Hi(x(u))> Pi(x(u), tn i cqu)) 	Vi. 
Therefore 
E wi[u] = Epi(x(0) + y, pko), 1715-(o) + Hax(u»1 ,=, 	Jo, 
 [ 
E cti E Hi(x0.0)] 
= E Tli(x(u))• 
i=o 
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SIMPLE INEQUALITIES FOR MULTISERVER QUEUFSt 
MATTHEW J. SOBEL* 
Simple inequalities are obtained for some operating characteristics of multiserver queueing 
models. "Loss system" and "delay system" results are presented. 
(QUEUES; MULTISERVER; INEQUALITIES) 
1. Introduction 
It is difficult to obtain explicit formulae for operating characteristics of queueing 
models with more than one server. When formulae can be obtained, often they are 
complicated and depend on particular probability distributions. The results below are 
nonparametric and simple in form. Simplicity typically implies that an inequality is not 
sharp (cf. Kingman [6]). However, one of the principal inequalities below is simple and 
sharp. See Brumelle [3] and his references for other inequalities for multiserver 
queueing models. 
In a "loss system" with a Poisson input process, i.e., an M/G/c/N model (so 
arriving customers are refused entry when there are N customers already inside the 
facility), let p denote the "traffic intensity" and let B denote the long-run probability 
that the facility is full. A principal result below is 
(1 — 1/p) + < B 1 — 1/(p+1) 
for all c and N. For c> 2 and p 1.5, I — 1 /p seems very close to B. 
* All Notes are refereed. 
*Accepted by Marcel F. Neuts; received October 29, 1979. This paper has been with the author 3 weeks 
for 1 revision. 
*Georgia Institute of Technology. 
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In a stable "delay system" with a renewal input process, i.e., GI/G/c with p < 1, let 
D denote the long-run probability that all servers are busy. Then the other principal 
result is 
0 < p — D < (1 — p)(c — 1) 
so p is a good approximation to D if p is close to unity, i.e. "heavy traffic." 
For either G1/G/c or GI/G/c/N, let -I be the mean inter-arrival time,µ I be 
the mean service time, and p=A/(cA). Let pn (t) be the probability that n customers 
are in the facility at epoch t and suppose that the limit 
=lim p  
exists for all n and that 
E p„=1. 
n 
This precludes p>1 in GI/G/c but 0 < p <cc is admissable for GI/G/c/N. 
Let irn be the probability that the jth customer to arrive finds n customers already in 
the system (either GI/G/c or GI/G/c/N) and suppose that the limit 
ir„ = lim '771, 
j—).°C 
exists for all n. Generally, ir„ pn but a Poisson arrival process ensures ir = p„ for all 
n (Wolff [9]). Therefore, the following interpretations of D and B are known to be 
correct only for M/G/c and M/G/c/N models, respectively: 
D: the long-run probability that an arriving customer must wait in a queue; 
B: the long-run probability that an arriving customer is blocked from entering the 
facility (because it is full). 
Symbols that pertain to both the loss and the delay systems are listed below: 




J -0 	jac 
L = E 
jao 





a =A/ = cp. 
These symbols have the following interpretations: L is the long-run average number in 
the system, Lq is the long-run average number in the queue, S is the long-run average 
number of busy servers, and D is the long-run probability that all the servers are busy. 
Pr 
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2. Delay System 
Let PP and WI denote the mean (expected value) lengths of time that the jth 
customer spends in the system and in the queue, respectively. Suppose that the limits 
W = lim WI and W = lim 
i---000 	 q 	q 
exist. Then L =XW and L = XW 9 (Little [8]) are exploited in the following proof. 
THEOREM 1. 
S = X/p, = a; 	 (1) 
D = (S - g)/ c; (2) 
D = p - g/ c; 	 ( 3 ) 
0 < p - D < (1 - p)(c - 1). 	 (4) 
PROOF. From W = W + 
L =XW =X(W q + I ) = Lq + cp = a. 
Also, L = Lq + S so S = a which is (1). By definition, S = g + cD which yields (2). 
Then (1) and (2) give (3). For (4), D < p from (3). Also from (3), 
-1 
D=P- g/c=p- 	E jPf 
.1=0 
 c-i 
p - [(c - 1)/ c] 	pj > p - (1 - D)(c - 1)/ c 
which gives the right inequality in (4). Q.E.D. 
Theorem l's most useful results are (1) and (4). We know that D = p (exactly) in a 
single-server system. It follows from (4) that heavily-loaded systems, i.e. p close to 
unity, with few servers have values of D close to p. 
Theorem 1 was first displayed in Sobel [9]. The results seemed to be new then but 
they are sufficiently simple that they may have been obtained by others. In fact, Harris 
[4] has since presented (1). 
3. Loss System with Poisson Arrival Process 
The model now is M/G/c/N with 0 < p =X/(ciL)= a/c < co. Let B = p, which 
is the long-run probability that the system is full. A Poisson arrival process implies 
p„= rf„ for all n so vs = ps and B is the long-run probability that an arrival is blocked 
from entering the facility because it is full. Hence, D - B = E7 ,,'pi is the probability 
that an arriving customer gains entry and must wait in the queue, and 1 - D =E",:=4p, 
is the probability that an arriving customer gains entry and does not wait in the queue. 
The effective arrival rate is X(1 - B) because p, = ?TN = B so the following simple 
modification of Theorem 1 applies to loss systems. 
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COROLLARY 1. 
S = (1 - B)a and B=1- S / a; 	 (5) 
D = p(1- B)- g/c; 	 (6) 
0 < p(1 - B)- D qc-1)(1- 	-B]). 	 (7) 
THEOREM 2. 
	
( - 1 / p) + < B < 1 - 1 	+ 1); 	 (8) 
1- D < c/(1+ a). 	 (9) 
PROOF. From c > S and definitions of symbols, 
N -1 
C > = g+ cD > cD = c(B + > pj)) cB. 
These inequalities and (5) imply 
1 - c/a < B <1 - Bc/a 
which yields (8). For (9), (5) and B < D imply 
c- I 
a(1 - D)< a(1 - B)= 	cD <(c -1)(1- D)+ cD = c -1+ D 
j=o 
which yields (9). Q.E.D. 
The lower bound in (8), B > 1 - 1 /p, seems to provide an excellent approximation 
for B at larger values of p. The data in Table 1 compare (to two decimals) 1 - 1/p 
with values of B tabulated for M/M/c/N by Kuhn [7]. Kahn's tables show B only 
for p < 2.0. For those tabulated values, 0 < B - (1 - 1/ p) < 0.03, regardless of c, if 
p 	1.5 and N - c 	2. 
TABLE I 
c N - c p 1 - 1 /p 
1 2 2.0 0.50 0.53 
1 5 2.0 0.50 0.50 
2 I 2.0 0.50 0.55 
2 5 2.0 0.50 0.50 
2 10 2.0 0.50 0.50 
2 5 1.6 0.38 0.39 
6 1 2.0 0.50 0.53 
6 5 1.6 0.38 0.38 
6 5 2.0 0.50 0.50 
40 1 1.6 0.38 0.39 
40 5 1.2 0.17 0.19 
40 5 1.6 0.38 0.38 
100 1 1.4 0.29 0.30 
100 1 1.6 0.38 0.38 
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Dr. D. P. Heyman of Bell Telephone Laboratories observes that the bounds in (8) 
cannot be tightened. In an M/ M/1/1 model, B = p/(1 + p) whereas in an 
M/M/1/N model, B=1—(i— p N )/(1 _ () iv-4-1 )s°, if p < •, B-41-1/pasN—*oc. 
Also, Heyman shows [5] that the bound B 	1 — 1/p (with B interpreted as the 
long-run probability that an arriving customer is blocked from entry because the 
facility is full) is valid without Theorem 2's hypothesis of a Poisson input process (so 
irN = pN ) and that it is valid even for non-renewal input processes. Therefore, he has 
significantly broadened the applicability of the bound. 
Whitt, [11] proposes a heavy traffic approximation for B in G/G/c/c (i.e. 
N — c = 0 so there is no waiting room at all) and compares it with 1 — 1 jp and other 
approximations. He focuses on the "peakedness" factor in the extent to which the 
arrival process is non-Poisson. His numerical results for G/M/c/c suggest that 
1 — 1 /p is consistent with the heavy traffic approximation (and others he tested) 
except when the number of servers is very high, peakedness is very high, and p is 
relatively low. However, he has not computed B exactly for any of the cases 
mentioned. Also, see [12]. 
Whitt [11] also observes that Borovkov [1] presents a heavy traffic limit theorem for 
B. Borovkov shows that B—*1— 1/p as a -4 co and oo in such a way that p 
remains above unity. 
Let h = (D — B)/(1 — B) which is 
h= P [ (gain entry) fl (wait in queue))/P (gain entry) 
= P (wait in queue I gain entry ). 
Thus h is the long-run conditional probability that an arrival must wait in queue if the 
arrival is not blocked from entry. 
COROLLARY 2. 
h < p; 	 (10) 
D — B < p— B(p + 1) < 1 / p. 	 (II) 
PROOF. The definition of h and (7) yield 
h=(D — B)/(1— B) < D 	— B) < p. 
For (11), (6) and (8) yield 
D — B = p(1 — B)— g/ c — B < p— B(p + 1) 
< p— (p + 1)(1 — 1/p) = 1/p. Q.E.D.' 
'The exposition of this paper was improved by incorporating a referee's recommendations. 
The author was partially supported by NSF Grant SOC78-05770. 
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Incentives and the Choice of Optimal Plans 
By SUSAN I. COHEN * 
There is a vast literature in economics 
concerned with the specification and discus-
sion of planning procedures for economies 
(for example, see Kenneth Arrow; Theodore 
Groves; Geoffrey Heal; Martin Loeb and 
Wesley Magat). This literature is generally 
concerned with the algorithmic side of plan-
ning, in that it deals with behavioral rules 
that if followed lead to a "social optimum" 
(from the planner's point of view). In gen-
eral, the enforcement question is not dealt 
with; namely, is it in the best interests of the 
economic agents to follow the planning 
board's directives?' 
If it is not in the economic agents' inter-
ests to follow the planning board's direc-
tives, then it is not necessarily true that a 
social optimum will actually be attained by 
these procedures. The existence of enforce-
ment rules or evaluation measures that in-
sure compliance has been shown in several 
rather general contexts (see, for example, 
Groves). The importance of the existence of 
such rules is well recognized in the planning 
literature: 
There is a very important aspect of 
any planning problem ... [that] may be 
loosely described as the problem of 
ensuring that it is in the interests of 
the firms in the economy to behave as 
the centre requires them to.... Once 
an incentive structure has been speci-
fied for a planned economy, it is rea-
sonable to suppose that firms will be 
•Assistant professor, College of Industrial Manage-
ment, Georgia Institute of Technology. This research 
was partially supported by National Science Founda-
tion Grant SOC 78-05770. I would like to thank an 
anonymous referee for very helpful suggestions. All 
errors, of course, remain my own. 
'Jacques Dreze and D. de la Vallee Poussin, John 
Roberts, and Francoise Schoumaker consider these 
questions in titonnement procedures. Loeb and Magat 
consider the problem in a centrally planned economy 
in which the communication between the planing board 
and the firms is of a "one-time only" nature.  
concerned to choose that strategy that 
will maximise the rewards accruing to 
them under this.... Ideally one would 
like to devise for any planning process 
an associated incentive structure such 
that each firm would maximise its re- 
turns under this system by revealing 
correct information to the centre, and 
producing the optimum once located. 
[Heal, p. 214] 
The purpose of this paper is the definition 
of just such a system for a particular class of 
decentralized planning procedures (and thus 
a particular model of a planned economy). 
As noted above, the existence of such a 
system has been previously demonstrated in 
other contexts. However, those results are 
not applicable to decentralized planning 
procedures since those systems require firms 
to communicate entire functions or sets as a 
one-time message. The properties of those 
procedures depend heavily on the assump-
tion of noniterative communication. A gen-
eral model with iterative communication is 
presented in my earlier paper. The results 
obtained there are weaker than those ob-
tained when communication is noniterative. 
In particular, Groves demonstrates that 
when communication is noniterative, follow-
ing the planning board's directives is a 
dominant strategy for every firm. 2 When 
communication is iterative, it is only possi-
ble to show that following the planning 
board's directives constitutes a Nash equi-
librium that weakly dominates all other 
Nash equilibria for all firms. 
In Section I, a model of an economy 
(based on a model due to Edmond Malin-
vaud) is presented. A class of planning pro-
cedures for the economy is defined in Sec-
tion II. The enforcement rules for these pro-
cedures are defined in Section III, where it 
2 The models in my earlier paper and in Groves are 
not stated as planning models, although they can easily 
be interpreted as such. 
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is also shown that, with these rules, the 
agents in the economy have an incentive to 
follow the planning board's directives. Fi-
nally, in Section IV, it is shown that 
Malinvaud's model and "Procedure Imply-
ing Mathematical Programming at the Cen-
ter" are special cases of the model and plan-
ning procedures defined in Section II. 
I. The Model of the Economy 
Let us consider the following model 3 of 
an economy: there are N +1 agents, consist-
ing of N firms (or ministries) and the plan-
ning board. There are M commodities 
produced in the economy. The net demand 
for each good produced is the final con-
sumption of the good minus the net outputs 
of the good by all firms. A program P for 
the economy consists of a vector of final 
consumption, a vector of net outputs for all 
goods for all firms, and a vector of net 
demands for all goods. 
The program P chosen by the planning 
bureau must be feasible from the consumers' 
point of view. Let us assume that the plan-
ning bureau knows, a priori, the set of feasi-
ble final consumption vectors. The program 
P must also be technologically feasible; thus 
the vector of net outputs for each firm must 
be an element of the firm's feasible produc-
tion set. Each firm knows' its own produc-
tion-possibilities set. These sets are not 
known to the planning bureau. Finally, the 
net demand for each good in the program 
chosen by the planning bureau must be 
feasible, that is, the net demand cannot ex-
ceed the initial amount of the good availa-
ble in the economy (which is known by the 
planning bureau). 
Social preferences among alternative vec-
tors of final consumption are represented by 
a utility function, known by the planning 
bureau. A program P' is preferred to P2 if 
the utility of final consumption in P I is 
higher than the utility of final consumption 
3 This model is the one developed by Malinvaud. 
4 13y "know" I mean that the firm has the capability 
of calculating the coordinates of any point in its pro-
duction set; for example, given a price vector, it can 
determine the vector in its production set with maxi-
mum value.  
in P2 . The planning bureau seeks a feasible 
program in which the utility of final 
consumption is greater than or equal to the 
utility of final consumption in all other 
feasible programs. 
Formally, the model of the economy is as 
follows: 
(a) x k is the final consumption of good k, 
k=1,..., M. Let 	 xm ). 
(b) yk , is the net output of good k by firm i, 
k=1,..., M, i=1,..., N. 
N 
k y 	2, yk , is the total output of good k. 
(y,„ 	ym,) is the vector of net out- 
puts of all goods by firm i. Let 
(c) Yi is firm i 's feasible production set, 
i= 1,..., N. Wk is the initial amount 
of good k available in the economy, 
k=1,..., M. 
(d) X is the set of feasible final consumption 
vectors. 
(e) U(x) is the utility of the final con-
sumption x. U(.) is a function from 
the commodity space R m (the M-
f old Cartesian product of the real 
line) into the real line; i.e., U: 
R. 
The planning bureau seeks the program P* 
=(x*, y*) that solves the planning problem: 
max U(x) subject to x EX 
x, y 
( 1 ) 
	
y,EY, i=1,..., N 
N 
x — E 
II. A Class of Planning Procedures 
The class of planning procedures I con-
sider are those that choose feasible solutions 
and coverage to an optimal plan (either 
finitely or in the limit). I therefore eliminate 
from consideration those procedures that 
ensure a-convergence, that is, a plan "close" 
to the optimal plan. 
To reiterate, let us assume that the plan-
ning board knows its own utility function 
U(x) as well as the set of feasible final 
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consumption vectors X and the vector W of 
initial availabilities of all goods. Each firm 
knows its own feasible production set Yi , 
but not the sets of the other firms; the firms 
do not know the utility function of the plan-
ning board nor the set X. If the planning 
board knew all the production sets Yi , it 
could solve its planning problem (1) di-
rectly. 
The purpose of the planning procedure is 
thus to obtain information from the firms 
about their feasible production sets. We will 
assume that the planning board knows that 
the Y, are all members of the same subset H 
of sets in the commodity space R m. For 
example, H may be the set of convex sub-
sets of R M, so that the planning board knows 
that all the firms' production-possibilities 
sets are convex. If the firms choose to mis-
represent their production sets (i.e., cheat), 
they must do so in a way that is not detecta-
ble by the planning board. 
More formally, if Yi is firm i's true pro-
duction set, let Y1 c Rm denote firm i's re-
ported production set. Firm i will be said to 
be "telling the truth" if its reported produc-
tion set is its true production, i.e., if Yi = Yi . 
At each stage or iteration of the planning 
process, the planning bureau receives mes-
sages from the firms in response to its mes-
sages. The set of possible firm messages and 
planning board messages are denoted by M 
and P, respectively. For example, the firms 
might be reporting production vectors, so 
that M= R m, while the planning board 
might be sending price vectors, so that P is 
the unit simplex in R m. Let EP be the 
message sent to firm i at iteration t; let 
M be the reply of firm i. 
DEFINITION 1: The sequence {m r,}_ l will 
be said to be consistent with a set Y i given 
(pat l if (iiif}71 1 are the messages that would 
result from following the planning board 's 
directives when Y, C R M is the firm's produc-
tion set. 5 
5 Since it may not be decidable in general whether or 
not (m= is consistent with a particular set Yi c R 51, 
I am implicitly excluding planning procedures for which 
this is not decidable. 
Thus, a sequence of messages {na".. 1 is 
consistent with a set in H if Yi eli exists 
satisfying Definition 1. 
The messages sent to the planning board 
by each firm depend upon the production 
set Y1 the firm chooses to report as well as 
the board's messages {pf},t 1 . The planning 
board's messages to each division are as-
sumed to be nonrandom, that is, function-
ally dependent on the reported production 
sets of all the firms. We can express each 
firm's messages as a function of all the 
reported production sets: 
In=inf(Y1 ,• ••,YN) 
All the messages received by the planning 
board from every firm at every iteration 
will be denoted by nic° , 7 , m?, 
Define (x(m'), y (m`")) to be the vector 
of final consumption and firm production 
plans chosen by the planning procedure 
when the firms send messages m' to the 
planning board: 
DEFINITION 2: A planning procedure will 
be called admissible if when the reported 
production sets Y i E H for i = 1, . . . , N, 
(x(m°°(Y .,Y N )), y(m°°(Y ,Y N)))  solves 
the planning problem (1) where V, has been 
replaced by Y, for all i. 
Given this definition of an admissible 
procedure, if the firms all report their true 
production sets Yi , the procedure finds 
the solution to the planning board's prob-
lem (1). 
HI. Definition of Firm Evaluations 
Given the definition of an admissible 
planning procedure, we can define the en-
forcement rules. The enforcement rules are 
defined implicitly by an N-tuple of evalua-
tion measures, one for each firm. When the 
evaluation measures are appropriately de-
fined, maximization by a firm of its individ-
ual measure "enforces" the following of the 
planning board's directives. It should be 
pointed out that these evaluations provide 
index numbers on which individual firm re- 
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wards can be based; they do not represent 
real resource flows. For example, the reward 
to one firm might be in the form of paid 
vacation days, while another firm might be 
rewarded with salary increases. 
DEFINITION 3: Firm i's evaluation mea-
sure is a function E1 : M")-->01 defined as fol-
lows: 6 
U(x(m") ))if fnifir=i 
is consistent with a 
set in H given { 
and yi ( m°°) is feasible 
inf U(x) — 1 otherwise 
x ex 
These evaluations do not preclude firm 
cheating directly. The firm must appear to 
be reporting its true production set; in addi-
tion if y e (in')E Y, and thus not imple-
mentable, the planning board knows with 
certainty that the firm lied about its produc-
tion set. 
Payoff to each firm can be expressed as a 
function of the reported production sets: 
The problem for each firm is thus the 
choice of a reported production set that 
maximizes the firm's payoff. 
If firm i knows only that the other firms 
are reporting production sets in H (possibly 
the true production sets, but not necessarily), 
firm i 's best response is to report its true 
production set Y1 . 
Formal (mathematical) statements of all 
theorems and corollaries as well as their 
proofs (when necessary) are given in the 
Appendix. In addition, although not stated 
in each theorem and corollary explicitly, the 
results are only shown to hold for the plan-
ning procedures and evaluation measures 
defined by Definitions 2 and 3, respectively. 
C 0 
6 M 7,-. X M  
THEOREM 1: Firm i maximizes its 
payoff by reporting its true production set if 
the other (N-1) firms all report production 
sets in the set H. 
The following is immediate from Theorem 1: 
COROLLARY 1: Firm i maximizes its 
payoff by reporting its true production set when 
every other firm is reporting its true produc-
tion set; i.e., (111 ,...,Yht ) is a Nash equi-
librium. 
Is telling the truth the only optimal 
strategy for firm i? The answer is no. Never-
theless, one can show that any production 
set Yi• that maximizes firm i 's payoff for 
any possible (reported) production sets in H 
of the other firms must have a nonempty 
intersection with K, i.e., Yi•n 
THEOREM 2: If firm i maximizes its payoff 
by reporting Y i* no matter what production 
sets in H the other (N — 1) firms report, then 
Yi* n Y, O. 
Firm i will cheat only if cheating cannot be 
detected and does not reduce the firm's 
payoff if undetected. Therefore firm i will 
exclude points of its true production set 
only if there exist no production sets of the 
other firms that would lead the planning 
bureau to choose the excluded point given 
the set X and its constraints on feasible final 
consumption. Similarly, firm i will include 
infeasible points in its reported production 
set only if it is sure these infeasible points 
will never be chosen. 
Calculation of an optimal production set 
to report (other than Y,) requires knowledge 
of the set of feasible final consumption vec-
tors X. Thus Y is the only reported produc-
tion set that maximizes payoff and is totally 
independent of the reported production sets 
of the other firms, and the set X. 
Intermixtures of Nash equilibria are gen-
erally not Nash equilibria; we would thus 
like to ensure that the firms have an incen-
tive to arrive at a Nash equilibrium that 
leads to a decision that solves problem (1). 
The N-tuple (Y1 , Y,,,) can be shown to 
dominate for every firm in the set of Nash 
E,[ 
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equilibria; in addition, any such dominant 
Nash equilibrium leads to a decision solving 
problem (I). 
THEOREM 3: The payoff to each firm is at 
least as great at the Nash equilibrium 
( Y1 , ..., YN ) as it is at any other Nash 
equilibrium. 
THEOREM 4: If the payoff to each firm 
under the Nash equilibrium (Y;',...,Y;;) is the 
same as under the Nash equilibrium 
YN ), i.e., when every firm reports its 
true production set, then 
(x(m c° 07, • • -, 	)), Y(m`c(Yr • • -,Y11;))) 
solves the planning board's problem (1). 
IV. A Procedure Implying Mathematical 
Programming at the Center (MPC) 
Malinvaud defines three planning proce-
dures for solving problem (1). The first is a 
tatonnement procedure; the second is a pro-
cedure based on the Leontief-Samuelson 
technology; and the third is a procedure 
implying the use of mathematical program-
ming by the planning bureau. It is this third 
procedure with which this section is con-
cerned. Malinvaud makes the following as-
sumptions about U(.), X, the sets Y, and 
the planning board's a priori knowledge: 
(a) The set X is closed and convex. 
There exists an i-c- E X such that 	for all 
x E X. The utility function U(x) is concave 
and continuous. 
(b) The sets Y„ i= 1, 	N, are closed, 
bounded and convex. 
(c) The planning board knows a feasi-
ble solution to the planning problem (1). 
In this procedure prices are used to de-
compose problem (1). At each stage of the 
process, the planning bureau sends the firm 
a (normalized) price vector for their 
outputs. Each firm then maximizes the value 
of its output at the price vector, that is, each 





subject to yi E  
The firm then sends to the planning bureau 
the solution yt - I to the firm's problem. The 
bureau uses this maximizer along with the 
maximizers received at previous iterations to 
approximate Y„ the firm's feasible produc-
tion set. The approximated production set 
Yis for firm i at iteration t is the set of all 
convex combinations of maximizers re-
ceived from firm i at all iterations, including 
the current one: 
1 	
1- I 	i - I 
Yis---— YilYi= E AiTY7, E Air= 1, kr '›...--°, 
T =1 	TO 
r = 0, 1, .. . , t — 1 }  
The planning bureau then solves for what 
the optimal vectors of final consumption 
and net outputs would be if the firms' pro-
duction sets were actually the sets Y,t, i= 
1, 	N, i.e., the planning bureau solves 
problem (1) with Y, replaced by Y .,' for all i. 
Let (x', ye ) ) solve the planning board's 
problem at iteration t. Revised prices ',tare 
any (normalized) M-vector such that 
and satisfying the following three condi-
tions: 
1) p ,x>.pfx , 
U(x)>- U(xt) 
2) p'yz( t ) -Ksply, for all yi E Yt, for all 
i= 1, 	N 
3) pk=0 for all k such that 
N 
E Yt)-< wk 
1=1 
The planning bureau's decision is 
(x(m'), 	lim xr, lim y ( t ) ) 
Since the planning procedure converges 
to a solution of problem (I) (see Malinvaud) 
it is straightforward to verify its admissibil-
ity. If at each stage each division i solves a 
problem like (2) where Yi is replaced by Y1 , 
and where Y1 is convex, then it is immediate 
by admissibility that 
(x( m°° (Y1,• • • ,YN)), Y (mcc (Yi ,• • -, YN))) 
for all x EX such that 
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solves problem (1) where Y1 has been re-
placed by Y1 for all i. 
In order to apply the evaluation measures 
defined in Section III, and therefore the 
results of that section, it must be shown that 
the planning bureau can judge whether or 
not a sequence of vectors {y:},°1 1 is con-
sistent with some convex set Y1 . Since the 
firm is maximizing a linear function over a 
convex set, the maximizer y i must be an 
extreme point of Yi . Therefore a sequence 
{y1},' I will be consistent with a convex set 
Y1 if and only if the following is true for 
all t: 
ytE(interior Y r ) 
If Yi were a convex polyhedral set, then y: 
could certainly be a point on one of the 
faces of yt; i.e., y: E (boundary Yi t ). 
The evaluation measure for each firm is 
then: 
U(x(m°°)) if yr E (interior r) 
for all t; 
and lim yP) E 
inf U(x)— 1 otherwise 
xEX 
If the firms in Malinvaud's economy are 
evaluated in the above manner, there is rea-
son to expect that the rules of MPC will be 
followed, based on the results in Section III. 
These results state that the N-tuple of true 
production sets YN ) constitute a 
Nash equilibrium that dominates in the set 
of Nash equilibria. Moreover, this is the 
only Nash equilibrium known a priori to all 
the firms in the economy and that is inde-
pendent of the set X of feasible final con-
sumption vectors. 
APPENDIX 
All theorems and corollaries hold for all 
admissible planning procedures and evalua-
tion measures defined by Definitions 2 and 
3, respectively. 
THEOREM 1: For all Yi EH, j i, if = 
Yi  then WiiYi• • • , Y1* • • • • •YN1> W[Y1, 
...,YN ] for all Yi cR m . 
PROOF: 
By admissibility of the planning proce-




subject to xEX; yEY ;;yEY 1 and 
x — /,'1_ 1 iv-4W. 
Let 171 be any other subset of Ul m (not 
necessarily convex), and (x(m°°(Y 1 , , 
YN )), y(ni'(Y1 ,...,YN ))) the vector of final 
consumption and production chosen by the 
planning board when firm i reports its pro-
duction set as Yi . One of the following must 
hold: 
(i) yi (m"(111 ,...,YN))E 	The produc- 
tion plan chosen when firm i reports Yi is 
still available if the firm reports Y, in addi-
tion to production plans that were not 
previously available. It is immediate that 
U(x(m`")(Y1 ,..., r...,YN ))) U(x(m°°(' i , 
• • • •YN))) and Wi[Yi, • • • Yo 	, YN ] 
•• • ANL 
(ii) y i (m"(Y 1 , 	, YN )) E Y. Then 
Wi[YI , • • • • ITN] = infx Ex U(x)— 1 and 
Wi[Yi , • • •, Yo-••,YN]>- wi[YI,- -AN]. 
COROLLARY 1: The N-tuple (Y 1 ,..., YN ) 
is a Nash equilibrium, i.e., for all i= 1,..., N, 
W[Yi••• • •YNi> W,[ 311•• • ••Yi• • • • , YN ] for all 
Y i cE4 m . 
PROOF: 
Immediate from Theorem 1. 
THEOREM 2: If for all Y t EH, 
•• 17 , • • • 'ITN] > Wi [Y1 , • • • YN] for all 
then Y,* n 
PROOF: 
Assume Yi* n Y=4. Then Y,(m cc0(1 , • • 
Y, for all convex Yi , jai, and 
W,[171 , . , , YN = inf.„ Ex ) — 1 for 
some convex Yt , j i. Therefore Wi [Yi , 
yi , , 	wi [y, , , Yis , , VA,' which 
is a contradiction (from Theorem 1). 
THEOREM 3: For every Nash equilibrium 
(Y1•• • • 'ITN), W[Yi, • • • •Yisr] > WAp• • • ,YNi 
for all i=1,..., N. 
Ei [m' 
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PROOF: 
If P=(x(m"(Y 1 ,...,Y N )), 
YN))) is chosen when the firms report 
(Y1 , ...,YN), when the firms report Y; 
fyi(ne)(Y, YN))}, the planning board 
will again choose P. Therefore, U(x(m°°(Y i , 
• • • , YN)))= tAx(m w 0(i, • ,Y0)). Since 
(Y1, • • • , YN ) is a Nash equilibrium, yi(m")(Yi , 
y for all i. Thus, 	c y for all i 
and U(x(m'(Y;, 	, Y < U(x(m")(Yi , 
•• • , YN))). 
We therefore have W[Y 1 , 	, YN ] 
U(x (mNY 1 ,...,YN ))) = U(x(m' (Y;,..., 
111„))) < U(x(m°°(Y,, , Y N )))=- 
THEOREM 4: If (17,...,11;i") is a Nash 
equilibrium and for all i, 	 YNI= 
[Y', 	, YN ], then P* =(x(m")(V,..., 
V)), y(m'(Yq,...,V))) solves problem (1). 
PROOF: 
(i) Since (r, 	, 	) is a Nash 
equilibrium, P* = (x(m°°(V,...,V)), 
Y(mw(Yr , ...,Y,„1)))E X x Y l x ... X YN  
(ii) By admissibility, (x(m'(Yi , 	YN )), 
Ain c4(Y1,• • -,EN))) solves (1). By assump- 
tion, U(x(m`°(Y 1 ,..., YN ))) -- 	YN ] 
= WJY; , , Y 	U(x(m°°(Yr,...,V)))• 
From (i), P* is feasible. Thus, P* solves (1). 
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1 	introduction  
Since Shapley's seminal article [7], research on sequential games has 
demonstrated existence of an equilibrium point in stationary policies under 
ever more general conditions. This research, recently surveyed in [6], con-
cerns discounted and average return criteria. The present article addresses 
the discounted case. The central result is that the transitive completion of 
a game has an equilibrium point (respectively, a Pareto optimum) in stationary 
policies if the original game has any equilibrium point (Pareto optimum). 
The arguments here do not entail assumptions of cardinal utility. 
Instead, each player is assumed to possess a countably transitive preference 
structure that exhibits temporal persistence. Countable transitivity is akin 
to discounting and temporal persistence has been called "consistent choice." 
The consequences of the latter assumption are examined in [3] and the other 
assumptions are discussed briefly in [8]. The preference structures need not 
be transitive, reflexive, or complete. 
It is a pleasure to correct an oversight in [8] and acknowledge the 
contribution of Denardo's thesis [1]. Although the preferences in [1] are 
cardinal, the assumptions are closely related to mine here and in [8]. In 
particular, countable transitivity plays the same role as Denardo's "con-
vergence condition." 
In outline, §2 specifies the deterministic structure to which the results 
derived in §3 first apply. 	Games with the- following generalizations are 
discussed in §4: stochastic transitions, pure strategy solutions, learning, 
and nonstationary transition probabilities. 
The specific results in §3 apply to the core, hence Pareto optima, as 
well as equilibrium points. Therefore, they pertain to one-person sequential 
decision processes with a multi-attribute utility function. 
2. A Sequential Decision Process  
Let S be a nonempty set of states and A(s) a nonempty set of actions for 
each ssS. Let C = ((s,a): aEA(s), sES1, A = ss A(s), and Y = ti ll. Elements 
of A are single stage decision rules and elements of Y are Marko ,) 
Transitions from state to state are determined by a mapping M from C to S. A 
posterity is a feasible sequence of successive states and actions. The set s 
of all posterities with initial state s is 
s 
= ((s a s
?' 
a
2' ''''. ) 	s 1  = s, (s n ,an)eC and s n+1 = M(s ,a ) for all n} '  
A Markov policy 7 = (3 1 ,5 9 , ...) is a stationary policy if d i = 9 	• 
,c0 
for some 6EA. Then 7 is written as 	. 
Let. G be a nonempty set and 3GxG. If (b,b)EB for all bEG then B is 
reflexive. If (b,c)EB and (c,d)EB => (b,d)E3 then B is transitive. For all 
(b,c)EBxB, if (b,c)EG, or (c,b)EG, or both (b,c)EG and (c,b)EG, then 3 is 
complete. If B is complete, then it is reflexive. Let f be a mapping from G 
to G. Then f is isotone (with B) if (b,c)EB => [f(b),f(c)1EB. An element 
bEG is B-maximaZ if (b,c)EB for all cEG. 
For each yv!, let Ty be the mapping from Y to Y given by Ty7 = (Y,81,32, . 
where Tr = (3 1 ,8 2 , ...). Thus T,(7 defers the use of 7 for one period during 
which the single period decision rule y is used. 
The results in [81 depend on three axioms which concern a binary relation 
.0 	30 
y: y , yEAl is closed for 
6 (Theorem 5 in [8]). 
3 
	
B y Y x Y. We write T> S <=> (7,7)E13 <=> 
	
< T. The axioms are: 
(> Y) is reflexive and transitive; 
for each 	T is isotone on (>,Y); 
for each 7 = (6 ,6 , ...)EY and F,EY, 
> T T, 
6 1 0 2 K. 







7 > 	for all K < 	=> 7> 2 
iK 
The axioms are called rationality, consistent choice or temvoral persistence 
or stationarity, and countable transitivity, respectively. 
THEOREM 1 Suppose axioms (1), (2), and (3) are valid. 
A. T 6  7 > 7 => 6 > 7 (Theorem 1 in [8]).. 
. B. If there exists a >--maximal ITEY :hen there exists 6EA such that 3 is >- 
maximal (Theorem 2 in [8]). 
C. 1TcY is >-maximal <=> n > T-7 =or all 3EL 
D. If ICI < 00 then there exists a >—mazimal 
(Theorems 3 and 4 in [8]). 
co 
3 (Corollary in [8]). 
E. If i is compact in a topology for which { 
every 6EA, then there exists a >-maximal 
Part B. can be used to restate the => portion of part C: 
F. For every yeL1, either y is >-maximal or there is another 3cL such that 
The proof of F in [8] is constructive and is, essentially, the policy improve-
ment algorithm. Therefore, under the assumptions of Theorem 3 below, that 
algorithm can be applied to the transitive completions (specified in 53) of 
the orderings (> e ,Y) and (>9 
 ,Y) defined below. We do not explore the 
algorithm's performance in this paper. The theorem is valid too for 
stochastic sequential decision processes (34). 
The binary relation (>,Y) can arise in several ways. In a one-player 




s for each sES with the interpretation (p,p')E9 <=> posterity p 
is at least as desireable as posterity p'. For sES and 7 = (6 1 ,6 2 , ....)EY, 
let p s (7) denote (s,al ,s 2 ,a 2 , ...)Et s where an =
n
(s
n) for all n. In [8], 
7 > y <=> [p
s (7), p s (y)1Et s 
for all seS. 
An equivalence between (>,Y) and (9 s
: sES} is detailed in [41 and [5, §XVII.31. 
In particular, if (9 s : sES} possess rationality, temporal persistence, and 
countable transitivity then (>,Y) inherits these properties. 
Multiple player models can induce (>,Y). Let I be a nonempty set of 
players and Al a nonempty set of actions available to player i when the state 
is s. Let A(s) = xET A
i 
i 	s
. Then define 3,Y, C. and M as previously done. A 
coalition is a nonempty subset of players. Let 2, the set of latent coalitions, 





, x t s 
indicate the coalition's preferences concerning posterities with 
s 1 = s. This is a 
sequential game model. 
00 
It is convenient to label the i-th ?layer's portion of ITEY = x 	x'x A
i 
t=1 sES iEI s 
as 7
i 
and the portion of 7 due to all the remaining players as 7. With this 
notation, binary relations underlying definitions of equilibrium point and 
Pareto optimum, respectively, are 
7 > y <=> [P s ( 7 ), P s 
for all sES and iEI; 
7 > 	<=> either [o (7),p (E)]Ee  for all SES, WE2 
'S 
	
or there exist (s,w) and (u,j) such that 	(5) 
[Ps(7),1),s()lie and [p u (5),p s (7)]teita . 
DEFINITION. 7 is an equilibrium point <=> 7 iS > -maximal. 7 is in the 
core <=> IT is > -maw mal. 
When 2 = I, elements in the core are sometimes called Pareto optima. 
The binary relation (>,Y) can arise in a manner that mixes the one-
player and multiple ?layer models. Consider a single decision maker with 
Y, C, and H defined as in the one-player model. Let I denote a nonempty 
set of criteria. If 11.  > 1 this is a muiti-criterlion model. For each sES 
and idI, let ess x (1) s indicate preferences with respect to the i-th 
criterion if s
1
=s. Let (5) define > with 2 = I. Then a 2-maximal policy 
is called undoml:nated, eff::cient, and a Pareto optimum in various literatures. 
If { w : sES, wE2} has rationality, temporal persistence, and countable 
transitivity, (> ,Y) and (> 0 ,Y) are not necessarily transitive. Hence, 
Theorem 1 cannot straightforwardly be applied to sequential games. 
The difficulty has nothing to do with the dynamical nature of the 
process. Consider the following bimatrix game. 
r s 	1 t 
0, 0 0, -1 I 0, 1 
u v1 w 
-1, 0 0, 0 i ' 0, -1 
Y i 
1, 0 x -1, 0 0,0 
z 
Then r > v and v > z but r 	z. Consider the following bimatrix game. 
--e 
	
0, 1 	3, 0 
y 
2, 2 	0, 0 
Then w >
P 
 x and x > y but w p y. 
3. Solutions in Stationary Policies  




was provoked by Whitt's paper [9] stimulated by Fishburn [2]. Let G be a 
nonempty set and 3 y G X G. Using Whitt's notation, we write xRy <=> (x,y)cB, 
and xPy <=> xRy and not yRx. An inconsistency cycle connecting x and y is a 
finite sequence x1 , 	xn with x l = xn = x and xk = y for some k, 
1 < k < n, such that x.Rxi+1 for all i and x.Px. 	for some i. In the 2x2 1 1+1 
bimatrix game above, w, x, y, w is an inconsistency cycle under the relation 
> . Define a relation R' on G via xR'y <=> either xRy, or neither xRy nor yRx 
so x and v are unrelated under R. Define a relation R
c 
on G via xR v <=> either 
c ' 
xR'y or there is an inconsistency cycle connecting x and y under R'. The 
relation R
c 
is the transitive corTietion of R. 
The following properties of ac can be proven straightforwardly. 
LEMMA 1. A. R
c 
is compiete and transitive. 
B. xRy => xRny. 
C. xEG is R-maxirrai => x is R 
Consider a relation (>,Y) which need be neither complete, reflexive, nor 
7 
transitive. Let (> ,Y) denote the relation constructed from (>,Y) as (R
c
,G) --c 
was constructed from (R,G). 
THEOREM 2. Suppose (>,Y) is a relation for which (2) and (3) are valid. 
,00 
u 
A. T 1.7 > C T => 0 > 
	
T. 
- 	 -C 
B. If there exists a > -mawmal TrEY then 7 s > - maxirral and there exists 
a > -maximal 6 . 
-C 
C. If ITEY is >-maximal then 7 > 	for all 
00 
D. If ICI < 
	
	then there exists a > -maxi,TaL 3 . -c 
00 	co 
E. If G is comract in a torology for which 	y > 6 , yE,L} is closed -'or 
= 
every 6EA, then there exists a >c -maximal 6 S. - 
F. For every yEz. 	
. 
either y 	> -maximal or there is another 5 	such that 
.0 	00 
> y . -c 
PROOF. Parts A through F depend on part A of the lemma and on > inheriting 
(2) and (3) from >. Part B of the lemma applies that > inherits (2) and (3) 
from 	Each part of this theorem uses its corresponding latter part of 
Theorem 1. Also, parts S through F depend on part C of the lemma. 
In order to apply Theorem 2 to the sequential game and multi-criterion 
models, it will be assumed that 9 () : we2,sES} is temporally persistent 
(2) and countably transitive (3). The task then will be to verify that 
> and > inherit these properties. —e 
A state seS is reachable if it can be reached from some state, 	if 
there exists (u,a)EC such that s = M(u,a). The set S is called reachable if 
s is reachable for all sES. 
We say that O: sES, LIJES} is temporally persistent if (u,a)EC, 
M(u,a) = s, and (p,p')E9 	=> [(u,a,p),(u,a,p 1 )]Eew . 





2' • s 
with p j matching o ° up l  
to s
j 
and a j , namely s t = s
0 
t 
and aj = a0 t = 1, , 2 

















for all j > 1; 
(p j ,p 34-1 )E9(1/ for all j >1 => (p j ,p 0 )Eew 	for all j > 1. 
LEMMA 2. Suppose (& is temporally persistent and countabLy transitive. 
A. .(> ,Y) satisfies (2) and (3). 
B. (>
-10 
 ,Y) satisfies (3). If S is reachable, then (>:,Y) satisfies (3). 
PROOF. Countable transitivity of {e w} straightforwardly implies (3) for 
> and > defined by (4) and (3). Temporal persistence of {e w} directly —e 	--P 
implies (2) for > . 
Suppose S is reachable. Let (,r,Y) be defined by 7 r <=> [p s (7),p s ()]zeui 
for all sES and LIJEC?.. Then temporal persistence of i:8 fp implies ( ,im,Y) 
satisfies (2). Isotonicity of (>
—T1 
 ,Y) involves two cases. If 7 > 	and 7 S. 
then (2) for (..,Y) implies Ter .1,9 T. If 7 > 	but 7 T 	is false, then 
> 7 is true. Hence, by (5), there exist (s,i) and (u,j) such that 
—10 
[13 s ( F), p s (Tolte i and [p u (Tr), pu (z)]tej. Therefore, temporal persistence of 
{e} and the assumption that s and u are reachable imply existence of (v,a) 
and (x,b) such that aEA(v), bEA(x), s = M(v,a), u = M(x,b), and 
([17 , a , P s ( ) 1 , [v ,a , P s (7)])i e .lv- , 	( [x,b,p u (71- )I, [x ,b,pu (,;' )])t e!. 




temporally persistent and c.:r2ntab17,' transitive. 
A. (> Y) has troterties A through E in neorer7 2, ?;here > 7-e=e-s 	t:e _e, 	_ 
—C 
transitive comv7etion or > . -e 
B. If S is reachable then (> ,Y) has oroperties A through E in Meore71 2, 
where > refers to the transitive comrietion of > . 
' 
Theorem 3 provides sufficient conditions for existence of an equilibrium 
point (respectively, subset of the core) among stationary policies if the set 
of equilibrium points (if the core) is nonempty. 
4. Generalizations  
Theorem 3 encompasses mixed strategies and processes in which states at 
successive stages comprise a discrete-time conditionally Markov process. The 
details in J5 of [8] will be outlined here. 
Let X denote the set of states of the underlying stochastic process 
and assume that X is denumerable. Let Zi be the denumerable set of actions 
X 
available to player i in state x, S be the set of all probability measures 
on X, and L i be the set of all (randomized) rules that specify an action in 
Z
i 
for each xeX; define L = .x
i 
and Y = x L. Then, s l ,s 2 , ... is the 
lei 
sequence of marginal distributions on X. The theorems are valid in this 
stochastic setting but a non-Markov policy would not induce conditionally 
independent successive states so the joint distribution of successive 





sufficiently arbitrary preference orderings could lead to Y being genuinely 
restrictive. 
The state-to-state mapping M may be nonstationary without invalidating 
any result. That is, for each t, let S t , A t (s), and M t depend on t, and 
suppose M t (s,a)eS t+1 for all seS
t 












is reachable if s is reachable for all 
scSt+1. For Lemma 2B and 
Theorem 3B, assume that S t is reachable for all t > 1. Then a careful review 
of the proofs in [8] on which Theorem 1 (here) is based, and of the arguments 
in this paper, shows that the lemmas and theorems here remain valid. This 
extension admits some learning processes and nonstationary transition 
probabilities in the stochastic case. Therefore, existence of a stationary 
solution rests on stationarity of preference, i.e. postulate (2), rather than 
on stationarity in the underlying dynamics. 
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HOMOGENEOUS MARKOV DECISION PROCESSES 
Matthew J. Sobel 
Georgia Institute of Technology 
Abstract  
Suppose that each random variable in a Markov decision process is 
replaced by A, A > 0. Let s be a state and let f(s,A) denote the value of 
an optimal policy in the new problem if s is the initial state. Sufficient 
conditions are presented for f(s,A) = A mf(s/A,1). The conditions are satisfied 
by several standard models. 
Key Words  
Markov decision process, dynamic programming, homogeneous, sensitivity analysis. 
1. Introduction. Let S denote the set of states, As the set of actions which 
are feasible in state s, and C = {(s,a): 
acAs' scS}. For each (s,a)cC, let 
s,a 
be a random variable with sample space Q (the same for all (s,a)cC). Let 
g be a real-valued function on C x 0 and let h be a function from C X Q to S. 
Consider dynamic programming recursions and equations such as 
fn (s) = sup{E[g(s,a,Cs,a
) + fn-1fh(s,ags,a
))]: acAs
), 	scS, 	(1.1) 
and 
v(s) = suplE[g(s,a,Es,$)] + av{h(s,a,Es,$)}]: acAs l, 	scS. 	(1.2) 
The result below concerns the effect on f
n
(•) and y•) if E
s,a 
 is replaced by 
A s,a' A > 0. Accordingly, let 
	
f(s,X) A = suplE[g(s,a,Es,a
) + J{h(s,a,Es,a
), X}J: aeAs }, seS, X >0, 
	(1.3) 
where J is a real-valued function on S X (0,00). Suppose that the expectation in 
(1.3) always exists and that f(.,•) is finite on S x(0,0)). 
The following section presents and discusses conditions sufficient for 
f(s,X) 	Amf(s/A), 1). This result is applied in §3 to an inventory model and 
to a fishery model. 
2. Homogeneity. A set X Q Me is a cone if X > 0 and xcX implies XxeX. If 
X is a cone, a function w: X ►  1R is homogeneous of degree m if A > 0 and xCX 
implies w(Ax) Xmw(x). If X is a cone and Dx is a random variable for each 
-2- 
xcX, then {Dx : xcx} is a conical family if A > 0 and xcX implies that D x and 
DAx 
have the same distribution. 
It is assumed that the probability space has been extended, if necessary, 
so that the sample space S2 is a cone. 
THEOREM. Suppose C is a cone, {Es a : (s,a)cC} is a conical family, g and 
J are homogeneous of degree m, and h is homogeneous of degree one. Then f 
is homogeneous of degree m, i.e. 
	
f(s,X) = Xmf(s/A, 1), 	scS, A > 0. 	 (2.1) 
Special cases of the models in [1], [3], [4], [5], [6], and [7] 
satisfy the conditions of the theorem with m = 1. The contexts are production 
smoothing, fisheries harvesting, cash management, and inventory control. 
Consider a particular model with A = 1 and the family of such models as E 
is replaced by A. If f(•,1) has been approximated numerically then (2.1) 
implies that the entire family has been approximated too. Thus the principal 
virtue of the theorem is its simplification of certain sensitivity analyses in 
applications of Markov decision processes. 
PROOF. Let A > O. From the assumptions, AmJ[h(z),1] = J[h(Az),X], 
aCAs p (s,a)CC a (Asdka)cC a XacAxs, 
andsa has the same distribution as ,  
tAsdat. Therefore, 
Amf(s,1) = sup{E[g(Asdadt sa) + .7111(Xsdia,A s,a),A)]: acA8 ) , 




which is equivalent to (2.1). 
Wijngaard and Boot [7] analyze a version of the production smoothing model 
in [1]. In that model, Es,a is the periodic demand for a product. It is invariant 
with respect to (s,a)6C so 
{E
s a: (s,a)cC) is trivially a conical family. 
Wijngaard and Boot restrict the demand distributions in their efforts to prove 
the following result which is stronger than (2.1). If each 	is 
replaced by X + k (where ke2 and )t + k62), let f(•,A, k) and f(•,1,0) 
denote the new and old analogues of (1.3). Then [7] concerns the extent to 
which Xf(s + k,1,0) = f(s/A,A,k) is true. See a paper by Denardo and Rothblum [2] 
for an entirely different approach to affine dynamic programming. 
If S a MR then (2.1) implies 
	
f(s,A) = smf(l,A/s), 	seS(wi0), 	A > 0, 	 (2.2) 
which yields computational alternatives to (1.1) and (1.2). In (1.2), for 
example, let v(s,X) denote v(s) when each Es ,a is replaced by AEs,a,  and let 
V(A) = v(1,A). If (2.2) is valid for v, then v(s,X) = s mV(A/s) so 
V(•) yields v(•,1). Let 
Ga(A) = E[g(1,a, AE1,a)]' 	Ha (X) = h(1,a,AE l,a ), 
and suppose Pilia (X) = 0) = 0 for all A > 0 and acAl . From (1.2), 
V(A) = sup{Ga (A) + 8E{[Ha (A)] InV[A/Ha (X)]): 	 A > 0. 	(2.3) 
The assumption P{lia (A) = 0} = 0 is satisfied in [5] and in some cases 
-4- 
of [6]. It remains to be seen if there are models for which an 
approximate numerical solution of (2.3) is an easier task than that of (1.2). 
3. Two Applications. 	Consider a single item discrete-time inventory model 
in which purchase costs are linear with unit cost c, holding and penalty costs 
are linear with respective unit costs h and r, demands are backlogged, a < 1 
is the discount factor, and demands F1 , F2, ... are independent and identically 
distributed with distribution function E(•). Generalizations of this model 
were studied by Veinott [6]. 
It follows from [6] that minimization of expected discounted cost leads 
to minimization of 
E[E:.1 an -1L 1 (an)] 
where, for A > 0, and aelR, 
L
A
(A) = c(1-a)a + hjr(a-x)da(x/A) + rjr(x-a)da(x/A). 
0 	 a 
(3.1) 
(3.2) 
The minimum of L(.) on IR is achieved at 
* 
ax = A8
-1  f[r-c(14)]/(n + h)), A > 0 	 (3.3) 
and the value of the infimum of (3.1) is L 1 (a1 )/(1-8) if the initial inventory 
level s < a 1 . 
Suppose that the problem is altered so each demand cl is replaced by 4n , 
A > 0. It follows from [6] that the problem is equivalent to minimization of 
-5- 
(3.1) with LA (an) replacing yan). Let f(s,A) denote the value of the minimum 
if s is the initial inventory level. From [6], 
f(s,A) = LA(ax)/(1-$), 	s < aA. A (3.4) 
Let KA denote the right side of (3.4). 
The conditions of the theorem are satisfied with m = 1 so 
f(s,A) = Af(s/A,1). 
From (3.4) 
f(s,A) = K
A 	if s < 	' aX •	Af(s/A,1) = AK1 	 1 
if s/A < al. 
Hence, (3.5) implies 
aA = Aa1 and KA = 
(3.5) 
(3.6) 
Heretofore, (3.6) has been known only for the several specific classes of 
distribution functions O(•) for which aA and L A (aA) can be written explicitly. 
Consider a fishery with q species ("species" may include different age-
classes of the same species) in which the objective is to maximize the expected 
discounted revenue from all species caught. If an is the vector of population 
levels (in units of biomass) at the end of the n-th fishing season, then assume 
that the vector of population levels (in units of biomass) at the start of the 
-6- 
n+l-st season is distributed as h(a n ,E). Let p denote the vector of prices 
(per unit biomass) for the species. This model is related to [3] and [4] and 
leads to the dynamic program 
f(s,A) = sup{P•(s-s) + BE{f[h(a,E), A]}: 0 < a < s} 	 (3.7) 
in which A > 0 and 13E10 with s > 0. 
Suppose that the expectation in (3.7) exists for all a and that (3.7) is 
finite for all s and A. Suppose too that a x maximizes -p.a + 8E{f[h(a,E), A]) 
on the nonnegative orthant of TO. Then 
f(s,A) = KA if a < s — ' (3.8) 




If h is homogeneous of degree one, then the theorem's conditions are satisfied 
so, from the argument yielding (3.6), 
* 
ax = Aal and KA = AK1 . (3.9) 
For x = (xl ,x2 , 	x )eIllq , let (x)+ denote the q-vector whose i-th 
component is max{x0}. An example of a homogeneous h which suffices for some 
fisheries is 
h(a,E) m (MA + E) f 
-7- 
where M is a qxq real matrix and is a q-vector valued random variable. 
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STOCHASTIC FISHERY GAMES WITH MYOPIC EQUILIBRIA 
by 
Matthew J. Sobel 
Georgia Institute of Technology 
1. Introduction  
Most implemented fishery models use a single pooled age class. If the 
model concerns more than one species, then the species are pooled too. The 
reasons given to justify such highly aggregated models are mathematical 
complexity, numerical complexity, and sparse data. Many scientists and 
regulatory agencies realize that less highly aggregated models are desireable 
planning tools. 
Different species of fish may prey on one another or compete for common 
prey (Figure 1). For example, in New England, cod, pollock, and siler hake 
feed on herring; mackerel and silver hake feed on each other; and cod feed 
on mackerel. The age-class structure of a single species often exhibits 
marked fluctuations as time passes. These fluctuations should affect 
harvesting policies so there are biological reasons to build multi-species 
multi-age-class models. 
The Fishery Conservation and Management Act of 1976 (P.L. 94-265) mandates 
a regional approach to fishery management, Therefore, the biological inter-
actions mentioned above preclude disaggregation of the management task into 
independent tasks of managing each species separately. The Act creates 
Regional Councils so now there are instititional and legal reasons to build 
multi-species models. 









species. This "bycatch" phenomenon is a technological reason to build 
multi-species models. 
These technological and biological considerations provide economic 
incentives to coordinate the management of several species. From Figure 1, 
in New England we should not stipulate the mackerel catch without considering 
the effects on cod and silver hake. 
Figure 1  
NEW ENGLAND FISHERY  
Aico-,eax 	  /L.r/gR 
71,4gE 
orgER 	Fisli ARE FOoD FoR AL L j THEY PREY o/t/ 
ALL EXCEPT COD 	POLI-OCK. 
OTHER. /A/VERTEBR4TES ARE FOOD .FOR 
DENor-ES Y FEEDS ON X. 
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The stochastic game in §2 includes a general class of species and age-
class interactions in the underlying population dynamics. The model is 
presented in §2 and critiqued in §4. The special case of linear returns leads 
to a simplification which is presented formally in §3. The potential 
applications to fisheries are discussed in §5. In this case, the stochastic 
game has a "myopic" equilibrium point which can be computed relatively easily. 
There is a large and growing literature on the 1976 Act. Other writers 
have noted the multiplicity of objectives and "players" in a regional fishery 
(cf. Mendelssohn (6]). Some writers have analyzed the international "game" 
in conflicts over fisheries resources (cf. Levhari and Mirman (51). This 
paper proposes that sequential game models be used to analyze dynamic 
interactions. Many others (cf:' Clark (2]) have advocated the use of sequential 
models to analyze the optimal operation of renewable resources where "optimal" 
refers to a single perspective (firm, agency, country, etc.). 
2. A Stochastic Fishery Game  
Let I be the set of relevant species. The species identities are assumed 
to be equivalent to the various sub-industries that fish for the species. 
In year t, 	..., the state is the vector s t' The i-th component of s t 
is s t which is the biomass of species i at the beginning of the fishing 
season. Let S denote the set of all possible states. If seS then s
i 
denotes 
the i-th component of s. This notation is consistent with a more general model 
that has several age-classes for each species. Then s t and s
i 
become vectors 
with as many components as there are age-classes for species i. The same 
remark applies to the following notation. 
Let at 
denote the biomass of species i at the end of the fishing season in year 
t, i.e. its "escapement", and let a t 	(at,ia). The set of possible values of a t 
 depends, generally, on st . For example, 0 < a t st unless species i reproduces 
-4- 
extraordinarily quickly. If the constraint is 0 < a
i 	i 
' 
< s t , we might interpret 
t t 
s t - at as the size of the catch of species i in year t. This interpretation 
is reasonable only if natural mortality and recruitment are negligible during 
the fishing season. Generally, let A i denote the set of feasible values of 
i if s
t 
= s. Then C s = X AS is the set of feasible values of at 
 if s t 
 = s 
and a eC 4* a
t e A
i for all iEI. Let A 	U Cs . If aEA then a
i 
denotes 
t s t 	st 	 sES 
the i-th component of a. For any t, W = {(s,a): aEC s , sES} denotes the set of 
feasible (st'at) pairs. If AS = (0,s
i
] for each i, then 
W = {(s,a): 0 < a < s, sES}. For computational and expository convenience, 
assume that W is a setiaith only finitely many elements. 
The population dynamics are specified by transition probabilities. 
Assume that (i) the dynamics are Markovian so s t+1 has a distribution that 
depends on sv al ,...,se at only through s t and at ; (ii) the distribution of 
s ti.1 does not depend on s t . Assumption (i) is made throughout the stochastic 
game literature and is reasonable for a fishery. The biomasses in year t+1 
depend on the biomasses and catches in year t. Assumption (ii) is a 
characteristic of regional fisheries that significantly simplifies the 
analysis of their dynamics. 
Assumptions (i) and (ii) together imply that there are numbers 	 ) 
• 	
Pj,  
jES and aEA, such that 






,a1t,at = a} 
for all t. Therefore, the biomasses at the start of the t+l-st fishing season 
are assumed to depend only on the biomasses at the end of the t-th season 
(and, possibly, on exogenous uncertainty). In fact, (1) is implicit in most 
theoretical and empirical fisheries research. It is a stochastic generalization 
of the "metered model" in [1]. 
Let a 0 < a i 
 < 1, denote the single period discount factor for the sub- 
-5- 
industry which harvests species i. Let r i (s,a) denote sub-industry i's 
(expected) profit in any year t where s t=s and 	For example, if (i) sub- 





the catch of species i, and (iii) if its profit is proportional to the size 
of the catch, then 
(2) r i (s,a) = b i 
where b i is the unit profit. Let 
(3) Vi =
co 
t=1 a t 
-1 ri (s t' at  ) 
denote sub-industry i's sum of discounted profits. 
Let 7
i 
denote the set of all nonanticipative decision rules (possibly 
history dependent and randomized) which player i could use to choose the 
i 
sequence of actions al'
a2 
' 
... . Let 7 ma X 7i be the product set of all 
ieI 
players' possible rules and, for pe7r, write p = (p,p) where pE 
jai 
For pvm, the expectation v.(pls) = Ep 1  (V.Is = s] exists for all idI, 
sES, and pE7. 
DEFINITION. A policy 6E7 is an EQUILIBRIUM POINT RELATIVE TO X Q S tiff 
(4) v (51s) = sup{v i ( p 	 seX, 	ieI. 
Thus an equilibrium point relative to X is noncollusively optimal for every 
player for each initial state in X. 
There is a stationary policy which is an equilibrium point relative to S 
(11,4,9,13). However, even a two-person zero sum stochastic game with 'WI < co 
and rational data may possess an irrational value. Therefore, a finitely 
convergent algorithm is not achievable in general. 
-6- 
3. Myopic Equilibria  
Assumption (1) and two others below lead to a relatively easily computable 
equilibrium point relative to a proper subset of S. Suppose 
(5) ri (s,a) = Ki (a) + Li (s), 	ieI, 	(s,a)eW. 
The case which is pertinent for fisheries is (2) where K i (a) = b ia i 
 and Li (s) = b.s i . Under assumptions (1) and (5), let 
(6) G (a) = Ki
(a) + ai E
seS  p s (a)L.(s), 	aeA, ieI.  I 
When (5) is caused by (2), 
(7) Gi la) = -b al + a.b.ZseS p s
(a)si 
Let S(a) = {s: seS, aeAs } denote the states in which action aeA is 
feasible. Let r denote the following noncooperative static (Nash) game among 




actions and G (a) is player i's payoff if the actions are 
a = (ai , ieI). Since 1A1 1 < co for each i and III < co, there is 
an equilibrium point of r. First, suppose that a * is an unrandomized 
equilibrium point of r: 
(8) There exists a*eA which is an equilibrium point of r. 
THEOREM. Assumptions (1), (5), (8), and 
(9) jeS(a*) Pi (a*
) = 1 
imply at = a* for all t=1,2, ... is an equilibrium point relative to S(a*). 
-7- 
There is a more general version of this result where the equilibrium 
point may represent randomized strategies. The more general version is the 
Corollary below. The significance of the Theorem and Corollary is that there 
are several finitely convergent algorithms to compute an equilibrium point of 
a game such as r (a Nash game). The algorithms are cited in [14] which proves 
the Theorem and Corollary. A stochastic game that satisfies the conditions 
of the Theorem or Corollary is said to have a myopic equilibrium point. Ad 
infinitum repetition of the equilibrium point of a static game comprises an 
equilibrium point of the dynamic game. 
For the Corollary, let D i denote the set of all probability vectors on 
As and D = X U D which is the randomization version of A = X U A
i s . s 
iEI seS 	 icI seS 
(10) Let dcD denote an equilibrium point of r 
which necessarily exists because 1A1 < co.- In this notation, 
d(a) = n P{in r player i chooses action a isAi}. 
ieI 
Let 
A' = {a: aeA, d(a) > 0} 
S' = 	seS, aeA forfor all acA'} = 	S(a). 
aeA' 
COROLLARY. Assumptions (1), (5), and 
-8- 
(11) 	Ejes , Pj (a) = 1 	for aZZ aeA' 
imply P{a t = a} = d(a) for aZZ t=1,2, ... is an equilibrium 
point relative to S'. 
4. Critique of Assumptions  
The applicability of the Theorem and Corollary depends on the extent to 
which the assumptions are reasonable in fisheries. Assumption (2), 




), and its consequences are discussed in §4. It is implicit 
in (2) that s i-ai is interpreted as the catch of species i. We have already 
observed that this interpretation is reasonable if natural mortality and 
recruitment are not too massive during the fishing season. 
The stochastic game model in §2 uses a t , the biomass of species i in the 
fishery at the end of the t-th fishing season, as the generic decision variable. 
In practice, often the estimates of such biomasses are crude. Actually one 
has only sample data from which to infer posterior distributions of s t 
and at and these distributions may exhibit significant variation. Is catch 
size a more appropriate decision variable because it can be measured 
accurately? It is a Hobson's choice. 
Let (a) denote a random variable with the distribution given in (1): 
• 
P (a) = P{(a) = j}, 	jcS, acA. 
Then (1) asserts st+1t) where X Y indicates that random variables X 
and Y have the same distribution. The preceding paragraph admits that we 
-9- 




are the sample data and let 








t ) but we have to 
settle for 
(12) s t+1 	E[E(s - z t)1Xt )  
where the expectation is taken with respect to the conditional distribution of 
s
t 
given X. In words, even if the decision variable is catch size rather 
than residual biomass, (12) exhibits the same posterior distribution for 
s t+1 . 





indicates catch size: 
(13) P{s 	> t+1 * ail = 1, 	id', t = 1,2, ... . 





: a = (a
i
,a)eA'l 
and ao = (ao
, idI). In the notation of the preceeding paragraph, assumption 
(11) is equivalent to 
(14) Pd  {E(a) > 
ao } = 1 
where a is the random action that will be taken using d. 
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In a fishery model, (•) is usually stochastically nondecreasing (this 
ignores overpopulatiOn, i.e. "overcompensation"), so 
(15) P{ (a') < b} > P{(a") < b}, 	< a ,1 , 
for every nonnegative I-vector b. Let 
- a
i 
= min{a: a = (a ,a i)elt } 
and a
+ 
= 	 ' (ai+  iEI). Then (11) and (15) require 
(16) P{(al..) > ao • 
The general sense of (9), (11), (13), (14), or (16) is that, with probability 
one, recruitment minus natural mortality exceeds catch size. If any 
component of a* (or a+) is very low then the assumption is likely to be 
unreasonable ("overfishing."). 
It is implicit in §2 that a separate sub-industry harvests each major 
commercial species. Without such an assumption, consider a dynamic model of 
equilibrium between sub-industries. Such a model would still be a stochastic 
game and an equilibrium point would necessarily exist. But computation and 
characterization would be more difficult (or impossible) because the Theorem 
and Corollary would be invalid. 
The identification of sub-industries with species may be a reasonable 
first approximation in some contexts. Only empirical results can support a 
conclusion regarding whether or not the courseness of the approximation is 
an acceptable price to pay for relatively easy computations. 
5. Fisheries Applications of Myopic Equilibria  
Linear returns (2) leads to (7) which may be written 
(17) 	G.(a) = b.EsES p s (a)(a.s
i 
- al). 
It is apparent that the set of equilibrium points of r does not depend on 
b = (bv icI). Also, Gi la) is proportional to a weighted average of the 
difference between the discounted biomass at the start of next year's season 
and the biomass at the end of this year's season. 
The myopic equilibrium asserted in the Theorem is closely related to a 
result in [7]. The model there is a (single player) version of the present 
one where there is exactly one species. Then linear returns (and some 
technical assumptions) yields a myopic optimum without the restriction (9), 
i.e. without requiring feasibility with probability one. 
The decision rule in the Theorem and Corollary is part of a stationary 




= a} for all t=1,2, 	. Thus the actions are not necessar- 
ily the same for all t but the rule that determines the actions is the same. 
What are the ergodic consequences of using a stationary policy in a stochastic 
game? Section 6 in [7] contributes to the literature (see references in [7] ) 
which answers this question for single species models. The primary tool in [§6 
of 7] is the general theory of discrete-time Markov processes. The same -theory 
was used by Sanghvi [101 to obtain some ergodic consequences of stationary 
policies in stochastic games. He focuses on probabilities of absorbtion. 
In most fisheries models, the absorbing states connote "extinction" so 
Sanghvi's results may be useful here. 
Consider a variant of the model in §2 which stresses aggregate regional 
benefits. Instead of a game-like perspective, suppose that the objective is to 
























and let a* denote an element of A that maximizes G(•) on A. Such an element 
exists because A is a finite set. Suppose C s = [0,s] for scS. As a 
consequence of the Theorem, assumptions (1), (2), and (9) imply a t = a* for 
all t=1,2, ... is optimAl with respect to all initial states s > a * . Such a 
policy is called a myopic optimum. This result can be easily extended to a 
more general model where (i) each species has an age structure, and (ii) sub-
industries are not equivalent to species. 
When III = 1 so species (and age-classes) are pooled, a myopic optimum in 
(18) is merely the familiar discounted version of maximum sustained yield. 
Suppress subscript i in (18) because I = {1} and let 11(a) denote E sesp s (a)s. 
Then (18) is the familiar relationship 
G(a) = b[au(a) - a]. 
If A were an (open) interval and 1.1(•) were continuously differentiable, then 
-13- 
a necessary condition for a* would be au t (ad - 1 = 0 or 4 1 (a*) = a
1
. This 
stochastic version of the usual maximum sustained yield condition occurs in 
the model (with K=0) that Daniel F. Spulber [15] presented at this Conference. 
Another example of a myopic optimum occurs in a stochastic version of 
the model that Lee G. Anderson presented at this Conference [1]. His model 
concerns fleet size and allocation of fishing effort between two species. 
The following model addresses only allocation of effort. For each n, s n ,an , 
and (a
n) are two-vectors with a component for each species. In fact, the 
objective in [1] leads to (18) with III = 2. The distinghishing feature in 
















) < u 
n 





) maximizes (18). Then (19) implies that (9) is equivalent to 
P{g(a ) > a w.(Ua ] - a ) < u} = 1 * 	*, 	* 	* 
where w 	(wl ,w2 ). 
Colin W. Clark's paper [3] at this Conference includes a duopoly model 
that does not have a myopic equilibrium point. His model has two players; 
player 1 is the fishing fleet and player 2 is the processor. Let a l denote 
the escapement chosen by the fleet and let a
2 
denote the unit price of fish 
that the processor will pay the fleet. Then the single period rewards are 
1 
r1 (s,a) = a
2










), and p 
is the wholesale price (less processing cost) that the processor receives 









r2 (s ' a) = -a
2 
 s + ps - pal + a
2a1 
whose first terms lack the additive decomposition feature in (5). 
REFERENCES 
1. Anderson, L.G., "The Economics of Multipurpose Fleet Behavior," presented 
at this Conference (1979). 
2. Clark, C.W., Mathematical Bioeconomics, Wiley, New York (1976). 
3. , "Towards a Predictive Model for the Economic Regulation of 
Commercial Fisheries," presented at this Conference (1979). 
4. Fink, A.M., "Equilibrium in a Stochastic n-Person Game," J. Sci. Hiroshima 
Univ. Ser. A-I 28 (1964), 89-93. 
5. Levhari, D. and L. Mirman, "The Great Fish War: An Example Using a 
Cournot-Nash Equilibrium," Bell J., to appear. 
6. Mendelssohn, R., "Harvesting Policies and the Fishery Conservation and 
Management Act of 1976," unpublished manuscript (1977). 
7. , and M.J. Sobel, "Capital Accumulation and the Optimization 
of Renewable Resource Models," Journal of Economic Theory, to appear. 
8. Parthesarthy, T. and M. Stern, "On Markov Games," Lecture Notes in Pure 
and Applied Mathematics, Vol. 30 (1977) Marcel Dekker Publishing Company, 
pp. 1-46. 
9. Rogers, P. D., "Nonzero-sum stochastic games. Report ORC 69-8, Operations 
Research Center, University of California, Berkeley, 1969. 
10. Sanghvi, A. P., "Sequential Games as Stochastic Processes," Stochastic  
Processes and their Applications, 6 (1978), 323-336. 
11. Shapley, L., "Stochastic Games," Proceedings of the National Academy of  
Sciences, USA, Vol. 39 (1953), pp. 1095-1100. 
12. Shubik, M. and M. J. Sobel, "Stochastic Games, Oligopoly Theory, and 
Competitive Resource Allocation," to appear in Dynamic Optimization and  
Mathematical Economics edited by P. T. Liu, Vol. 19 in the series 
'Mathematical Concepts and Methods in Science and Engineering," Plenum 
Press, New York, L970. 
13. Sobel, M. J., "Noncooperative Stochastic Games," Annals of Mathematical  
Statistics, Vol. 42 (1971), pp. 1930-1935. 
14. "Myopic Equilibrium Points in Stochastic Games," unpublished 
manuscript, 1979. 
15. Spulber, D.F., "Adaptive Harvesting of a Renewable Resource and Stable 
Equilibrium," presented at this Conference (1979). 
16. Whitt, W., "Representation and Approximation of Noncooperative Stochastic 
Games," J. SIAM Control, to appear. 

















Bernell K. Stone, "The Design of a Receivable Collection System: 
Heuristic Procedures." 
Robert P. Kertz and David C. Nachman, "Persistently Optimal Plans. 
for Non-Stationary Dynamic Programming: The Topology of Weak 
Convergence Case." Revision of MS-77-1. 
George E. Monahan, "OptimAl Stopping in a Partially Ovservable 
Markov Process with Costly Information." 
Bernell K Stone, "'Lock. Box Selection and Collection System Design: . 
01:Elective Function Val tr4-4 ty.." 
Bernell. FG. Stone,. "Hreak.-Eves Receivable Size and. the Allocation of 
Receivables to- Lock. Boxes." 
Bernell IC- Stone, "Zero-Balance. Banking and Collection System Design 
In. a Divisionalized Firm." 
Bernell: IC. Stone,. "Design- of a Receivable Collection System: 
Sequential. Building Heuristics.' 
Bernell r.. Stone,. "Daily Cash. Forecasting- A. Multiplicative Model. 
far- Measuring Cash. Flow Cycles.." 
Georg& E.. iron-ahem:. "Optimal. Stopping in a Partially Observable, Binary-
Valued. Markov. Chain. with Costly- Perfect Informat -ion," Revised. April, 197T. 
Matthew Sabel and. Martin Shubik„ "-Stoc.hAtzt.c Games, Oligopoly Theory 
and: Competitive Resource Allocation.' 
Bernell. IC.. Stone,. Ned. Ai 1 L, "Cash. Thansfer Scheduling- The Key to 
Efficient Case Con." 
Bernell. IC.. Stone,. Ned. 	 "The Design of a Cash Concentration. System." 
Matthew Sobel, "Simple Inequalities for Multiserver Queues." 
Matthew J"... Sob el, "Capital Accumulation and the Optimization o f Renewable 
Resource Models." With Fay Mendelssohn. 
Robert G. Jeroslow, "A Disjunctive Penalty - Method For Some Strong 
Noncaavezities." 
George E. Monahan, "Optimal Stopping in a Partially Observable 
Markov Process with Costly Information." Revised June, 1979. 
George E. Monahan, "Optimal Stopping in a Partially Observable 
Markov Process with Costly Information." Revised October 1979. 
MANAGEMENT SCIENCE WORKING PAPERS  
MS-29-13: 	Robert G. Jeroslow, "The Limiting Lagrangean." With R. J. Duff in 
MS-79-14: 	Robert G. Jeroslow, "A Limiting INFISUP Theorem." With C. E. Blair 
and R. J. Duff in. 
MS-79-15: 	Robert G. Jeroslow, "An Exact Penalty Method for Mixed-Integer 
Programs " With C. E. Blair. 
MS-79-16: 	Bernell K. Stone and Tom W. Miller, "The Use of Constrained Regression 
Estimates in Daily Cash Flow Forecasting." 
MS-79-17: 	Bernell K. Stone and Tom W. Miller, "Forecasting Short-Term Cash Flows 
With Constrained Growth Models." 
MS-79-18 	Bernell K. Stone and Tom W. Miller, "Daily Cash Forecasting With Dummy- 
Variable Regression Using Multiplicative and Mixed-Effects Models for 
Measuring Cash Flow Cycles." 
MS-80-1: 	Bernell K. Stone and Ned C Hill, "Cash Transfer Scheduling for 
Efficient Cash Concentration." 
MS-80-2: 	Bernell K. Stone and Ned C Hill, "The Evaluation of Alternative Cash 
Transfer Mechanisms and Methods." 
MS-80-3: 	Mathew J. Sobel, "Ordinal Sequential Games." 
MS-80-4: 	Matthew J. Sobel, "Stochastic Fishery Games With Myopic Equilibria." 
Chapter VIII 
SEQUENTIAL GAMES 
A sequential game is a multi-person decision process in which each 
participant makes a sequence of decisions. The participants' sequences of 
decisions influence the evolution of the process and affect the time streams 
of rewards to the participants. A sequential game is also called a stochastic 
game and a Markov game. 
Sequential game models have been constructed of diverse phenomena in 
management science, biology, economics, psychology, and military affairs. 
Some of the phenomena are arms control and disarmament, advertising decisions 
of competing firms, pricing and production decisions of competing firms, 
interactions of biological species, harvesting decisions in a fishery, the 
entry and exit of firms to and from an industry, pursuit-evasion tactics for 
opposing submarines, duels between opposing aircraft, and various paradigms in 
experimental social psychology. 
The dynamic games in this chapter are discrete in time.
1 
There is a 
largely separate literature on continuous-time sequential games called 
differential games. The Bibliographic Guide at the end of the chapter includes 
several general references on differential games. 
A sequential game is a natural generalization both of Markov decision 
processes (MDP's) and "static" game theory.
2 
Therefore, this chapter leans 
heavily on earlier chapters. 
1They encompass games based on semi-Markov processes in the sense that 
§V.1 demonstrates that a semi-Markov decision process is equivalent to an MDP. 
2
We are rather unfair in our perjorative use of "static". First, the 
"static" normal form of games encompasses dynamic models. Second, the theory 
of sequential games originated in the late 1940's so it has, by now, attained 
classical status. 
-2-- 
Chapter IV influences the entire chapter, Chapter III influences §4 and 56, 
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1. The Model 
The canonical elements of a sequential game model include nonempty sets 
Q of players, S of states, and AS of alternative actions for each qcQ and scS. 
The other canonical elements are a transition function and single stage reward 
functions. The general idea is that (i) each player must take a sequence of 
decisions, and (ii) the state of affairs when the players are about to take 
their n-th decisions (for each n) is adequately summarized by some state scS. 
The "adequately" in (ii) has three qualifications. First, the 
constraining effects of the past history on player q's set of feasible 
alternative actions is completely specified by s in A2. Second, the subsequent 
state of affairs is conditionally independent of the past history given the 
current state and current action. Third, the immediate reward, possibly an 
r.v., also is conditionally independent of the past history given the current 
state and current action. These are Markovian assumptions. 
The sample path (or outcome) of a sequential game specifies the successive 
states and actions. Let a q denote the action taken by player q in period n, 
let a = (as , qcQ) be the vector of all players' actions in period n, and let s  4wn 
denote the state at the beginning of period n. In order to be consistent with 
our MDT' notation, let 
A = x Aq 
s 	qE.Q. s 
= {(s,a): aeAs , 	se.S) 
Hence, A
s is the set of feasible action vectors (actions of all players) in 
period n if the state is s
n = s. 
Definitions and Assumptions 
Only in this subsection, we use boldface type to denote random quantities 
-4- 
and ordinary typeface to denote the values taken by random quantities. 1 
DEFINITION 1. The history up to the time at which the n -th action is taken is 
(1)  Hn = (s ,a s a 	... s 	a 	s ). 1 l' 2' 2" n-1' n-1' n 
AswithanMDP,attimej<n,alltheplayersknowll.but sn  and an  are not 
known. They are r.v.'s because they depend on how the game evolves during 
j+1, j+2, 	n. 
ASSUMPTION 1. For any J c:S, 
P{sn+1 EJIHn'  a
n }  = P{sn+1 EJlsn' 
 an }. - 	- 	- 	- 	- 
This Markovian assumption implies existence of a transition function 
p(.1-,.) defined as follows. 
DEFINITION 2. The transition function p(.1.,.) satisfies 
P(Jls,a) = P{sn+1 EJls n = s, an  = a}, - 	-  
nEI+' 	(s,a)E S. 
When S is a discrete set, we write p sj  (a) for p({j}ls,a). 
Here is the Markovian assumption concerning the reward Xnq received by 
player q in period n. 
ASSUMPTION 2. For each 	and qq., E(Xmi llin: an) = 	 an). 
DEFINITION 3. The single stage reward function is 
1Elsewhere in the book (except for Sections 1 and 2 of Chapter IV), 
boldface type denotes a vector. 
(2) 
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r (s,a) = E(X 
nq 
 Isn  = s, an 
 = a), 
- 	- 	- (s,a)E S, 	(10. 
The extant sequential game theory is based on the assumption that all 
the players have the same planning horizon. Let N denote that planning 
horizon (possibly infinity). We call N the duration of the game. If N < cc, 
let L (s) denote the salvage value received by player q if the ultimate 
state is sN+1 = s. 
DEFINITION 4. The duration of the game N is a positive integer or infinity. 
The salvage value function is 
Lq (s) = E(K. 	Is 	= s), 
N+1,q N+1 	
scS, 	qE.Q. 
DEFINITION 5. A sequential game (SG) is a model which consists of the nonempty 
sets Q, S, and Aq , scS and qEQ„ the transition function, the single stage 
reward function, the duration N, and if N < co the salvage value function, and 
which satisfies Assumptions 1 and 2. 
Let Q denote the number of players, i.e. number of elements in the set O. 
DEFINITION 6. An SG is finite if,; is a finite set. 
It follows from the definition that a finite SG has only finitely many 
players, finitely many states, and each player in each state has only finitely 
many alternative actions. 
DEFINITION 6. An SG is finite if is a finite set. 
Let a be player q's discount factor, 0 <
q 
 < 1. Most solution concepts 
— 
for SG's (as is true for MDP's) concern expected values of the following r.v.'s: 





 ,a n) +
qLq (sN+1 ) 	(N < co), 
(3b) an-1r (s ,a ) < 1), n=lq qnn 
and 








Of course, these are the sums of discounted rewards for finite and infinite 
durations, and the average reward per period. 
In Sections 2 and 3 of Chapter IV we discuss the notion of a policy in an MDP. 
Briefly a policy in an MDP is a nonanticipative and deterministic contingency 
plan for making feasible decisions. A policy for player q in an SG is exactly 
the same except that randomizations are permitted. Hence, a policy 




) is a probability distribution on As if sn , the last element 
of Hn
, specifies sn 
= s. 
DEFINITION 7. A policy E = (Eq ; clEQ) is a Q-tuple consisting of a randonizef7 
policy for player q, for each qcQ. 
Our definition of policy is restricted to the behavior strategies of game 
theory. Briefly, a behavior strategy separates for each n the randomization 
for period n+l's decision from the randomizations for decisions in periods 1 
through n. Example 5 below specifies a policy which is not a behavior strategy. 
The restriction to behavior strategies is without loss of optimality in the 
following sense. For the solution concepts in Section 2, if the other players 
are using behavior strategies, then you cannot do any better outside the class 
of behavior strategies than you can do within the class of behavior strategies. 
Definition 7 admits policies for player q which are not Markov policies 
(cf. Definition IV.3.4). In words, a'policy for player q permits the n-th 
decision to depend on more of the past history than merely the n-th state. 
Theorem 4 in Section 3 presents sufficient conditions for existence of an SG 
solution which is a Markov policy. 
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We amend the notation in (3a,b,c) to indicate the dependence on the 
players' policy: V q (E,N), Vq (E), and Gq (H). Let lower case letters denote 
expected values
1
of these r.v.'s: 
(4a) v:(E,N) = E[Vq (E,N)Is i = s], 
(4b) vs(H) = E[0(H)Is i = s], 
and 
(4c) g:(H) = E[G q (E)Is i = s3. 
For the remainder of the chapter, we revert to our customary use of 
boldface type to denote vectors. 
EXAMPLE 1 (Tossing Nickels). Two gamblers, Mutt and Jeff, are going to play the 
following game. Mutt has two nickels. Nickel 1 is biased so that its 
probability of heads is 1/3; nickel 2 has probability 3/4 of heads. Mutt and 
Jeff each have five pennies. At each play of the game, Mutt chooses which of 
his nickels he will flip and, simultaneously, Jeff decides positive (+) or 
negative (-). Depending on whether the flipped nickel falls heads (H) or tails 
(T), and whether Jeff decided on + or -, one of the players gives a penny to 
1As with MDP's, sufficiently general models admit policies H for which 
Vq (E,N), Vq(H), or OM may not be bona fied r.v.'s or, if they are, for 
which the expectations may not exist. 
the other according to Table 1. 
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Outcome of Flip 
Jeff's Choice 
Heads Tails 
+ Mutt gives Jeff lc Jeff gives Mutt is 
- Jeff gives Mutt lc Mutt gives Jeff lc 
Table 1. Movements of the Nickel Tossing Game 
The game ends when one of the players has all ten pennies (nickels are not 
convertible to pennies). 
Here, 9. = {1,2}; let q =1 label Mutt and q = 2 label Jeff. Let state s 
label Mutt's penny holdings so Jeff holds 10-s pennies and the initial state 
is s 1  = 5. We adjoin "dummy" states s = -1 and s = 11 to {0,1,..., 10} and 
let S = {-1,0,..., 11}. State s = -1 indicates that the game ended with 
s = 0 so Mutt had no pennies and Jeff had ten. Similarly, s = 11 indicates 
termination with Mutt holding ten pennies. Mutt's actions are chosen from 
Al = {1,2} where 1(2) indicates nickel 1(2), if sE{1,2, 	9}. Similarly, 
Jeff's actions are chosen from A
2 






 = {0} where "action 0" is a "dummy action." 

























Table 2 specifies Ds,s+1(a) = 1 	ps,s_1 (a) if se{1, ...,9}. For these values '  
of s, p si (a) = 0 if je{s+1, s-1}. Finally, let p 0, _1 (0,0) = p-1,-1(0,) = 
10,11(0'0) = p11,11 (0,0) = 1 so states -1 and 11 are absorbing. 
The single stage reward function is r i [10,(0,0)] = r 2 [0,(0,0)] = 10 and 
r (s,a) = 0 for all other values of q, s, and a. In words, Mutt keeps ten 
pennies if the game ends at s=10, and Jeff keeps ten pennies if the game ends 
at s=0. We use the artifice of N = 00, i.e. an infinite duration, to overcome 
the difficulty due to the fact that the actual length of the game is an r.v. 
whose distribution depends on how the players play the game. 
EXAMPLE 2 (Advertising and Pricing). Consider two retail stores which compete 
with one another primarily on the basis of price of goods sold and advertising. 
Suppose that wholesale costs are approximately the same for both stores and 
proportional to quantities sold. Let c denote the wholesale cost per unit 
sold. Suppose also that the stores experience negligible inventory costs 
because wholesalers are located close by. 
Let pn,q and zn,q denote store q's price and advertising expenditure in 
period n, respectively. Let a ,q  = (pn,q ,zn,q) and 2n = (011,1 ,41,2 ). vn 
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Suppose, as in Section 4 of Chapter III, that "goodwill" represents the im-
pacts of advertising expenditures on demand. Let s
n,q 
denote store q's goodwill at 
the beginning of period n; let An = (sn ,,sn,2). We assume that each store's ,  
goodwill in period n depends, perhaps probabilistically, on both stores' 
goodwills and advertising expenditures in period n-1. A simple specific 
model of goodwill that is similar to the model in Section 4 of Chapter III is 
sn,q = 0q (sn-1,q + zn-1,q ), 	q = 1, 2, 
where 0 < 6q 
	 q 




denote the demand (in dollars) for store q's goods in period 
n; let D n 	 so 
 (Dn,i ,Dn,2 ). We assume that Dn 
 is a random vector with a 
oe  
distribution which depends only on sn and a . One of several examples we 
shall analyze in §4 has Dn,q uniformly distributed on 
[0, 
(sn,q 
+ zn,q)/(sn,1 + sn,2 





> 0, and 
P{D
n,q 
= 0} = 1 if sn,q + zn,q =0. 
If each firm uses the discount factor 6, then the sum of discounted gross 








(s,a) = E(Dn,q Isn = s, zn = a) 
r 
q 
 (s,a) = (p
n,q 
- c)p q 
	"1 





where a = ((pi ,z 1 ), (p2 , z 2 )). Then the expected value of (5) is the same 
as the expected value of 
E00 	13n-1r (s a ). 
n=1 q n,on 
This model satisfies the definition of an SG with Q = {1,2), S = ER . 
 (goodwill is scaled to be nonnegative),and AS = alk2+ for each seS and qEQ.
❑ 
EXAMPLE 3 (Competing Banks). Suppose that a town has three banks and that 
nearly all the residents maintain their checking accounts at these banks. 
Let Q. = {1,2,3} and let s j denote the fraction of the residents with accounts 
n,j 
at bank j at the beginning of month n; let sdn = (sn,i ,sn,2 ,sn,3). Then 
AnE.S={(xl ,x2 0( 3):xi >OalliandEx.i  =1). 
Suppose that the banks do not engage in price competition but that they 
do vary in the lengths of time that customers must wait at tellers' windows. 
Let a







). In the short-run, each bank is limited by its physical 
structure; let m
q 
 denote the number of tellers' windows in bank q. Then 
AS 	{1, .. , mq } 	for each 
... 
s and q. A simple model for the dependence of 
s  .., 
the fraction of accounts on quality of service is 











where 0 < y
q 
 < 1. 
Suppose that the operating profit in a month depends on the amount of 
funds deposited in a bank and that the amount of funds is proportional to the 
fraction of residents with accounts at the bank. Then a reasonable model for 
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the expected monthly operating profit is 
r q  (s,a) = w qq  (sq ) - c q  (a q ) 
where w (-) describes revenue due to invested assets and c (.) describes the 
cost of employing aq  tellers. ri 
EXAMPLE 4 (Oligopoly with Pricing, Production, and Inventories). Suppose that 
a collection Q of manufacturers are competitors. Let s
n,q 
denote the amount 
of the q-th firm's stock of finished goods at the beginning of period n; let 
s = (s 	NEO) and S = 	Let z 	denote the quantity of goods 
«n n,q - 	 n,q 
produced by the q-th firm during period n and let yn,c, = sn,q + zn,q.  The 
constraint z
n,q .10
> 0 implies 
yn,qn,q. 
 Suppose that production is 
sufficiently rapid (relative to a period's length) so that y
n,q is the total 
amount of goods available to satisfy demand during period n. Let 
V = (V 	!o0). 
hn 	'n,q'' 
Let Dn,q 
denote firm q's demand during period n; let D = (D
n,q
;qc(2). 
Under the assumption that excess demand is backlogged, sn+1,c, = yn,c, - Dn,c, 
SO 
(6) s 	y - D . pdn+1 Arn 
Let p
n,q denote the price charged by firm n during period n. Let 
4a,c, 	(Yn,q ,Pn,q) and gt = (an,q ;q0). Then All = [sq ,c0) x [0,0). We assume 
that Zi given a1, 	given,52 ,... is a sequence of conditionally independent 
and identically distributed random vectors. With (6), this assumption implies 
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that the distribution of , is entirely determined by awl : 
	
n+1 	 .t 
P{ +n+1 < 
	= 	= P{D, > 	251,5n = 
where xEIR Q 
We make revenue and cost assumptions similar to those in Section 2 of 
Chapter III for the monopoly case. Suppose that c q  is the q-th firm's unit 




 Let g 
q
(y,p,d) denote the q-th firm's 
revenue minus inventory and stockout costs in any period in which y = y, 
Ain 
p = p, and D = d. An example is 
hof n 	Nn 
g q 	Olale (y,p,d) = -h q 
 -(y
q 

















Recall that Aan,q = (yn,q ,pn,q ). Therefore, the specification of a model which i 
satisfies the definition of an SG is completed with 
r (spa) = E[g (y,p,D )1a = a] - c .(y - s ) q 	 q 	,a 	 q q 	q 
where s q  and yq  are the q-th components of s and y, respectively, and 
^V 
= (al ,q ; CIEQ)* 0 
EXAMPLE 5. Consider a two period MDP. This is an SG with Q = {1} and N = 2. 
Let S = {1} and Al = {1,2}. The set of all policies, according to Definition 7, 1 
is the set of all triples fa a
21' a22' 
) where al is the probability of taking 
action 1 in period 1 and, for j = 1 or 2, a2j is the probability of taking action 
1 in period 2 if action j was taken in period 1. In each instance, one minus 
alpha is the probability of taking action 2. 
Here is a decision rule which is not a policy, i.e. is not admitted by 
Definition 7. With probability 1/2, take action 1 in both periods; with 
-13- 
probability 1/2 take action 2 in both periods. This rule requires a joint 
randomization which is precluded by Definition 7. El 1 
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2. Solution Concepts  
Specific sequential game models are descriptions of interactions among 
several persons or institutions. What is a "solution" of such a model? It 
can be construed as a prediction of the behavior that would actually occur in 
the modeled context. Also, it can be viewed as a recommendation of how the 
players ought to play the game. For either purpose, one must at least 
anticipate the "other" players' behavior. But behavior often seems to depend 
on the type of setting and personality as much as on the actual rewards and 
dynamics. This pluralism leads to numerous concepts of solution for a game. 
In this section, we define several concepts of solution for sequential games. 
Suppose that all players know the initial state s
1* 
For much of this 
section we fix s l = s. Suppose further that each player qe.(1 chooses a 
criterion among (1.4a,b,c): either the finite horizon ' expected discounted return 
vq (E,N), the infinite horizon expected discounted return vq (E), or the 
expected average return per period g q (E). If each player q selects a policy E 
let H = (n q ; clEQ). Then H induces a value for each player's criterion. Let 
w (E) denote the numerical value of player q's criterion if the players use 
policy H (and s is the initial state). 
EXAMPLE 1. Suppose that there are two players, that each has only two 
alternative policies, and that the resulting values of w (E) are given below. 
Let cle{1,2} and c 2c{1,2} label the policies of players 1 and 2, respectively. 
The entries in Table 1 are [wi (ci ,c 2 ), w2 (cl ,c 2 )], i.e. the first entry in a 
cell is player l's payoff and the second is player 2's. 
1
If any player gal uses the criterion vq(EIN), then we assume that aZ1 
players use that criterion with the durationN being the same integer from 
each player's perspective. 
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Player 2's Policy 
c 2 
1 2 




2 5,3 3,2 
Table 1. Payoffs in a One Period Game: [wl (c i ,c 2 ), w2 (c i ,c 2 )] 
Suppose (c l ,c 2 ) = (2,1). Then the payoffs are (5,3). If player 2 adheres 
to c 2 = 1, how attractive to player 1 is c l = 2 vs. c l = 1? Player l's payoffs 
is 4 if c 1  = 1 versus 5 if c = 2. We assume "more is better" so player 1 would 
prefer to use c
1 
 = 2 if pZayer 2 adheres to c 2 = 1. 
Similarly, if player 1 adheres to c l = 2, what should player 2 do? The 
comparison is a payoff of 3 via c 2 = 1 vs. 2 if c 2 = 1. Hence, player 2 would 
-15- 
prefer to use c 2 = 1 if player 2 aOleres to c 1 = 2. We say that (c l ,c 2 ) = 
(2,1) is an equilibrium point. Neither player has an incentive to deviate from 
his or her portion of (c l ,c 2 ) = (2,1) if the other player is steadfast. Each 
player checks, or balances, the other. 
If the players use (c l ,c 2 ) = (2,1), their payoffs sum to 5 + 3 = 8. 
However, if they use (c l , c 2 ) = (1,1) then the sum is 4 + 5 = 9 and no other 
policy leads to a higher sum. We say that (c i ,c 2 ) = (1,1) is a joint maxirtA.7. 
Suppose each player is trying to hurt the other one. Each strives to 
minimize the other's payoff. If player 1 uses c l = 1, then player 2, by using 
c2 = 2, can limit player 1 to a payoff of 2. If player 1 uses c l = 2, then 
player 2, by using c 2 = 2, can limit player 1 to a payoff of 3. If player 2 
uses c2 = 1, player l's best rejoinder (i.e. policy which minimizes player 2's 
payoff) is c
1 
= 2. If player 2 uses c 2 = 2 , player l's best rejoinder is 
c1 = 2. Therefore, each component of (c l , c 2 ) = (2,2) hurts the opponent as 
much as possible. This is an ill-fare equilibrium point. Note that 
(cl , c 2 ) = (2,2) is an equilibrium point for the following bimatrix game used in 






	1 	-5,-4 	 -6,-2 
2 	-3,-5 
	 -2,-3 
Table 2. Payoffs for an Ill-Fare Equilibrium Point 
The entry at (cl ,c2 ) in Table 2 is [-w2 (ci ,c2 ), -wl (c i ,c 2)] where wi (ci ,c 2 ) and 
w2(cc2) are taken from Table 1. 
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Player 1 prefers (c 1 ,c 2 ) = (2,1) to (c 1 ,c 2 ) = (1,1) because the payoff 
would be 5 instead of 4. However, player 2's payoff would drop from 5 to 3. 
Similarly, player 2 prefers (c 1 ,c 2 ) = (1,2) to (1,1) because the payoff would 
be 6 instead of 5. However, player l's payoff would drop from 4 to 2. There-
fore, (c 1 ,c 2
) = (1,1) has the property that neither player's welfare can be 
improved without injuring the other player. We say that (c 1 ,c 2 ) = (1,1) is 
Pareto optimal (called efficient or admissable in some literatures). Also, 
(1,2) and (2,1) are Pareto optimal. 
Suppose each player tries to maximize the amount by which his or her 
payoff is higher than the opponent's payoff. Then we replace the entries in 
Table 1 with [w1 (c1 ,c 2 ) - w2 (c i ,c 2 ), w2 (c 1 ,c 2 ) - w1 (c1 ,c 2 ] as in Table 3. 








1 -1,1 -4,4 
2 2,-2 1,-1. 
Table 3. Payoffs for the Criterion: Maxmin the Difference 
The entries in each cell then sum to zero. We call this criterion maxmin the 
difference. The policy (c1 ,c 2 ) = (2,2) is an equilibrium point in Table 3. 
That is, w1 (•,2) - w2 (•,2) is maximized at c l = 2, and w2 (2,•) - w1 (2,•) is 
maximized at c 2=2. 
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Suppose, instead, that each player tries to maximize the amount by which 
his or her payoff exceeds the average payoff. If (c l ,c 2 ) = (1,1) then the 
payoffs are (4,5) so the average is 4.5 and, with respect to this average, 
the players' increments are (-.5,.5). If (c l ,c 2 ) = (1,2), the increments 
are (-2,2); if (c l ,c 2) = (2,1), the increments are (1,-1); and if (c l ,c 2 ) = 
(2,2), the increments are (.5,-.5). Multiplying these increments by two 
yields the entries in Table 3. Therefore, (c l ,c 2 ) is an equilibrium point 
for the criterion maxmin the difference if, and only if, it is an equilibrium 
point for the criterion beat the average. If the game had more than two 
players, then beat the average would be well-defined whereas maxmin the 
difference would be ill-defined. 
Equilibrium Point of a Static Game 
In order to define an equilibrium point of an SG (sequential game) 
and prove that one exists, it is convenient first to define an equilibrium 
point of a single period SG. A single period SG is called a static game, 
noncooperative game, or Nash game (after John Nash who first proved existence 
of equilibrium points under reasonably general conditions). 
DEFINITION 1. A static game consists of a nonempty set 0, for each qcQ a 
nonempty set W(1, and for each qcQ a real-valued function mq  (•) defined on 
W = x W 
1E0 i 
We interpret Wq  as the set of choices available to player q. In some 
applications, Wq  consists of the specific actions available to player q. In 
others, Wq  is a set of probability distributions on the set of specific actions 
available to player q. The latter interpretation arises if we admit 
randomized strategies. 
Suppose Wq  is a set of randomized strategies and Yq  is the set of specific 
actions available to player q. If Y q  is a denumerable set, usually Wq  is the set 
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of aZZ probability distributions on Y , i.e. the set of all [y(q,k); kEY 
q
] > 0 
such that 
Eke? 
y(q,k) = 1. 
q 
If there are more than denumerably many specific actions in Y , then (for 
technical reasons) Wq  is a proper subset of the set of all probability 
distributions on Y . Where this issue might arise in SG's, we shall make an 
assumption comparable to YtY < 03 for each qcQ. 
q 
Suppose for each qeQ that w cw is player q's choice, and let 
w = (w q ; qc 0 ). Sometimes it is convenient to separate a specific player's 
component in w from those of the other players. Hence, we abuse notation and 
and for a specific qcQ write w = (w q  , w -q  ) where w-q  denotes the choices of 
all the players except player q. Similarly, for any icQ, qcQ, and wEW, we 
write m.1 (w) = m.1(w q 
,w -q). 
- 	 - 














 and qeQ. 
— 	-  
When W is clear from the context, we often write "EP" rather than "EP with 
respect to W." The qualification "with respect to W" is important. For 
example, in some static games, if W represents only unrandomized specific 
actions, then no EP exists. In many such games, if W is expanded to include 
randomizations of actions, then an EP exists. If a static game has an EP 
with respect to unrandomized specific actions then that multiplayer action 
remains an EP with respect to randomizations of specific actions. 
From Appendix B, a set X is a convex and bounded polyhedron if X has 
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only finitely many extreme points x l ,...,xm 
and, for all xEX, there are 
nonnegative numbers A








i 	 1=1  
PROPOSITION 1 (John Nash). If a static game has finitely many players and, 
for each qEQ, m (-) is continuous on W and Wq  is a closed, convex, and bounded 
polyhedron, then there is an EP with respect to W. 
PROOF. John Nash (1950) 1 . 0 
PROPOSITION 2 (John Nash). Suppose a static game has finitely many players 
and, for each q, Wq  consists of all the probability distributions on a finite 
set Yq  and m (.) is player q's expected payoff. Then there is an EP with 
respect to W. 
PROOF. We shall apply Proposition 1. For each q, Wq  consists of the 
nonnegative solutions [y(q,k); kEY ] to EkEy y(q,k) = 1. This is a closed, 
q 




Q) denote player q's payoff if the players take 
unrandomized actions (k...,kQ). If the players use y = [y(q,k); kEY 	(1E0]E1,1 
then player q's expected payoff is 











	is continuous on W. for every i, hence on W. Proposition 
1 now yields existence of an EP. 0 
1J. Nash, "Equilibrium Points in n-Person Games,” Proceedings National  
Academy of Sciences U.S.A., Vol. 36, 48-49, 1950. 
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Definitions for Sequential Games 
Now we define equilibrium points and Pareto optima of SG's (sequential 
games). The other solution concepts in Example 1 were equilibrium points of 
transformations of the original game. 
It is convenient to write the policy 11 = (Ty qE J as the pair (11k ,71_k ) 
for a specific player ken. Then n_k represents the policies of all the players 
except player k. Recall the notation v q (II,N), vq (11), and gq (E) (from (1.4a,b,c)) 
for the expected total reward, expected discounted reward, and expected 
average reward per period. Let S'be a subset of states, let iT be a subset 
of player q's policies, and let 7 = 	X iT 
qe(2. -q 
DUMr=1.Apolicyll=(l•q0) is an N-period equilibrium point(EP) with 





 ,N) > vs[( q 	q), N] 	for aZZ seS; E q C7 	and gen. , 
A policy II is a discounted equilibrium point (EP) with respect to S' and 7 if 
(3) v(E*) > vq[(Eq -q )] for aZZ seS', 	E q C7 q , and qE. Q. s 	— s 	 - 
. 
A policy II 1..s an average reward equilibrium point (EP) with respect to S' and r 
if 





 ) > g's[(Eq 
	q 	 q 
)] for aZZ seS', 	C7 , and (leg. _q
Usually the type of equilibrium point, S', and 7 are clear from the context 
so we say merely equilibrium point and use the abbreviation EP. 
There are several reasons why sometimes S' and it are proper subsets 
of S and the set of all policies, respectively. First, proper subsets may 
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be necessary to ensure existence of the expectations v q (11,N), v q (E), and 
gs (E) (and to ensure that they correspond to bona fide r.v.'s). Second, we 
may be able to prove existence of EP's only for proper subsets. Third, there 
may be an EP with special properties only for proper subsets. An example of the 
second reason occurs in Section 3 when existence of discounted EP's is proven at 
first with respect to 7 as the set of stationary policies. An example of 
the third reason occurs in Section 4 where we study EP analogues of the myopic 
optima in Chapter III. 
An EP of a sequential game is closely related to the idea of EP for static 
games. We use discounted EP's to illustrate the relationship. A collection of 
static games corresponds to an SG with 1 q  < 1 for each gen. Suppose 
7 = q X 7q ; 
• let W = 7 and Wq = n gen. Fix seS; for each gen, and nE7, let 0  
(n) = vq (E). Call this the s-th static game. There is an s-th static game 
for each seS. 
. 
THEOREM 1. A policy E is a discounted EP with respect to S' and 7 if and 
. 	. 
only 1..f is an EP with respect to W = 7 for every s-th static game with 
seS'. 
PROOF. Exercise 2. 0 
It does not follow from Theorem 1 that the issue of existence of a 
discounted EP can be settled by the straight-forward application of Nash's 
theorem (Proposition 1). Theorem 1 requires that the same policy TI be an 
EP with respect to W for all of the s-th static games with seS'. The optimum 
of a discounted infinite horizon MDP can be construed as the solution of a 
vector maximization problem. Similarly, a discounted EP can be regarded as 
the solution of a vector static EP problem. In both cases, the components 
of the vector correspond to possible initial states. 
Exercise 2 asks you to specify static games whose EP corresponds to an 
N-period EP and other static games whose EP corresponds to an average reward 
-22-- 
EP. 
Some of the results in Section 7 concern Pareto optima of sequential 
'games. 
. 
DEFINITION 2. R is Pareto optimal with respect to r if &67, q€ Q, and s€S 
with vq (R* ) < va () implies existence of j0. and ucS with vi (II *) > vi (E). 
The definition of Pareto optimality can be altered so that the criterion 
is expected total reward or expected average reward per period. Following the 
three parts of Definition 1, the formalities should be obvious. 
We abbreviate Pareto optimality with P0. A policy R is PO if no player 
-23- 
can be made better off from some initial state without some player becoming 
worse off from some initial state. Either the players or the initial states 
(but not both) may be the same. 
EXERCISES  
1. Define each of the following solution concepts for a sequential game 
with the criterion of expected discounted reward. 
(a) Joint maximum. 
(b) Ill-fare equilibrium point. 
(c) Maxmin the difference (assuming 0 = 2). 
(d) Beat the average equilibrium point. 
2. (a) Prove Theorem 1. 
(b) State analogues of Theorem 1 for N-period EP's and average reward EP's. 
3. Existence of Equilibrium Points  
An equilibrium point has the property that the players' strategies balance 
each other. No player's expected payoff can be raised if all the other players 
adhere to their components of the strategy. The players implicitly 
hold each other to the (joint) strategy. Appending the idea of balance to a 
mathematical model usually leads to fixed point theorems. Therefore, it is 
hardly surprising that numerous authors have used fixed point theorems ' to prove 
the existence of EP (equilibrium point) solutions to sequential game models. 
In this section, we present sufficient conditions for the existence of 
discounted, average reward, and N-period equilibrium points. For discounted EP's, 
the existence proof is a generalization of John Nash's use of the Brouwer Fixed 
Point Theorem in (static) game theory. An alternative proof could be given based 
on the Contraction Mapping Fixed Point Theorem (cf. Section 2 in Chapter V) and 
the Kakutani Fixed Point Theorem. 
All existence proofs depend on the following 
observation. Suppose all the players but one are using stationary policies. Then 
the remaining player faces an MDP (Markov decision process) whose criterion is the 
expected present value of the rewards. Therefore, Corollary IV.2.1 asserts that 
the player can confine a search for an optimal Markov policy to the set of 
stationary policies. As a result, the material in Sections 4 and 5 of Chapter IV 
and Section 2 of Chapter V can be invoked in existence proofs. 
This section considers only finite SG's, i.e. games with finitely many pZayere, 
states, and actions. Here we introduce the notation which specifies the MDP 
1
The theorems invoked include the Contraction Mapping, Brouwer, and Kakutani 
Fixed Point Theorems and their corollaries. These may be found in references 
listed at the end of the chapter. 
la 
faced by one player when all the other players use stationary policies. From 
Section 2, recall that a policy is written TI = (f q ; q0.) with player q's policy 
being the component TIq = (7rlq ,72q ,...) in which 7
nq 
specifies player q's decision 
rule in the n-th period. The following definition of a single stage decision 
rule permits randomized rules. As Section 2 illustrates, even in static games 
there may not exist an EP unless randomized rules are permitted. 
DEFINITION 1. A single stage decision rule for player q is a collection 
6 = {6 (s): sES} such that d (s) is a probability distribution on Aq for each 
sc.S. A single stage decision rule 6 is a collection {d q : q0.} such that 6 is 
a single stage decision rule for player q, for each qcQ. If there is a single 
stage decision rule Sq such that Trrig (Hn) = S q (sn ) for all Hn and n, then lig is a 
stationary policy for player q. The policy TI = (Eq ; qc0 is a stationary policy 
if, for each (40, Eq is a stationary policy for player q. The symbols Zq and Z 




(i) From the definitions, 
Z = 	x Z qcQ. -q
. 
 
(ii) Recall that Z denotes the set of stationary policies in an MDP (Section 
3 in Chapter IV). 
(iii) Since the SG is finite, i.e. 1 < co, there are only finitely many 
elements in the sets of players, states, and actions. 
(iv) A single stage decision rule is a collection of probability 
distributions, one for each player in each state. The set A q is finite 
and kegs so we interpret 6 (s)(k) as the probability that player q will choose 
action k when the state is s. 
A single stage decision rule corresponds to each stationary policy, 
and conversely. Therefore, we also use Z and Z q  to denote the set of single 
stage decision rules and the set of single stage decision rules for player q, 
respectively. It will be clear from each context whether Z (Z q 
 ) represents single 
stage decision rules (for player q) or stationary policies (for player q). 
Let m(s,q) = 0Aq ; m(s,q) < 00 for each s and q in a finite SG. The set of all 
probability distributions on AS is the set of all solutions of the system 




k  , 
	= `= s  
Let Z sq  denote the set of all solutions to (2); then define 
(3) Z = x Z 	and Z= xZ = x xz 







 ; qcOa. Then for each scS and q0, 6 
q
(s) is specified by 
 
exactly one solution to (2). Let 0 • kcAq , q0, scS} correspond to 6. Recall 
sic' 	s 	 .... 
that we use Q to denote the number of players, i.e. the size of Q. 
Let 
b (6) 	E
m(s ' 1) 	Em(s, (4) ps (k 	k) 	Dq sj 	k1=1 k 	 cle 1 	 =1 
Q) 
which is the expected value of the transition probability induced by L. Let B6 
W 
represent the matrix of these transition probabilities and let 8 indicate the 
stationary policy in which player q uses the policy r, for each qEQ. 






1) 	 Em(s'Q) JO. s E Dik  r q  (s,k1 Q). s 	= 	 k =1  
1 
This quantity is player q's expected single stage reward induced by policy L' when-
ever the state is s. Let OM be player q's expected present value induced by 
s ••• 
policy ( from the initial state s; let v q (S) denote the vector whose s-th 
component is v(6). Then Rq  < 1 and Theorem IV.5.1 (alternatively, Theorem V.2.1) 
s'd 
imply 
(6) = 1=0  (a B ) 1 Pq (k) = (I - B q 
B ) -1 pq (k) 
	
q 	 - 
(where B,
0 
 = I). 
Existence of Discounted EP's 
The main result, Theorem 1 below, asserts that a finite SG necessarily has a 
discounted EP among the class of stationary policies. The proof has two parts. 
4 
First, we construct a mapping T and use Brouwer's fixed point theorem to prove 
that T has a nonempty set of fixed points. Second, we show that the fixed points 
of .1" are necessarily EP's and conversely. 
DEFINITION 2. A function f with domain and range D has fixed point d if dED and 
f(d) = d. 
We abbreviate fixed point with FP. Brouwer's theorem presents sufficient 
conditions for the existence of an FP in D. 
PROPOSITION 1 (Brouwer's Fixed Point Theorem). Let f be a function with domain and 
range D. If D is a closed, bounded, and convex subset of De m 
 
(m < co) , and i f f is 
continuous on D, then f has an FP in D. 
THEOREM 1. If a finite SG has 13 c, < 1 for all qcQ then there exists a discounted 
EP with respect to S and Z. 
PROOF. Step (i) constructs a mapping T on Z and uses Brouwer's theorem to establish 
= 
that T has an FP in Z. Step (ii) proves that (ScZ is an FP of T if, and only if, S 
is an EP. 
(i) In order to use Brouwer's theorem, Z must be a closed, bounded, and convex 
subset of IR
m 
for some m < co. If Z
q  has the required properties for each qcn, then 
Z = qc xQ Zq  has them too. The SG is finite so m(s,q) = 4fAs < co for each s and - 
q. Using (2) and (3), it is simple to verify that Zsq is a closed, bounded, and convex 
subset of IRm(s ' cl) (Exercise 1 asks you to do this). Let 
A 
m = scS Eqc0 	' 
m(s q). 
Then ZC IR m ,m < co, and Z is closed, bounded, and convex. 
Let elsk  denote the modification of 6 
in which player q takes action kcAq with 
	
probability one if the state is s; i.e. Dqk 
	 s 
= 1 and Dqj  = 0 if j 	k. Then s  
5 
Pcsi(Lcsik ) 	IjeSiDsj (s+sk)vj (L ) 
is'player q's expected discounted return from the initial state s if all the other 
players adhere to their portions of 6 while player q uses 8 gk  in the first period ms 
and, thereafter, 8 . Let 
(7) ci)sk („S) = LPs(4k) + 	Ejesbsi (41k)v3(08,) - vs(N)3 +q 
indicate the increase in player q's expected discounted return, if any, from 
deferring 6 for one period during which 6 qk 
 is used. Define a function T: Z 	Z 
ms 
with 
Dg + el (d) 
sk 	sk Ae  (8) T(8)(s,k,q) = 	 , 	, kcAq 
I40 	 m(s,q) q 1 + E. (I) 	(6) 
s 
1=1 	si ...4 
scS, qcQ.. 
Exercise 2 asks you to verify that T(8)EZ and that T(•) is continuous on Z. There- ", - 	 - 
fore, Brouwer's theorem implies existence of an FP of T. 
00 
(ii) {EP) c {FP): Suppose that 6 is an EP and all players except q use their 
components of As . Then player q faces an MDP whose transition probabilities and 
rewards are specified by 
fbsj m ( sk 	s ): kce ' 	 s scS) 	and {Pq (d gk  ): kcA1, scS}, ms 
respectively. The definition of an EP (Definition 2.1) implies that r is an 
optimal policy for this MDP. Then Theorem IV.5.3 implies 4)2 1( U) = 0 for all s, k, 
and q. Therefore, T(d) = 6 from (8) soL is an FP. 
{EP) D {FP}: Suppose 6 is an FP so T(6) = ,d. We shall prove eslk (L) = 0 for 
m 
all s, k, and q so, by Theorem IV.5.3, 4, is an EP. From (8), 
q el + 	(6) 
q - 	
D 
sk sk ...,  kEAq D 	 , 	sES, 	qEQ, , sk m(s q) q 	 s 1 + E. 
, (6) 






kEAq , 	eS, 	qeQ, 1  
where we suppress the notational dependence of e. on 6. From (9), if Dq
k  = 0 then 
	
si 	.... 	 s 
eslk = 0. Suppose, for some q and s, 
m(s q) q > O. 
Ej ' 	4)=1 sj 
Then 
q 	q ,...m(s,q) D = (1) IL 	(1)
q 
 , 	kEAq , sk sk j=1 sj s 
so Dqk 	 s 
> 0 implies 0k 
	 s > 0. Also Dqk 	 s > 0 for some kEA' from (2). But we shall prove s  
that 
ask 	 s 
= 0 for some k such that D qk  > 0. From (4), (5), and (6),   
qm(s,q) q q 
vsT = Ek=1 Dskvsk (N) 




Let j be a value of k at which min {...) is attained so v2j (6) - v:(6) < 0 while 
Dqj 
	 s > O. Therefore, (0 j 	D'. 	 s 
(6) = 0 while q > O. Hence, cpq
j 
 (6) = 0 for all s, j, s   
and q so 6c° is an EP. 0 
00 
Under the assumptions of Theorem 1, if 6 is an EP then no player has an 
incentive to move to another stationary policy if the other players adhere to their 
co 
portions of 6 . The following result shows that no player can obtain an improvement 
by choosing a Markov policy (Definition IV.3.4) that is not stationary, i.e. out-
side Z. 
COROLLARY 1.1. If an SG is finite and Bq < 1 for each q0., then there is a 
stationary policy which is a discounted EP with respect to S and the set of all 
Markov policies. 
co 
PROOF. From Theorem 1, there exists a stationary policy 6 which is an EP with 




portion of 6 , then player q faces an MDP which satisfies the conditions of 
Corollary IV.2.1. That result asserts that an MDP has an optimal stationary policy 
if it has an optimal Markov policy. Therefore, within the class of Markov policies 
player q cannot improve upon 6 q 	a rejoinderto
q
. This is true of all players 
cic2• El 
Existence of an Average Reward Equilibrium Point 
From definition (2.1), E = (E ; q0) is an average reward equilibrium point 
with respect to initial states in S' and policies in w if 
(10) ci (e) > q gs 	gs [(Eq ,T1,..q )] for all scS', 	Eurr, 	and 	(10,.. 
* 
The search for R to satisfy (10) is at least as hard as the search for an optimal 
policy in an MDP with the criterion of average return. From Section 6 in Chapter 
8 
IV, the MDP problem is simpler if every stationary policy induces a Markov chain 
with only one communicating class of states. We make the corresponding assumption 
below. As you might guess from Section 3 of Chapter V, the existence of an 
equilibrium point can be proved under weaker conditions.
1 
UNICHAIN ASSUMPTION. Every single stage decision rule 6 has a transition matrix 
B6 that induces a Markov chain with one communicating class of states and a 
(possible empty) set of transient states. 
The unichain assumption and finitely many states implies (Section 6 of 
Chapter VII in Volume 1) existence of a stationary distribution which is the same 
regardless of the initial state. That is, for each 6 there is a probability vector 
6 	 6 
c with components c
s
, seS, such that 
(11) 	c(6) > 0, c(S)•e = 1, and c(6) = c(d)B(S), 
where e denotes the column vector whose components are all one. The importance of 
the unichain assumption in the following proof is that it simplifies the verifica-
tion that T is continuous on Z. Some assumption is needed (Exercise 3). 
THEOREM 2. Suppose a finite SG satisfies the unichain assumption. Then there 
exists an average reward EP with respect to S and Z. 
PROOF. The proof is similar to that of Theorem 1. We already know that Z is a 
closed, bounded, and convex subset of le with m < co. 
For each d, the unichain assumption and Theorem IV.6.1 (cf (17) through (22) in 
Section 6 of Chapter IV) imply for each q0. that there exists a unique number g q (S) 
1A. Federgruen, "Successive Approximation Methods in Undiscounted Stochastic 
Games," Operations Research, Vol. 28, 794-809, 1980. 
9 
and vector 0(6) with components 0(6) such that 
(12) 0(6) = c(6)•41 
(13)' c(6)•wq (6) = 0 
(14) e•gq (6) + 0(6) = e2 	Be,q(6) 
where c(6) is the stationary distribution which uniquely solves (11). Let 
(15) (PL(6) = [P ci (el ) + E s 	k 	jeSbsj (6 :k )w3 (6) 	gq(5) 	wq(6)]+  
which is similar to the test quantity (IV.6-43) in the policy improvement 
algorithm for the average return criterion under the unichain assumption. Let 
CI iD
sk correspond to 6. Then define T: 	Z with 
Ds 
 + q (6) 







, k6Aq , 	seS, qeQ 
i=1 	Si 
which is the same as (8) except that cP cslk (6) is specified by (15) instead of (7). 
Continuity of T on Z will be shown below; then Brouwer's theorem implies 
existence of an FP. To show that an FP 6 is necessarily an EP, we have as in the 
proof of Theorem 1 that e
k  (6) = 
0 for all s, k, and q. Therefore, due to Theorem 
s 
IV.6.3, e° is an EP. Conversely, if e- is an EP then all e k  (6) = 0 due to s 
Theorem IV.6.3 so 6 is an FP of T. 
Continuity of T on Z will follow from continuity of gq (•) and wq (•) for each 
q0.. If gq (.), B6 , and c(•) are continuous then so also is w q (•) due to (13) and 
10 
(14). For continuity of gq (.), it is sufficient to prove that B 6 and c(•) are 
continuous and to verify that B
6 
has one communicating class of states (and, 
perhaps, some transient states). 
Recall that Z is a convex set and let H denote its set of extreme points; 
#11<co.Hence,(5a,impliesexistenceofafinitesetfa.:in) such that a. > 0 
i — 
for all i, E. 
	
a. = 1, and 
EH 
(16) B 6 = E.ai Pi 
where P. is the matrix of transition probabilities under the i-th extreme point 
policy. It follows from (16) that B 	continuous on Z. As a consequence of 
Exercises 4 and 5, B 6 has one communicating class and it and c(•) are continuous 
on Z. 
Existence of an N-Period Equilibrium Point 
From Section 1, recall the notation 
(17a) Vq (E
o 
 , N) = En=1N 8n
q
-1 r q f̀sn' am' + 8NL q (sN+1 ) A a 	q  
and 
(17b) vlI (E,N) = E[0(2,,N)Is i = s] 
which makes explicit the dependence on the players' policy 
A/ 
 H = (11,4 ; q0). From 
Definition 2.1, a policy 7 is an N-period EP with respect to initial states in S' 








, 	),N], 	scS', 	C C7 
 g
, 	and clE 0 . 
s — 	 —  
1 1 
Recall the notation in Definitions 2.1 and 2.2 of a static game and an EP 
of a static game. From Exercise 2.2(b), E is an N-period EP with respect to S' 
and It if and only if it is an EP with respect to W = r for every static game, 
called the s -th static game, obtained by fixing seS' and letting W q  = 7q  and - 
N(n) = vcsl (H,N), qeQ• 
THEOREM 3. For every NEI+ , a finite SG has an N-period EP with respect to S and 
the set of an policies. 
PROOF. Fix NEI+. We shall construct a policy which is simultaneously an EP for 
every s-th static game, seS. Fix seS. A policy for player q is a sequence 
IIq = (rici ,r2q , ...,rNci) with rnci (Hn) being a probability distribution on AS . , 
sn 
(where sn is the last element of history Hn). For fixed n, a finite SG can have 
only finitely many sequences Hn = (s
1
,a1 ,...,sn_1 ,an_1 ,s
n), hence only finitely 
many sequences (H 1 ,...,H11 ), hence only finitely many unrandomized sequences 
H = (Tr
lqNq
). Label player q's unrandomized policies E1 	Ed (q) with 
d(q) < co. Exercise 8 asks you to prove that any n q  is a convex combination of 
these unrandomized policies. Therefore, the set of all policies for player q is 
a closed, bounded, and convex polyhedron. For each q, player q's payoff in the 
s-th static game is the expected payoff. Therefore, Proposition 2.2 implies 
existence of an EP H (s) in the s-th static game. 
Continue to keep seS fixed. Since II
* 
 (s) is a bona fide policy, it stipulates 
a randomized action a
n 
for each possible history H
n
, for n=1,...,N. The possible 
histories include all possible initial states but the payoffs v2(11,N) in the s-th 
static game depend only on randomized actions in response to histories whose 
* 	 * 




randomized actions a 1, ...,aN for histories with initial state jeS. Therefore, in 
* 	 * 	 * 
II (s), if jOs, we may alter II (s) j and the altered II (s) will remain an EP in the 
s-th static game. 
12 
Now let s vary in S and construct a policy with components E (s) s , scS. For 
each scS, if the initial state is s, then the randomized actions are part of an 
EP in the s-th static game. From the argument above, such a constructed policy 
is an EP in every s-th static game, scS, hence an N-period EP. D 
Recall the discussion below Definition 1.7 which observes that our definition 
of "policy" admits non-Markov decision rules. 
DEFINITION 3. A Markov policy TI = (II ;(10.) in an N-period SG is a policy in which 
player q's policy TIq = (71q ,...ormi ) has Trilq , for each n, depend on En only 
through its last element, sn . 
It follows from the definition that a Markov policy is a sequence (d 1 ,d2N) 
in which el depends only on the state when n periods remain until the game ends. 
The construction in Theorem 3's proof does not yield any insight into the 
structure of an N-period EP. The following proof is essentially an alternative 
proof of Theorem 3 which shows that there is an N-period EP which is a Markov 
* 
policy. Thus there is an EP E
* 
 in which player q's component E
q 
 consists of a 
sequence ( 15q, 	q 	 s1 ...,e q 
) where, for each n, e l (s) is a probability distribution on A. 
We interpret dq (s) k as the probability that player q will take action k in period 
n if sn = s. 
THEOREM 4. For every NcI+ , a finite SG has a Markov policy which is an N-period 
EP with respect to S and the set of all policies. 
PROOF. Let V be the set of all real-valued functions on SO and let 
(19) 	h(s,a,q,v) = r (s,$) + aq EjcS psj (a)v(j,q), (s,a)cg, qcQ, and vEV. 
13 
To initiate an inductive proof, let N=1. Then Theorem 3 asserts
1 
existence 
of a 1-period EP d
1 
with respect to S and the set of all policies. Trivially, 8 1 
is a Markov policy. 
Suppose the theorem is valid for N-1. From the comment below Definition 3, 




) in which do is the decision rule 
which determines the randomized action when n periods remain until the game ends. 
Also, el depends only on the state at the beginning of the period, i.e. s
N-n+1. 
Let v(j,q) = vq[(c5N-1 ,...,d
1
),N] which is player q's expected return in the 
N-1-period game, from initial state j, if the players use the N-1-period EP 
(d
N-1 	1 
). Then h(s,a,q,v) in (19) is player q's expected return in the N- 
period game in which the initial state is s, the players take action a, and then 
Ise the N-1-period EP 	 1). Fix seS and let m (a) = h(s,a,q,v). The SG 




 AS.  Consider the static game in 
hich each player q's payoff is the expected value of m (.) and in which player q 
ly randomize on A2. From Proposition 2.2, this static game has an EP 6








) is an N-period EP. 
We 	write 0(11,N) for the r.v. 0(11,N) in (17a) if s 1
=s and En 
r an expectation with respect to probabilities induced by policy E. Let z
N-1 
(d 	,...,d J,  and z 	(6,zN-1,; let v(j,q) = v3(zN-1 , N-1'. -tote )	N = 	
N 	
) 	 ) 	Suppose all 
players but q use policy zN 4:1 = (d
N
14, z




Then player q's expected return from initial state s is 
1Alternatively, for N=1 appeal directly to Proposition 2.2 in the proof of 
rem 3 with N=1. 
14 
	
v[(E q  ,zNq  ),N] = E (E q ,zN_q )
{r q (s ' a) + qj  Z 	p sj 	j .(a)0[(E zNq'  ) N-1]} s 	 eS 
, = E ft. ,zN 
qi 
 ‘fr,(s,a) + qjeS psj (a)v3 [(Eq'
zN-1 
 -q )N-1]) _ 
 (20) 	<. E ( 	N ) irq (s,a) + a E. 	p 	j(a)v.(z 
N-1
j q ,z _q 
(21) 	= E(EzN ) [h(s,a,q,v)) < E 6N  [h(s,a,q,v)] — q, 
where a is the random action with N periods remaining. The inequality in (20) is 
due to z
N-1 
being an N-1 period EP. The inequality in (21) is caused by the EP 




1. (a) Using notation in part (i) of the proof of Theorem 1, prove that Z 	is sq 
a closed, bounded, and convex subset of IR
m(s,q) 




m = seS E clE0 m(s,q)• 
2. (a) Using notation in part (i) of the proof of Theorem 1, prove4EZ implies 
T()67. 
(b) Prove that T(•) is continuous on Z. (Hint: use (4) through (8) to prove 
that e 
k
•), hence T, is continuous). 
3. Construct an example, with at most three states and two players, where T 
constructed in the proof of Theorem 2 is not continuous on Z. (The example, 
of course, will not satisfy the hypothesis of Theorem 2). 
4. Let P1 ,P2 ,...,P
m 
be a finite number of stochastic matrices of the same size. 
Suppose that P 1 induces a Markov chain with one communicating class (and, 




 be nonnegative numbers 
which sum to one and h
1 
> 0. Prove the following properties of 
(17) 	M = Em h P . 1=1 i i 
(a) If states k and j communicate in P 1 then they communicate in M. 
(b) M induces a Markov chain with one communicating class of states (and, 








5. In Exercise 4, suppose P 1 ,P2 ,...,Pm each induce a Markov chain with one 
communicating class (and, perhaps, some transient states); the classes may 
differ from one matrix to the next. Prove the following properties of M in 
(17) without requiring h1 > 0. 
(a) M induces a Markov chain with one communicating class of states (and, 
perhaps, some transient states). 
(b) Let H be the set of all h = (h 1 " h m  ) > 0 such that e h i  = 1. Let i=1 
M(h) make the dependence on h explicit. From (a), for each hEH, there 
exists a unique solution c(h) to c(h) > 0, c(h)•e = 1, and c(h) = c(h)M(h). 
Then c(•) is continuous on H. (Hint: Suppose N(x) is a nonsingular 
matrix with finitely many rows for all xcX and N(•) is continuous on X; 
then [N(•)]
-1 
is continuous on X.) 
. This exercise is along the lines of Section 2 of Chapter V. Suppose S and Q 
are countable and AS is countable for each s and q. Let V be the set of all 
bounded real-valued functions on Sx(.1 and let 
d(u,v) = sup{lu(s,q) - v(s,q)I: seS, gen}, uEV, vcV. 
(a) Prove that V with d•,•) is a complete metric space. 





.v(j q) for (s,a)c 	cleQ, and vcV. 
Assume that there exists f3 < 1 and u < co such that q  < S for all cleQ. and 
Ir (s,a)! < u for all qcQ and (s,a)c S. State analogues of the Contraction 
and Boundedness Assumptions in Section 2 of Chapter V, and prove that 
h(•,•,•,•) satisfies these assumptions. 
'c) For each single stage decision rule 6 and veV, let H 6
v be the mapping on 
SxQ which assigns to (s,q) the value hjs,6(s),q,v]. Prove for each 6 that 
H6 has a unique fixed point v 6cV, and 
17 
d(v (5 ,v) < d( Htsv,v)/(1 — 8) , 	vcV. 
A, 
(d) For each single stage decision rule 6 and vcV, let L
6
v be the following 
A. A. 





q) = supfh[s,a 	-qq (s),q,v]: a q
cAq ), 	(s,q)cSxn • w 	s 
A. 
Prove that L6 is a contraction mapping on V. A/ 
(e) Prove that h satisfies an analogue of the Monotonicity Assumption in 
Section 2 of Chapter V. Let F
6 











q): ye A } 
where L1 q  is player q's set of single stage decision rules, and v 6 is the 
unique FP of H. Prove that f ss = F6 for each single stage decision rule S. 
A. 
7. The steps in Exercise 6 do not prove existence of an EP. For that result, 
v6 = f 6 
for some (S is needed; then cS 	is an EP. This last step has been 
proven
1 
using the Kakutani fixed point theorem. However, the problem is 
simpler if, as we assume now, there are only two 
players, rewards are zero-sum, i.e. ri (s,4) + r 2 (s,a) = 0 for all (s,a)c,;, and 
< co. Define h as in Exercise 6; here h(s,a,l,v) = -h(s,a,2,v) for all 
A, 
(s,a)E S and vEV so, in the remainder of the exercise, let h(•,•,•) = h(•,•,1,•). 
From the minimax theorem for matrix games, for each vcV, define a mapping Gv 
on S via 
1A. M. Fink, "Equilibrium in a Stochastic n-Person Game," Journal of Science  















 6 = (6
l'
6
2 ) and vEV, define a mapping H6v on S with [H 6v](s) = h[s,d(s),v]. Ar 
A/ 
(a) Explain why an FP of G is an EP. 
(b) Prove that HS is a contraction mapping, hence it has a unique FP v. 
(c) Prove that G is a contraction mapping, hence it has a unique FP. (Hint: 
For each d 1 and v let 
[.766 v](s) = inff[H ics 6 )v](s): 626A2}, 
1 	 ` l' 2' 
and prove that 2
6 
is a contraction mapping. Note that 
1 
[Gv](s) = sup{LE 6 v1(s): 6 1Epl i 1 
and use Theorem V.2.2. 









= G and G
1+1 = GG. From (c), limi v
i 
exists and is the FP of G. 
+co 
Fix i and explain (in detail), how to compute v
i 
starting from v0 . 
8. Fix NEI+. In the proof of Theorem 3, it is claimed that any II is a convex 
combination of the unrandomized H 's. Prove it. 
q 
9. Prove that m (.), defined in the proof of Theorem 4, is continuous on N (for 
each N, s, and q). 
10. Theorems 3 and 4 are alternative existence proofs for N-period EP's. Construct 
a third proof by invoking Theorem 1. (Hint: For N fixed, construct an 
infinite horizon game with state space Sx{1,...,N+1}.) 
4. Myopic Equilibrium Points  
Section 3 establishes that every finite SG, for every initial state, has 
an N-period EP (equilibrium point) for every N. Also, it has a discounted EP 
and, under certain conditions, it has an average reward EP. Section 8 contains 
algorithms for the computation and approximation of EP's but those algorithms are 
lengthy. This section presents sufficient conditions for the computation of an 
EP in an SG to be replaced by the computation of an EP in a static game. The 
latter task is much easier than the former. 
The results in this section are analogous to Chapter III's simplification 
for MDP's. We find in Chapter III that myopic optima facilitate the qualitative 
analysis of optimal policies. In an example at the end of this section and 
throughout Section 5, we find that myopic EP's simplify the analysis of 
qualitative properties of EP's of SG's. 
From section 3 of Chapter III, an MDP is said to have a myopic optimum if 
its data can be used easily to specify a single period optimization problem with 
the following property: ad infinitum repetition of a solution to the single 
period problem comprises an optimal MDP solution. Similarly, an SG is said to 
have a myopic EP if its data can be used easily to specify a static game with 
the following property: ad infinitum repetition of an EP of the static game 
comprises an EP for the SG. 
The following assumptions are similar to Assumptions I through IV in 
Section 3 of Chapter III. It is convenient to define 
Aq = U Aq, 	
(1 
A = 	Aq 
stS s 0 
and 
-2- 
S(2) = {s: (s,2)E S}, 	acA. 
Hence, S(a) is the set of states from which the multiplayer actionz is feasible. 
Recall Definition 1.4 which introduces the notation L (s) for player q's salvage 
value if the ultimate state is s. Finally, in notation similar to that in 
Section 2, we write d = (d , -q  )EA where d is player q's action and d q 	 A-q 




(s,a) = K 
q (a) + Lq  (s), oy   
(S 55)E 	qE2. 
ASSUMPTION II: 
The transition function satisfies 
(2) p(Jls,a) = x(JI2), (s,
^
a)E S, so sTril. - (a
n
), nEI+ . 
A/  
Let 
(3) Yq  (a) = K q  (a) + q EiLq  [E(a)]}, 
	aEA, 
and let r denote the following static game among the players in O. Player q has 
available the set of moves Aq and 'y (a) is player q's payoff when the players 
choose acA. First, suppose r has an EP in pure (i.e. unrandomized) strategies. 
ASSUMPTION III: 
There exists a EA such that ^, 
(4) y q  (a 
	








 )} = 1. 
The MDP version of these assumptions is discussed in Section 3 of 
Chapter III. In particular, the transition function p(•Is,a), which ordinarily 
depends on both s and a, is assumed in (2) to depend only on a. As a result, the 
n+l-st state sn+1,  which ordinarily depends on both the n-th state sn and the 
n-th multiplayer action a
n , is assumed in (2) to depend only on a n . Therefore, 
sn+1 has the same probability distribution as a random variable E(an) whose 
distribution, from (2), is 
x(J1a) = P{E(a)EJ}. 
Following Corollary 1.1 below, we relax Assumption III which requires r to have 
an EP in pure strategies. 
* 
Let a be a single stage decision rule which specifies a(s) = a (with 
probability one) if seS(a ) (c a E xn s 
Aq) and specifies an arbitrary element 
(Le  
of ge  xn s 
Aq if sS(a ). Let aN deriote the N-period policy where a n 
= a(sn) for 
n = 1, ..., N. 
THEOREM 1. Assumptions I through IV imply: 
(a) ac° is a discounted EP with respect to S(a* ) and the set of an policies; 
(b) aN is an N-period EP, for every NEI+ , with respect to S(a* ) and the set 
of all policies. 
* 	, 
1Let (Q,S,P) be the probability space here. By (5), we mean P{ (a )Clit = 1 
for all HES with S(a*)C H. 
-4- 
PROOF. As in the proof of Theorem 111.3.1, the substitution of (1) and (2) in 
(6) V q 	-N ,-1 (N) = Ln=1 16 q rq (sn
,a
n
) +L (s 	) q q N+1 
yields 




{1( q  (an  ) + 8 qLq [E(an)1} q  
E[Vq (N)] = L q (s 1 ) + E[EN 
fp* fa 
n=1 q 	n‘] 
where y (•) is defined by (3). 
Suppose s
1
=scS(a ) and all the players except player q use the single stage 
decision rule aN q in periods 1,...,N. Let E denote an expectation evaluated with 
probabilities induced by policy H. If player q uses the N-period policy F, then 





















(8) < L 
q 
 (s) + y (a* )En=1 q
Nn-1 
—  
with the inequality due to (4), the static EP property of a * . Player q attains 
the right side of (8) by using the q-th component of a * in every period. This 




For (a), let N co above. The EP claim is valid with respect to aZZ policies, 
rather than only the Markov policies, for the following reason. From (4), if all 
the players but q are using a_ q  and player q uses any policy 	then 
vs(,ac°q co 
q 
 ) = L (s) + 
E (  -  
(9) < Lq  (a) + 	(a )/(1 - a). 
Player q attains the right side of (9) by using the q-th component of 1. r7  
COROLLARY 1.1 Suppose there is u < co such that 
(10) IL (s) I < u , 	scS, 	qe(2. , 
and Assumptions I through IV are satisfied (with6 c1 = 1 in (3)). Then a° is an 
average reward EP with respect to S(a * ) and all policies. 
PROOF. Let (6) denote V q (N) with (3 c, = 1. Then 
EN
n=1 
r(sn' an) = Vq
(N) - Lq (sN+1 ) 
SO 
Gq = lim infN E
N 
=1 
r(s  n  ,a n )/N +00   





From Theorem 1, if s
1 
 eS(a ) then for each fixed N, each player's component of 
a = a(s 
n 
 ), n=1,...,N, is an optimal rejoinder if all the other players do like- 
wise. I.e., 




 ) = vs
q 
 ( ,N)/N > s 	q 90(AP-q ),N]/N, 	
sES(a ), 
q 	 —  
for all policies Eq  available to player q. Also, (10) implies Lq(sN+1)/N + 0 for 
all policies. From (11) and (12), taking expected values in (12) and 











[(E , m )1, SCS (a ) 
S  
for all E . Hence, a satisfies (2.3), the definition of an average reward 
EP. D 
Recall from Section 3 where 1/AS < co that Zsq denotes the set of all probability 
distributions on 	If AS 
s 
is not denumerable, then technical difficulties 
require a modification of the definition of Z sq . For the remainder of this 
section, we avoid such modifications by considering only finite SG's. Now suppose 
r lacks a pure EP so Assumption III is not valid. Since the SG is finite, it 
follows that A = x U Aq is a finite set so there necessarily exists at least 
c169- seS s 
a randomized EP (due to Proposition 2.2). 
Formally, 
Zq = ) Z , 	qcQ, 	and 	x Zq 
scS-sq cleQ- 
correspond to the sets A q and A defined above Assumption I. In fact, Z q is 
-7- 
contained in set of all probability distributions on A q : 
Z q ic {(z. 	 ziq 
 > 0 for all i.E.Aq lq 	— 
and E
1.EA
q ziq = 1}. 
We write z 
q 
a 	 qE q for an element of Z q . Then x Z q is the set of all z = (z q ; - Q.-  
If the players in r use the randomized strategy z, then player q's expected return is 
Pq(z) = EilEA37 	EA 	zi 
which extends the notation (3.5). An EP z of r, which necessarily exists, 
satisfies 
(13) 	 Pq (z) > Pq (E2z )2 	Eaq , 
For a particular EP z of r, let A' denote the elements of A which are given 
positive probability: 
A' = 	 (k1 ,...,yEA and zk 	> 0 for all q).
q 
q 
Let S' denote the set of states from which every element of A' is feasible: 
S' = {s: sES and a E X Aq 	for all aEA'} 
q0.1, s 
= r) S(a). 
aEAT 
-8- 
The SG is assumed to be finite, so 
letPsj  .(a) denote the transition probability 
T(fins,a) . Assumption II is equivalent to the existence of numbers x.(a), jeS, 
aEA, such that 
xj (a) = psi (a), 	(s,a)E S, jcS. 
In place of Assumption IV, there is 
ASSUMPTION IV': 
(14) E. 	xj 
 (a) = 1 
jES  
for all acA'. 
The elements of A' are exactly the actions which are 
given positive probability by z. Then (14) asserts that, with probability one, 
the subsequent state will be in 5'. But 5' is exactly the set of states from 
which all the elements of A' are feasible. 
Let A be a single stage decision rule which uses z if scS' and is arbitrary 
if s4S'. Let AN denote the N-period policy which uses the single stage decision 
rule A in periods 1,..., N. 
THEOREM 2. Suppose a finite SG satisfies assumptions I, II, and IV'. 
(a) X 	a discounted EP and an average reward EP with respect to S' and all 
policies. 
(b) For all NEI+ , AN is an N-period EP with respect to 5' and all policies. 
PROOF. Exercise 1. F-1 
Computation 
Suppose an SG satisfies Assumptions I through IV or IV'. It follows from 
Theorems 1 and 2 that an EP solution of the SG is equivalent to finding an EP 
of the static game r specified between (3) and (4). Suppose that the SG is 
-9- 
finite so that each player in r is randomizing over only finitely many actions, 
i.e. Aq is finite for each q. The Bibliographic Guide at the end of this 
chapter includes references to several algorithms which may be used to compute 
or approximate an EP of r. 
A Useful Special Case 
Instances of the following structure arise later in this section and in 





,...,aQ) in stating and proving the following result. 
THEOREM 3. Suppose Q > 2 and for all qEQ that yq (a) in (3) takes the form 
	
Y (a) ) = a + w a /E 	a. - E a q 	q 	q q 1 	q q 
with w > 0 and E
q 
 > 0. Let Ti c, = Eq /wq and suppose E ico, n i O. Let 
G = (Q-1)/E ico Il i and a
* 
= (aq ; qEQ) where 
a q  = a - nq 
Q2 , 
	qEQ. 




is an EP of r (the static q _ 	 iEQ 1 




PROOF. The assumed structure of y (.) yields 
ay (aVaa = Z 	a /(Z. Aa4)
2 
- 
q 	q 	q i 	ll! 4- 
a 2Y (a)na2 = -2w a , a )/(E 3 . q 	q ifq i 	/CV. 1 
-9a- 
The assumptions imply a i > 0 for each i so the second derivative is nonpositive 
atla = a . Setting the first derivative equal to zero yields 
(15) 	E. 	ai = aq + nq (E ico ai )
2 .
i 
Sum both sides over (10 to obtain 
Q Z ien ai = Ego aq + (Eqconq)(Eio. a i ) 2 . 
Dividing both sides by E io. ai (# 0) leads to 
E icq ai = (0-1)/Eion i = a 
which, upon substitution in (15), yields a q  = a - n G
2
. If nq  = n for all q then 
a = (Q-1)/(Q11) so 
aq  = a - n G
2 





"Guns or Butter" Example 
Interactions among nations and among biological species are sometimes 
discussed in terms of tradeoffs between consumption and investment. The idea 
is that a nation (species) is more likely to survive in the future if it invests 
more and consumes less. However, one of the purposes of survival is to be able 
to consume, so one would rather not forego consumption. These considerations 
are implicit in the following model. It can be regarded as a sequential game 
generalization of the resource management and capital accumulation model in 
Section 4 of Chapter VII. 





). Each period n, player q decides how much to invest in "guns", g q , and  
how much to consume as "butter," b q . A player cannot use more than the available 
wealth so gq + bq < s q and n 	n 
Aq 
s 1 ,s 2 ) 
 = {(g,b): 0 < g, 0 < b, and g + b < s q l; (  
for each q, 	0 < s q . 






X2 ), (X3' X3 ),...be independent and identically distributed 
random vectors. We assume 
(16) 
gn  




S q = 
n+1 
X(s - b) 
n n 	n 




where h > 0. In (16), sq - bq - gq is the residual wealth after consumption and n 	n 	n 
q 1 2 
investment, and hqgn/(gn + gn
) is proportional to player es fraction of the 
total investment. Hence, s
n+1 
is a random multiple of the sum of these two 




) has the property that the effectiveness of 
player q's investment in "guns" diminishes as the other player's investment in 
"guns" increases. 
Suppose that player q's reward in period n is the amount of "butter" that 
q consumes, b q . Then 












)1) = b q , 	q = 1,2. 
This model satisfies Assumption I because, in (17), r q (s,a) = Kg (a) + Lq (s) with 
L (.) E 0 and K (a) = K r(
_1 03 1 ), (g2 03 2 )3 	
bq. However, Assumption II is 
violated by (16). 
Assumption II stipulates that s n+1 depends only on an . Therefore, we 
transform the definition of player q's action from (0,0) to (s q - bq ,gq ) and 
replace AS in (13) with its equivalent for the new action (d q ,gq ) where 
dq = sq - bg: 
Aq 
s 1 ,s 2 ) 
 = {(d,g): 0 < g < d < s q }. 
(  
Recall the notation 
Aq = L) Aq . 
scS s 
Here , S = IR 2 so 
(18) 	 Aq = {(d,g): 0 < g < d), 	q = 1,2. 
-12- 











1 ,s 2 ): 0 < gq < dq < sq , 	q = 1,2}. 
1.. 	
,al,a2., 
and let Let aq now denote the new action (d q ,gq), let a = k 	)...  A, 
s = (s 1 ,s 2 ). Then (19) becomes 
r q (s,a) = s - d 
", 
because sq-dq = sq - (sq - bq) = bq . In this form, r 	satisfies Assumption 
I with K 
q 
 (a) = 
(20) sn+1 = 
-dq and L q (s) 
Xnidnq - 
Xqd n n 
= sq . 	Also, (16) 
gn + hq( 1 	2 )] 
becomes 
if gcil > 0 
if gcli = 0. 
gn 8n 
Assumption II is satisfied because the right side of (20) involves only elements 
of a ; i.e. s enters only as a component of aAin  . vn 
For Assumption III, we must first specify the static game r whose payoffs 
y (.) are defined by (3). Let U q = E(X?). For the remainder of this section, 
we write q as a subscript rather than a superscript. Here, if g > 0, 
q 
yq (0 = y a) + $ 44E{Lq [EcO]} 
= -dq + f3qE1Xlq[dq -gq + hq (i:41 
SO 
gq 
(21) Y (a) = -d + 11 	- g + h 
q 	qqqq 	qg1412 
-13- 
Player q's available actions in r are Aq given by (18). Suppose 
0 < 8 q p q  < 1, q = 1,2. Exercise 2 asks you to prove that r has the 
fqllowing EP: 
d1 = gl = (1/h 2 )/(1/11 1 + 1/h2 ) 2 
(22) 
d2 = g2 = (1/11 1 )/(1/11 1 + 1/h2 ) 2 . 
The assumption 8p < 1 restricts E(Xlq)to at most 1/8 . Hence, if E p < 1 for q q 
q = 1,2, then Assumption III is satisfied by a specified by (22). 
Assumption IV is P{(a *)cS(a *)) = 1. With (18), (19), and (21), this 
condition is 
(23) PfX7 hqgq /(gi + g2 ) > gq , q = 1,2) = 1 




2 = 1/(1/h 1  + 1/h2
). 
Hence, (23) becomes 
(24) P{Xcl > (1/h )/(1/h1  + 1/h 2
) 
1 —  
q = 1,2) = 1. 








) and 8cipq < 1 for q = 1,2, so (24) is satisfied, 
then (d1 ,4) = (dq ,gq ) specified by (22) for all n = 2,3,..., g7 = gq and 
bq1  = sq - gq 
 comprise an EP for the SG. Using (7), the resulting expected 
discounted return in the infinite duration case is 
-14- 




][1 - 61p1h1(1/h1 + 1/h2 )]/( 1 - 61  ) 1  
for player 1, with a similar expression for player 2. Notice that neither the 
actions (22) nor their consequent expected return (25) depend on the joint 





) except through p
1 
and p
2 i.e. the expected 
values of the marginal distributions. 
A symmetric game is one in which each player has the same opportunities and 
rewards. In the present game, symmetry means 6 = 6 1 = 6 2 , p = p i = p 2 , and 
hi = h2 ; then J = J i = J2 . If hi = h2 = h, then (22) becomes 
1 	1 	2 	2 
d =g =d =g = h/4 
and (24) is reduced to 
(26) PfX7 > 1/2, 	q = 1,21 = 1. 
1 
The entire restriction on (X1
,X
1
) is p < 1/6 and (26). 
-15- 
EXERCISES  
1. Prove Theorem 2. 
2. In (21), suppose 0 < R gU q < 1 for q = 1,2. Verify that (22) specifies an EP 
for F with payoffs given by (21) and actions given by (18). (Hint: Theorem 3). 













), n = 1,2, ..., are independent and identically 
distributed random vectors. Let hq = E(Hq ) and let (21) define d q and gq , 
q = 1,2. Prove that this modified model has the same myopic EP as the 
original model if (23) is replaced by 




1 J 2 
 )1(1/J 1 
 + 1/.3 2 ) -2 1 1   
q = 1,2} = 1. 
4. The model in this section is stationary, i.e. time-invariant. Suppose, 
instead, that Sn is the set of states in period, Aqn  is player q's set of s 
alternative actions in period n if 






n  = a} 
for J C S 	and (s,a)e 	= f(s,a): ae x Aq and seS 3, r (p,a) is player n+1 A. n 	A. 	A, gen sn 	n 	qn 
q's reward in period n if (sn 
A a n 	 n  ) = (s,a)e 
	, and one monetary unit at the , 
start of n+1 is worth 8
qn 
at the start of period n. State and prove a 
version of Theorem for this nonstationary model. (Hint: Let 
yqn (e = Kqn (a) + f3,411E{Lchni_l i n c,t)])). 
-16- 
5. A more general version of the model in Theorem 3 is 
i 
Y (a) = a + w a /(E. a ) m - 	a q 	q 	q q 10 i 	q q 
with MI+ and m < Q. Suppose also that n = q 
 /w
q 





 = [(Q-111)/Q1144.1 ]
l/m 
for all q 
is an EP of the static game F. 
6. Prove that the conclusions of Theorem 3 are valid for the following model 
(which is different from the one in Theorem 3): 





 /E 	a i 	- - E q  a lig c0... ' 
5.1 
5. Competitive Advertising Decisions  
= Section 4 of Chapter III presents an MDP model of a firm's advertising 
decisions. That model does not include the competitive reaction of competing 
firms, a feature which is added in this section. It is important to use an SG 
model of advertising decisions instead of an MDP model if one's competitors 
react quickly and their decisions greatly affect one's own demand. 
This section analyzes a duopoly model, i.e. a model of two competing firms. 
The principal conclusions are valid in a similar model with more than two firms 
but the exposition would be more cumbersome. The end of section 6 combines the 
results in this section with those of a duopoly model in which firms make 
production decisions and hold inventories. 
Duopoly models are sometimes useful to model competitive decisions in 
industries with more than two firms but where one firm is dominant. Then the two 
firms in the model are the dominant firm and a pseudo-"firm" which aggregates 
all the firms except the dominant one. Some examples of industries where the 
leading firm is indeed dominant are IBM in computers and General Mills in 
breakfast cereals. 
The notation in the following model generally consists of appending "q" super-
scripts and subscripts to the notation in Section 4 of Chapter III. The model 
describes two interacting firms so gen = {1,2). We assume that the effect of 
firm q's advertising on its "goodwill" depreciates at a rate 6 q per time period, 
0 < 0 < 1. Let 	denotee firm q's advertising expenditure in period n so z8i 
— q 	 n q 
is the impact of zq on goodwill in period n+j. Firm q's goodwill is the aggregate 
impact of its advertising expenditures so a:, its goodwill in period n, is 
5.2 
aq = z qe-1 + z qe-2 ++ zq 	+ • n 	1 q 	2 q 	 n-1 zn' 
(1) aq = Z11-1 z q nk -q 	° 	(4° n 	k=0 n-k 	n q n-1 n 	n 
 z + 8 a' = z + s'




) and s = (s
n ,sn ).nn n 
Let Dq be firm q's demand in period n, measured in physical units, and let 




). We assume for each n that the distribution of D depends only on 
n n 	 Poti 
a , i.e. demand depends only on current goodwill. Let 
(2) 1.1q  (a) = E(D
cl ia = a) , 	 a > (0,0) 
1 P41 	A/ 
where we emphasize that the distribution of D i 	depend on both firms' goodwills. 
1 
Let r q  be firm q's gross profit per unit of demand, not including advertising 
expenditures; we assume r q  > 0. Then r q n Dq - z
n 












is firm q's sum of discounted profits; we assume S q < 1, q = 1,2. 
Let s cil = 04 denote the initial goodwill so a cl = z7 + s7; then (1) is valid 
for all 	Substitution of zn q 
 = a
n q 
 - 8 g 
 a
n-1  in (3) yields 
Vg 	
a 	c0 	n 	







q 0 n=1 q q n 
Let 




) > (0,0). 
5.3 
Let E1  denote an expectation with respect to probabilities induced by the firms' 
use of policy IL= (111 ,112 ). Then 
(5) v2(11) = s q + En [E'n=1 an-ly*(a ) Is = si q q 





The constraint on a is 
A/n 
	
1 2 	1 	2 
(6) ,
0





< aq for each q. Note that the realized values of the demands D ,D — n 
do not affect the feasibility of a a .... 




) such that 
* * 	* 1 * 	* * * * 2 






Then the model satisfies Assumptions I through IV in Section 4 (Exercise 1 asks you 
to verify this claim) so the following result is a consequence of Theorem 4.1. 
PROPOSITION 1. If (7) is valid, then a. n=a* for all n is a discounted EP 1 with respect 
to {s: s < a
*
1 and the set of all policies. 
* 	 * 
Proposition 1 states that, if s
1 
 < a , then a = a for all n comprises an EP. 
e 
From (6), the consequent advertising expenditures are 





- s' and z'
n 
 = a 
q
(1 - e ) for n > 1. 
1
The rule isn a
* 
is not a policy because .fin = a is not feasible ifjn jz . 
Let ar, be arbitrary,"mt feasible, if s 	Of course, if zi< a * then the rule 
a = a causes s < a* for all n. 
— 
5.4 
In order to analyze the static game with payoffs in (4), it is 









Observe that a is an EP of the static game with payoffs in (4) if and only if it 
is an EP for the static game with payoffs y (-) = y (•)/r : 
(8) y q 








If y (-) is differentiable at (al ,a2 ) > (0,0), then a necessary condition for an 
interior EP is 
(9) 81-1 q (a 1 ,a 2)naq - hq = 0 , 	q = 1,2. 
EXAMPLE 1. Let w q (a) = aq /(a 1+a2
) which is firm q's fraction of the total goodwill. 
Suppose D2 for each n and q has a marginal distribution which is a uniform 




 + 2J 
q w q 
 (a)]. Then p 
q 
 (a) = g
q 



















. From (10), 












so a 1 + a2 = (H1 + H2 )
-1 






) 2 and a











1. Suppose there are n firms instead of only two, and 9 > 2. In place 
of (7), if 
* 	 * 
Yq (aA, — ) > yq (aq ,,0—q ), 	aq — 
> 0, 	q = 1,...,9, 
then Proposition 1 is still valid. Work out the details of Example 1 if 
w 
q
(a) = a q q /E2=1 aq 	n and Dq 






 + 2J q  w q (a)) for each n and q. (Hint: Theorem 4.3).  -./ 
6. Dynamic Oligopoly  
Sequential games constitute a reasonable framework in which to analyze 
many of the economic phenomena associated with imperfect competition. The 
preceding section presents a duopoly model which is a natural generalization 
of Section 4 of Chapter III. This section contains a multi-firm generalization 
of Sections 1 and 2 of Chapter III, i.e. a dynamic oligopoly model in which 
firms hold inventories from one period to the next. A firm's decisions each 
period are the amount to produce and the price at which it is willing to its 
goods. At the end of the section, we add a third decision, namely the amount 
to spend on advetising. 
Let n be a set of firms and let s g be firm q's inventory level at the 
beginning of period n. We assume that production is sufficiently rapid 
relative to a period's length that the quantity produced can be used to satisfy 
demand in the same period. Let 	and Dg be firm q's production quantity and n 	n 
demand in period n, respectively. We assume P{D : > 01 = 1 for all n and q. 
Suppose that excess demand is backlogged so s igra = sg + zg - Dg . Let n 	n 	n 
yg = s g 	and let s , z ,zn , and D
11 
 denote the vectors whose s-th components 
n 	n n 	Non 	A., 
are sg , zg , yg , and Dg , respectively. Then n n n 	n 
=s +z -D =y -D. 
A.,n 	"in 
Let pg be the price announced by firm q in period n and let p n be the 
vector whose s-th component is pg . Let ag = (yg ,0g) and let a be the vector 
n n n 
whose s-th component is 	We assume that the distribution of D , given 
an = 8 = ( p,y), is conditionally independent of the history 
sn-1' ,gn-1' s , and depends only on p and, possibly, on y. Let 
6.1 
= E(D:11 19.11 = a). 
Thus the distribution of each firm's demand may be affected by the prices and 
quantities set by competing firms as well as by its own price and quantity. 
Suppose that each firm has two kinds of costs. We assume that production 
cost is proportional to the amount produced; we believe that this is the major 
limitation of the model. Let c q n .z be firm q's production cost in period n. 
Also, suppose that firm q's salvage value of s q is -c q . 
Let g (y,p,d) denote firm q's revenue minus its inventory-related costs in q  
period n if an  = (y,p) and D =d. This representation encompasses many cases. n 
EXAMPLE 1. Let en be the "raw" demand faced by firm q in period n. Suppose e n , 
the vector with s-th component en , depends only on the price vector pn . Let 





- y) 4. ' 	yn
q 	q - en } 	if yq > en s n' 
where Z m < 1. Thus the general backordering assumption encompasses the EIEQ.  q — 
case in which excess demand is lost. The simplest such case would have m =0 
in (2) for all qEO. Suppose that consumers in this industry are well informed 
and will pay only the lowest price set by any of the firms. Then g (y,p,d) q 
might take the form 
(2) 	g(y,p,d) = dq  minfpj : jcQ} - h .(y q - d c1 )+ 
si  
- b .(dq - yq ) -1. 
where hq  and bq  are respective unit costs of inventory and shortage. In 
6.2 
this example, other firms' actions affect firm q via demand and via the price 
that traffic will bear. 
Let 8 denote firm q's discount factor. Exercise 1 ask you to verify that 
the oligopoly model satisfies Assumptions I and II in Section 4 with (4.3) taking 
the form 
(3) y q  (a) = E[g q 
 (a,D
1 ) 
	a q c q1  Dq la4  = a] - c (1 - 	)37c1  . 
where yq  is the q-th component of y in a = (y,p). 
Let the constraints on a q = (yq ,pq ) be 
an 	n n 
0 < zq = yq - s q 	so 	sq < yq and 0 < pq , 
—n n n n — n 	 — n 
so that production quantities and prices must both be nonnegative. With 
backordering in the model, S = 3R 4 so 
(4) AS = [0,03) x [0,03), Aq = 
	
	 ' 	 qc 
AS 	TR2+ 
and A = x
0 A
q = IR 2Q 
 s  
sE.S 
where s q  is the q-th component of s. As in the general case in Section 3, let 
rw 
r denote the following static game among the firms in Q: firm q's payoffs is 
y (a) and its set of alternative moves is A q . 
Exercise 1 ask you to verify that, if F has an EP (equilibrium point) in 
pure strategies, then the model satisfies Assumption IV in Section 3. The 
following result is then an immediate corollary of Theorem 4.1. 
THEOREM 1. If r has an unrandomized EP a = (y* ,p*), Zet a be a single stage 
Al Al 
decision rule which specifies a(s) = a
* 
(with probability one) if s < y
* 
and 





 is a discounted EP with respect to [y
* 	
and the set of all policies. 
(b) aN is a N-period EP, for every NEI+ , with respect to [y ,x) and the set of 
all policies. 
An industry which has the structure of the oligopoly model would have the 
following properties if r has an unrandomized EP and s l < y : 
(i) Each firm's price would be time-invariant. However, 
different firms may have different prices (the theorem 




(ii) Each firm's maximum inventory would be time-invariant. 
Suppose that the model remains myopic but no longer time-invariant (see 
Exercise 4.4). Then (i) and (ii) would no longer be valid. The myopic 
- structure itself would vanish if the model included bankruptcy and other 
financial details. 
We have assumed P{D > 0} = 1 for all n. Therefore, from (1), if 
"en — 
* 
in = y, then 
* 	* 
	
s 	=y - Dn =y - D< y Ai 	 — 
* 
so yn+l  = y is again feasible (with probability one). As a result, the re-
quirement in Theorem 1 that r has an unrandomized EP is stronger than necessary. 
COROLLARY 1.1. Suppose r has an EP z, possible randomized, which assigns 
Ply = y
*
1 = 1 for some y*EIRQ . Let A denote a single stage decision rule which 
...., 	...... 	 ,..  
specifies X(s) = z if s < y
* 
and is arbitrary if s i y
*
. Suppose (3 < 1 for all 
S.' 
	060' 	 SI 	^W 	 q 
qc(2. Then (a) and (b) of Theorem 1 are valid with A 	AN in place of 
AS 	 •••■•• 
co 
a and aN . 
6.4 
Linear Inventory and Backorder Costs 
The rest of this section presents some of the cases in which the condition 
of the corollary is satisfied. Suppose 
(5) g q (y,p,d) = pddg - h•(yg - dg ) .4- - 1)'(dg - y g ) 4- 
where, unlike (2), the unit costs of inventory and backorders are assumed the 
same for all firms (i.e. h and b are not subscripted with q). Similarly, let 
a = a and cq  = c for all q. These assumptions are made merely to simplify 
the notation but they are reasonable in many industries. 
Suppose for each q that the marginal distribution function F of D I depends 
on a = (y
1
,p1) only via the price vector p l . Let 
F 
q 
 (x1p) = Pfag < xlp, = p} 
so that the expected value of D i 	be written 1 
Vn (P) = E[D i la = (Y,P)]• 
With these simplifications, the substitution of (5) in (3) yields 
(6') y 
q  () = (Pg - (icq )Vq 	 1 	1 (P) - c (1 -13)Y
g - E[h(yg - Dg ) 4- + b(Dg - y)+ 1p_I  = pl. 
Since we shall analyze several versions of r with payoffs as in (6'), it 
clarifies the exposition to write D q for D?, yq for yg , and pq for pg . Then 
(6') becomes 
(6) y q (a) = (p - ap)p CI
(p)
PV 






+ b(D - y )
+1
P1 = P]. A0 	 „ 	Ao 
6.5 
We assume for each q that F (*Ip) has a density function (I) 
q
(.10 








(7) 	0 = ay (a)/ay q 	q I a=a*  
N "1 
is necessary. From (6), 
ay q (a) 
aY q p = 
* 
* = -c(1 - 	- hF
q 
 (Y 1p ) + b[1 - F
q  (Y lo )] q 	 q 
 
Therefore, (7) is equivalent to 
* b-c(1 -B)  
F (y IP ) = q q 	b + h 
Let 
F p) = sup{x: F q (xIP) < r) q1(ri 	 0., 
and 
(8) v = [b - c(1 - 13)]/[b + h] 










This equation has exactly the same form as (111.2.4) which specifies the 
optimal base stock level for a firm in a perfectly competitive market (or a 
monopolist whose price is not a decision variable). 





in (6) to obtain y (.) as a function only of p. Let M (p) denote y 
q (a) = y q (y,o) ^0  




(11) (p) = (p q  — 1301.1 q  (p) — 







(p) — x]cp (x1p)dx - b 	[x — 3 (p)]cp q (x1p)dx. q 	"i 
0 
Then a necessary condition for an EP is 
(12) 0 'M (P)/ap q 	qi 
P = P 
ry 	1•0 
if M (*) is concave on fl and if there is any p which satisfies (12). 
ow 
In order to check (12), let 
(X) 
3q  ()) 
3 ,1 q LP) 	 (P) 
f 	 3 (p) = 	 (I(P) - 	i to"*" P 
D0 ci (xl,&) 
and 0 cl' 	= 	 
q 
6.7 
which are assumed to exist. Then Leibnitz' rule and (10) yield 
am go (13) 	 




	[J q  (o) - x] q  (x1o)dx - hf q (p)Fq [3 (0)1p1  q 
0 
- b Jr Ex - J q  (p)IP  q  (x1„p)dx + bf q (p){1 - F q [J (p)IA p]).  ^, 
J (p) 
q 
Now 0 = am (p)/ap and F [J (p)Ip] = F [F-1 (v101p] = v yield 
q 
u (p) + (pq  - ac)u (to) = b jr- 	[x - J (p)lp (x1p)dx ,v 	J (0) q 	q 
(14) 




Direct verification of the concavity of M (.) via its Hessian matrix 
seems too painful without a specific assumption concerning F , hence fq , u , 
1.0, 0q , and q . Nevertheless, observe that neither (9) nor (12) depend on 
the joint distribution of all the firms' demands except through the marginal 
distributions. In order to simplify the analysis, the following cases have 
0 
q 
(x1p) constant with respect to x. 
6.8 
Uniform Marginal Distributions 
EXAMPLE 2. Suppose that there are two firms which we label q = 1 and q = -1 
for convenience of exposition. We assume that the marginal distribution of D q , 
firm q's demand, 	is uniform on the interval 	[0, wo _q/{1 + (p1 
+ p
-1
) 2 }]. 
These marginal distributions would result in the following cases: 
(i) For each q, Dq = wp_qU/[1 + (p 1 + p 1 ) 2 ] where U is uniformly 
distributed on [0,w]; 
(ii) For each q, Dq = P_q U where U is uniformly distributed on 
[0, w/{1 +(p_1 + pl ) 2 }); and 
(iii) D1 and D-1 
are independent r.v.'s with the uniform distributions 
specified above. 
Uniform marginal distributions yield 
uq  = [wP / 2 ]/11 + (P -4- P-1 )
2
I 
P I = wP-q  (P1 +P-1  )/[1 + (P1 + P-1 ) 2 ] 2 < 0 (P 1 ,P-1 >  0) 
u 
q q 









) + wo (1+ p 





) 2 ] 2 
These relationships show that: 
(a) The firm's average demand decreases as its price rises; 
(b) For certain values of w(e.g. w =1), firm q's expected revenue 
is unimodal (quasiconcave) in p ; 
(c) D ►  0 as p
-q 
 0, and Dq  + wp 
-q 




In order to use (9) and (13) to obtain y
* and p* we need F , J , and 
A, 	06,6 	 q 	q 
0 . By assumption, 
0 (x!0) = [1 + (P1 + P)
2
1/[wp I, 0 < x < wO /[1 	(p1 	p_
1
) 2 1 _q 	 _q q 
SO 
cr(x1P) = 2(P1 + P)/(WP) 





0 < u < 1, 
(15) J q  (p) = F q  (v1p) = wp _ qv/[1 + 1 + p-1)I. 
It is convenient to define 
= [-2ac + b(1-v) 2 + hv 2 )/2 
(16) 6q  = 2p
-q 
 - p2 9 - 1. 
- 
Substitution in (13) yields 
Pq  - (P - $c)(P1 + P-1 )(11q /2)/[1 + 
	
P-1 ) 2 1 
 
= [2(P1 + P-1)/(wP-q r 















 )[b(1-v) 2 + hv
2 ]/(wp -q ). 
6.10 
Therefore, 
1 + (o1 + p-1)





Pq  + 2EPq 
 + 0
q 
 = 0, 
and 
p . _E 4. A2_ e (17) 
q 	 q 
if E2 > 0 q  , i.e. if E2 - 2p _q  E + p q 2 + 1 > 0. We shall have to verify 
,2 _ 2 , 4. r2 + 1 > 0 (18) p ci 	p_q   
* 
when p = P . 
The substitution of (16) in (17) yields 
(P + E) 2 = E 2 + 1 + p2 - 2Ep 
q 	 q 	-q 
SO 
2 (19) 2E(p1 + p_i ) -1 = p2_g - pg . 
This is valid for q=1 and q= -1 so pl = p_1 reduces (19) to 
* 	* 








= y2 = wvU(1 + 4
2
). 
In order to verify (17), substitute (19) to obtain 
p2 q - 2Ep_q + E
2 + 1 = (16 2 ) -1 - 1/2 + E 2 + 1 
= (16 2 ) -1 +
2 + 1/2 > 0. 0 
6.12 
EXERCISES  
1. (a) Verify that the oligopoly model satisfies Assumptions I and II in 
Section 4 with (4.3) taking the form (4). 
(b) Suppose that the static game r (described below (5)) has an 
* * 
unrandomized EP a = (y ,p ). Verify that the model satisfies 
ely 
Assumption IV in Section 4. 
2. Consider the non-symmetric version of Example 2 in which 	and
-1 
may 
differ. Prove that EP prices satisfy 
* * 
P-1 	- /P1 =It1 	2 - [(E1 - 2 )
2 
- 4(E 2 - E1 -1)11/21/2. 
7. Ordinal Sequential Games  
Section 3 presents sufficient conditions for an SG (sequential game) to 
pospess an EP (equilibrium point). The proofs there depend on the following 
observation: if all players but one use Markov policies then the remaining 
player faces an MDP (Markov decision process). That fact permits us to invoke 
existence theorems for MDP optima but it does not lead to the straightforward 
application of MDP algorithms to the computation of SG EP's. As a result, the 
section which concerns EP algorithms, Section 8, is a collection of largely 
unrelated special cases. 
This section has two purposes. First, we show that SG's with discounted 
payoffs can be imbedded in the ordinal framework of Sections 3 and 4 of Chapter 
IV and Section 4 of Chapter V. The second purpose is to justify a version of 
the policy improvement algorithm for EP's of discounted SG's. Recall from 
Sections 3 and 4 of Chapter IV that it is convenient to obtain results for 
deterministic decision processes and then to extend them to stochastic decision 
processes. The following deterministic SG model can be similarly extended. 
Let S be a nonempty set of states, ( a nonempty set of olayers, AS a non-
empty set of actions for player q in states s, 
A = x Aq , s qcQ s 




s' 	 n 
and 	Y = x A. 
00
1 
Let M be a mapping from g to S which determines successive states via sn+1= M(sn ,an). 

























) for all n). 
Definitions (1) and (2) are formally identical to (V.4.11) and (V.4.12) which 
specify an ordinal framework for multiple criteria MDP's. In Section 4 of Chapter 
V, Q denotes a set of criteria; here, the elements of Q are players. With that 
difference in interpretation, the following results are immediately applicable to 
SG's: Proposition V.4.1, Lemma V.4.1, Theorems V.4.3 and V.4.4, and Corollary 
V.4.4.1. The following exposition is based partly on those results and uses the 
same definitions and notation. Therefore, we urge the reader to review the 
portions of Section 4 in Chapter V labeled "Pareto Optimal Policies" and 
"Solutions in Stationary Policies." 
DEFINITION I. A coalition is a nonerrrpty subset of players. The set 2 of latent 
coalitions is a nonempty collection of coalitions. 
For each seS and wE1-2, let e s c is x i s indicate the preferences of coalition 
w among posterities when the initial state is s. We interpret (T,T')ce5 as 
"coalition w regards posterity T as being at least as desireable as posterity T' 
if s 1=s." 
As in Section 2, let E label the q-th player's portion of REY where 
co 
Y =xxxA 
n=1 seS gen s.  
The portion of R due to all the other players is labeled fl q  and we sometimes write 
= 	,E ) instead of E = 0 1 ,6 2 ,—) where the q-th component of an = dn (sn
) is q -q 
player q's action in period n. For each sES and E = (5 1 ,6 2 ,...)0, let Ts(E) 
7.3 
denote the posterity generated by the Markov policy TI from the initial state 
S: 
T s (E) = (s,(5 1 (s), M[s,6 1 (s)], 	(5 2 {M[s,d 1 (s))1, 
DEFINITION 2. Let II and be Markov policies. 
(3) TI >P 	
<=> either [T s (11),T s (Q]ce
w for all scS and west,, 
or there are s and j in S and w and u in Q such that 
[T s (11),T s (0140s) and [Tj (E),T j (E)ge• 
If Qc S2, then 
(4) n > e  E <=> tT s (TO ,T s (Eq-q 	s flee cl for all seS and q€ 
We repeat Definition V.4.2. 
DEFINITION 3. If D is a nonerrpty set and Bc D X D, then bED is B-maximal if 
(b,c)EB for all cED. 
These definitions lead to specifications of the core and an EP in terms of 
> and >, respectively. 
-P 	-e 
DEFINITION 4. A Markov policy TI is an equilibrium point (EP) <=> TI is > e-optimal. 
A Markov policy TI is in the core <=> II is >p-optimal. If 1 = Q then policies in 





 are necessarily transitive and, as we observe in Section 4 
- 
of Chapter V, intransitivity prevents the straightforward use of the arguments in 
Sections 3 and 4 of Chapter IV. 
EXAMPLE 1. Consider the following static bimatrix game (i.e. two-player non- 
7.4 
cooperative game) in which each player has two alternative actions. 




1 0,1 3,0 
2 2,2  0,0 
The entries in each cell are the rewards garnered by players 1 and-i, respectively. 
This is the same array of numbers as in Example V.4.4. Let (i,j) denote the policy 
in which player 1 takes action i and player 2 takes action j. Then (1,1) >
P 
 (1,2) 
because player 2's reward is 1 at (1,1) but only 0 at (1,2). Also, (1,2) >
P 
 (2,1) 
because player l's reward is 3 at (1,2) but only 2 at (2,1). However, 
(1,1) t
P 
 (2,1) because both players' rewards are lower at (1,1) than at (2,1). 
Therefore, > is not transitive. 0 
-P 
EXAMPLE 2. Consider the following bimatrix game. 
Player 2's Action 




1 I 	0,0 0,-1 0,1 
2 -1,0 0,0 0,-1 
3 
1 
1 	1,0 -1,0  0,0 
Using the same notation as in Example 1, (1,1) > e (2,2) because player 1 is no 
better off at (2,1) than at (1,1), and player 2 is no better off at (1,2) than at 
(1,1). Also, (2,2) > e (3,3) because player 1 is no better off at (3,2) than at 
(2,2) and player 2 is no better off at (2,3) than at (2,2). However, (1,1) t e (3,3) 
7.5 
because player 1 is better off at (3,1) than at (1,1) and player 2 is better 
off at (1,3) than at (1,1). Therefore, > e is not transitive. E] 
Partial Resolution of Intransitivity 
1 We repeat Definition V.4.5. 
DEFINITION 5. LetDbeanonempty set andBcDxD. An inconsistency cycle 
connects x and y under B if there is a finite sequence x l ,...,xn such that 
x1 = xn = x, xk = y for some 1 < k < n, (xi ,x.1+1 )EB for all i < n, and 
(x
1+1, x)0 for some i. The completion of a binary relation (B,D), written 
(B',D), is 
B' = B'j f(x,y): (x,y)EDxD, (x,y)B, and (y,x)0). 
The transitive completion of a binary relation (B,D), written (Bc D), is 
B
c 
= B",.) {(x,y): there is an inconsistency cycle 
which connects x and y under B'). 
See Example V.4.5 for the completion and the transitive completion of > p 
 in the bimatrix game of Example 1 in this section. 
Let (> ,Y) denote the transitive completion of (> 
p
,Y). The following 
restatement of Corollary V.4.4.1 uses terminology in Definitions V.4.6 and V.4.7. 
THEOREM 1. If S is reachable and fe s
6.1 : scS and coca) has consistent choice and 
is continuous then >p  and > have the following properties: - 	-c 
(5) T ril > II => 6 > n; 0 -c 	-c - 
(6) If HEY is > p 	 - -maximal then II is > c 	 - -maximal and there is a > -maximal r; - c 
(7) If HEY is > p 	 - -maximal then 11 >c T rE for aZZ 'Sc;A 
(8) If 	< co then there is a > -maximal r; 
(9) For every yet, either yc° is > -maximal or there is another SEA such that 
oce > 	y . -c 
7.6 
In particular (6) asserts that, if the core is nonempty then there is a 
stationary policy which is in the core defined with the transitive completion 
of >p . From (8), a finite SG necessarily has a stationary policy in its 
(nonempty) core defined with the transitive completion of > . 
-P 
Recall that > e  is the binary relation underlying an EP. Let (>,Y) denote 
the transitive completion of (>e ,Y). Exercise 1 asks you to prove the following 
result. 
THEOREM 2. If 0 c ,Q and {8:: scS and ciEn} is continuous and has consistent 
choice, then (5) through (9) are valid with > e  and > in place of > P 




1. Prove Theorem 2. 
2. Suppose the state-to-state mapping M is nonstationary. That is, for each 
t, let S t'  AS ( t), and Mt depend on t = 1,2,... and suppose M t (s,a)cSt+i 










t  ). Say that scS t+1 i  
reachable if there exists vES t and aE x Aci (t) such that s = Mt (v,a); and qcQ s 
St+1 is reachable if all scSt+1 are reachable. (a) Prove that Theorem 2 
remains valid. (b) Prove that Theorem 1 remains valid if S
t 
is reachable 
for all t = 2,3,... . 
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Truth-Telling, Dominant Strategies 
and Iterative Groves Mechanisms 
ABSTRACT 
This paper demonstrates that if a price-decomposition algorithm is 
used to solve a decentralized resource allocation problem, where rewards 
are those of a Groves methanism, truth-telling remains a dominant 
strategy equilibrium. It has been shown previously that for a general 
class of non-linear programming algorithms, truth-telling is a weakly 




Truth-Telling and Dominant Strategies 
4 
I. INTRODUCTION  
A problem that has received some attention of late is how a decentralized 
organization might construct an evaluation scheme for its members so that the 
members' own self interests coincide with the interests of the organization as 
a whole 11,2,4,5]. A "Groves scheme" [4] is one such mechanism. In a Groves 
scheme, the members of the organization communicate with a central decision 
maker who uses information from all the members to choose the optimal action 
for the organization as a whole. The messages sent by the members are in the 
form of functions; examples are, profit contribution functions or willingness- 
to-pay functions. Given this type of communication and the method of evaluation 
defined in a Groves mechanism, truth-telling can be shown to be a dominant 
strategy for the members of the organization. 
From an implementation perspective, requiring communicable knowledge of 
an entire function is a very restrictive assumption. If messages are to be 
in Euclidean space rather than function space, iterative procedures must be 
used to solve the overall organization's problem. In an iterative procedure, 
the members of the organization must only communicate certain well-chosen 
points on the graph of the appropriate functions. It was shown in [2] that for 
a particular (wide) class of mathematical programming algorithms used to solve 
the organization's problem iteratively, truth-telling is no longer a dominant 
strategy for the members. However, it was shown that truth-telling is a Nash 
equilibrium that weakly dominates all other Nash equilibria for all members of 
the organization. 
5 
In this paper, we show that truth-telling is a dominant strategy when 
the iterative procedure used is a price-decomposition algorithm. Examples 
of well-known price-decomposition algorithms are the Dantzig-Wolfe 
Decomposition Algorithm [3] and a resource allocation procedure due tc. 
Malinvaud [1,6]. 
II. THE MODEL  
The model used here is one developed in [2], modified for the specific_ 
class of algorithms considered. To briefly summarize [2], the basic model 
is of a multidivisional firm (for expository purposes only) with a corporate 
center (the Center) and N divisions, indexed by i = 0,1,...,N, respectively. 
Profit contribution functions for the Center and the divisions are concave 




resource use of i = 0,1,...,N 
(1)  
7.: IR L 	MR profit contribution function of i = 0,1,...,N 
The "technological coefficients" for the Center and the divisions are 
containedinMxLdimensionalmatricesct.
1
;resource availability is contained 
in an M- dimensional vector K and the set of feasible x from the centers' 




The Center wants to find that vector of resource use 
* * 	 L(N+1) 








E a.x. < K 
1 1 - 
i=0 
6 
ItisassurnedthattheCenterknowsonlythatthe) functions are concave, 
but not their functional form for i = 1,...,N. The Center knows its own 
7 0 (•) function in its entirety, as well as al] the technological coefficients 
a.; it also knows the vector of resource availabilities K and the set X. 
1 
Each division has knowledge only of its own profit contribution function and 
technological coefficients, but not necessarily of the functions and 
coefficients of the other divisions. The Center and all the divisions know 
the general form of the problem in (2). 
In [2] an iterative control mechanism was defined as a speciiication of 
iterative communication rules, a decision rule and enforcement rules. The 
particular algorithm used to solve (2) implicitly defines the communication 
and decision rules. The communication rules contain a message space from 
which the divisions choose their messages to the Center, and a message rule 
that specifies how the Center chooses its replies to the divisions. For the 
price-decomposition algorithms considered here, an iterative control mechanism 
C is defined as follows: 
C E (M, fp t 
(-)1t=1' x(•), ( E.(-) ) . 	) 1=1 (3) 
where 
(a) M = mL+1 is the message space of the divisions. 
1 	2 








where the Center interprets mi t EIR
L 
as resource use 
xi and rn.
2 
t is interpreted as profit contribution at that 
i 
resource use (i.e., 7.(x.)) 
t - 
m. = (m 	 ) 
1 	il' it 
X 	> 0 	i = 1,...,N 
iT - 










m t E (mit' — 'mNt ) 
(b) p t : MN(t-1) - IRM is the message rule of the Center 
, 	




) s the message from 
the Center to the divisions at iteration t > 2; p1 
is given a priori. The message p t (mt-1 ) is the 
vector of optimal dual multipliers associated with 
the first M constraints of the following constrained 
maximization problem: 
N t-1 
MAX 	E 	r 	m. + 7 (X ) 
iX
iT-' X 0 
 1=1 T=1 -LT 17 
N t-1 
1 
s. t. Z 	
ZaiiTMiT 
+ax< K 








0' '1Tm1T''''' 	'N-m C - 
T=1 	
T1 	L nT 
t-1 
ZX. 	= 1 	i = 1,...,N 
T=0 
Let (-J. T (m
t-1 
1 
to the above. 
x 	
t-1 
)) denote the optimal solution 
' 	0 
aD 
E.(7 ./ 71 ) E  1 
8 
(c) x: M + IR L(N+1) is the Center's decision rule. 
x(m ) = (x 0 (m ), x1 (m ),...,xN (m )) 















 1T' NT 
t -+ oc 	 T1 	 T=1 
(d) E. IR x Mcc + IR is the evaluation measure for division 
i. Let r. denote division i's actual (observable aposteriori) 
realized profit contribution. Then, 
r 	 t-1 - 
7 4 A 4 (mt-l )m. 1 + 7 (X (J)) 
jai t4c° T=1 -IT 	
JT 	0 0 
otherwise 
At each iteration of the communication process the divisions must 
decide how to respond to the messages from the Center, i.e., choose an 
mit EJY-Astrategyfordivisioniisafunctionu.from IR to IR L-1-1 where 






). Since p t depends upon m t-1 , we can express 
it it 
the divisions' messages recursively as functions of u = (u 1 ,...,uN). The 
divisions'messages can then be expressed as m
it 





The set of possible divisional strategies is denoted by U. 
In order to define what is meant by truth-telling, the principle 
behind a price decomposition algorithm must be clarified.5  At each 
iteration, the divisions solve a maximization problem using a vector 
of dual variables generated by the Center to "price-out" the vectors o.x.. 
if m. is consistent 1 
with a function 




2 t 	I 
m. - pa.m. = MAX r.(x.) - p
t
a.x. 
it 	1 it 	i 1 	1 1 
x. 
1 
A truthful strategy u. associated with any function F.(.) is defined to 
be any u
i 







(u) 	= 	MAX F(x) - p
ta.x 
It 	1 it 	 1 i 
	 (5) 
X. 




Thus, division i is playing a truthful strategy if it follows the rules 
of the price decomposition algorithm no matter what the other N-1 divisions 





Y'[F . ] and it (n/u.) = m
it 
 for all t. 7 
1  
It is now possible to define payoff functions for the divisions which 
depend on the strategy vector u. 
CO 
wi [u]  E E.[ 7 ., m (u)] 	 (6) 1 
The set U and the functions W.[.] define an N-person non-cooperative game 
in normal form. 
III. RESULTS 
Themainresultofthispaperisthatu.c4TrAis a dominant strategy 1 	1 
for division i, i.e., truth-telling by all divisions constitutes a dominant 
strategy equilibrium. In order to prove this result, three preliminary 
results must be shown. First, it must be shown that the maximizer of a 
function is also the maximizer of the concave hull of the function and 
that the two functions are equal at this maximizing value. It is then 
9 
( 4 ) 
10 
demonstrated that the messages generated by the strategies associated 
with a function and the function's concave hull are identical. The third 
preliminary result is that the payoff to any division is the same 
whether the other N-1 divisions play strategies associated with particular 
functions or the functions' concave hulls. 
The proofs of these results and the main theorem appear in the 
Appendix. 
LEMMA 1 
Let y < 00 solve 
MAX f(y) , 	where f: Irk s -0- IR 
* 
(i) Then y solves 
MAX f (y) , 	where T: IR s -0- IR and 
* 	— * 
(ii) f(y ) = f(y ), 
where f(•) is the concave hull of f(•), i.e. 
7(y) = sup fx,f(y1).4......4.xsf(ys) 
> 0 
J 
X. = 1 
j=1 3 
s 	• 
Z L X.y = y 
j=1 
LEMMA 2  
Letu.cniiiandu.E INEifor all j 	i. Then for any u. E U, 







	for all k = 1,...,N and t. 
ll 
LEMMA 3  
Letu.ETDIAandri.cT[g.]for all j 	i. Then for any u. L U, 
3 	3 	J 	j 	 - 	1 
W.[u/u
i1 
 ] = W.[a/u.] 
1 	1 
The main result of this paper can now be stated. 
THEORD•I 1  
* .„ 
Let u. E Y1. 7.J. 	Then 
1 	1 
W.[11/u.]>WAu]Vu.c1J, 	for any u\u . E
N-1 
1 	- 	 1 
IV. SL7,IMARY  
It has been shown that truth-telling retains its dominant strategy 
property when a Groves mechanism is made iterative using a price-decomposition 
algorithm. The usefulness of this result is that it lends further credence 
to the use of a price decomposition algorithm as a decentralized resource 
allocation procedure. 
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Proof of Lemma 1  
(i) By assumption 
f(y
* 	
f() V y t- 
By definition of f(•), 
_ * * 




 ) > f(y) 	y e 
Thus, 	y e 1R s 
— * 	 S 	i > 	f(y3 ) 	> 0 and y3 	 = y and 	= 2 
j 	
j=1 j- 	 j=1 
Therefore, summing over j, 
s 	 s 	. 	
- 
	 s . 
	




 0 an d 
j=1 3 	 - 	 j= 1 	 j=1 
C 
Taking the supremum of both sides over all 	> 0 and y
i 	
: 	vj = _ 
s 	 J 	 j=1 j 
and : 7.. = 1, we get 
j=1 3 
— * 	 - 
f (y ) f (y) 	y c 1R
s 
 (ii) Using the results in (1), the definition of f(y
* 




, we get f(y
* 
 ) = f(y ), 
Proof of Lemma 2  





m. (u/u.) - p t (m t-1 (u/u.)) (A.
J J 




(u/u.)) . a.x. j j 	 J 	 J J 	 J 	J J 
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In order to use Lemma 1, it must be shown that 
H.(x.) - ya.x. = H.(x.) - ya.x. 
3 J 	J J 	J J 	J J 
i.e., the concave hull of [H.(•) minus ya.x.] equals the concave hull of 
J ' J J 
H.
3
(•) minus ya.x.. 
 J J 
H. (x ) - ya.x. E sup 	(H.(x. 1  ) - 	1 	(H.(x L ) - va.x 












j s j 
s=1 
	
L 	 L 
For all X > 0 and x
j 	 s 
s 
7 = 1, sx j
s = 	we know that s- 
s=1 	s=1 
L 
ya.X x. = ya.x.. 
s=1 	3 s 	J 
Therefore, 
1 
H.(x.) - ya.x. = sup 	H.(x 	 H.(x.
L 	
- ya.x. = 14.(x.) - ya.x. 
3 	3 J 	'1 j j L j 	j JJ 	J 	J 	J J 










 = x 
s=1 	
j s 
The proof can now proceed by induction: 
At t = 1, p
1 





























(7.1/u.) E MAX H.(x.) - p la.x. 
1 J1 	 j j1 	
x 	J J 	J J 
Using Lemma 1 














m  (u/u ) = 	(u/u.) and m 
2
(u/u ) = m.
2
61/u ) 
J 7 i j
1
T 	1 	jT 	 J 7 	i 
• 
for all T < t-1. 
Then p t (m
t-1 










— 	 ? 
1 
m. 1 
it 	1 	3t (u/u.) = m.1 1 




 ) T 	 JT  
Since mj 
t 
 (u/u) = mj 
t  (u/u) V j 	













(u/u) V k = 1,...,N and Vi t • s 









) 	7i ( X
0 
 (M ( u ) ) 
0 1 j01 t-0-00 T=1 
W. [u] = 




00 	00 — 
Since m. (u) = m. (u/u.), if W.juj = -cc it is, then immediate that 








 (0=m m 
	
1(u/u.) V1c=1,...,M. Therefore A
j7 
 (mt -1  (u)) = A
j7 
 (m t -1 6 
1 
1/u.)) 
(from the definition of the X. 
T
(.)) for all t. 
The desired result follows immediately. ■ 
Proof of Theorem 1  
In [ 2 ], the following result was shown: 
If u. E T[H.], where H. is concave, then 
J 	J 	 J 
* 
W.[u/u. ] > W.[u/u.] 	V U. E U (i.e., if the other N-1 
	
1 	1 	- 1 	1 1 
divisions play strategies associated with concave functions. 
then i's optimal strategy choice is the truthful strategy). 
The current proof will proceed by contradiction: 
_ - 
Assume 	ui e U such that 









	where u. E YfH.] 	V 
1 	1  
— * 















LAspecialcaseiswhereM=Landallthea.are L x L identity 1 
matrices. The constraint would then be L- x. < K. 
1 - 
i=0 
2. For the Dantzig-Wolfe Decomposition Algorithm, X = x 1  x, > 0 , 
= 0,1,...,N; for Malinvaud's procedure X is the set of feasible 
final consumption vectors from the central planner's point of view. 
3. The general form of the problem in (2) can accomodate public goods 

















s. t. 	x o - x l f 0 
xl - x 0 < 0 











so that K = 	and a0 = 	1 
( 
0 
, al 	0 i and a 2 = - 




4. The messages m, will be consistent with a function if whenever 
1 
11 	 2 	2 m
it = is 
m for t i s (i.e., same resource usage), mit = m. 	(same 
is 
profit contribution). Clearly, this is easily verifiable and thus 
the condition is operational for the Center. 
5. Let f: IR
N 	
IR and g: IR
N 
-4- DR . The mathematical programming problem 
MAX 	f(x) 
xeIR N 
s.t. g(x) < 0 
17 
is decomposible if the Lagrangean function L(x,y) = f(x) - yg(x) 
L, 
(where y 	1R ) can be written as 
N 





6. u\ui E 
= 
7. Clearly, truth-telling is desirable behavior, since it can be shown 
that following the rules of the price decomposition algorithm leads 
to a solution of the overall problem as defined in (2). 
18 
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ABSTRACT 
The Dantzig-Wolfe decomposition algorithm (DWDA) is viewed as a 
resource allocation procedure for a multi-divisional firm. An evaluation 
procedure is proposed that provides incentives in equilibrium for the 
divisional managers to follow the rules of the DWDA even though they 
are able to "cheat" in a manner that could not be detected. The eval-
uation procedure for the DWDA is a specific example of a general pro-
cedure for the incentive compatible control of large divisionalized 
organizations using iterative decomposition algorithms. 
I. Statement of the Problem  
One of the most frequently encountered linear programming problems 





s.t. Ax. < B i xi 	i i=1, ..,N 
N 
a.x. < K 
i=1 
x. > 0 	i=1,...,N 1 - 
wherex.,c.andKarevectors,A.and a. are matrices, and B. are scalars. 1 	1 	 1 	1 	 1 
The Dantzig-Wolfe decomposition algorithm (DWDA) is a "price" decomposi-
tion algorithm. A series of subproblems are solved using prices generated 
by a series of master problems. The revised prices are the dual variables 
associated with the linking constraints 	aixi < K. A natural (and 
frequent) interpretation of (1.1) and the DWDA is that of a divisionalized 
firm, in which there are externalities, trying to maximize profit using 
internally generated prices. Division i's "output" is xi , its contribution 
to profit is c i 	
Ai  x i and its local constraint is x
i 
< Bi . The externalities 
are created by the linking constraints, where each component of K can be 
viewed as representing an amount of a scarce resource (e.g. cash, managerial 
time) that must be allocated to each of these divisions. 
Consider a multi-divisional firm that wishes to use the DWDA to solve 
its resource allocation problem (as modelled by 1.1). The corporate center 
(hereafter referred to as the Center) sends the divisions "prices" for the 
scarce resources, and instructs them to choose an output vector that maximizes 
divisional profit contribution minus the "cost" of the scarce resources. 
The Center instructs the divisions to inform it of their profit 
contribution and resource use at the optimal output vector. This informa-
tion is used, along with previously obtained information, to calculate 
revised prices. The process continues until the Center has determined 
(via an optimality criteria) that further rounds of communication would 
not lead to a better allocation of the scarce resources, in terms of its 
overall objective of solving (1.1). 
Given the above scenario, the following question is raised: will 
the divisions find it in their best interests to follow the Center's 
directives? If the answer is no, then the DWDA is not very useful as a 
resource allocation procedure. The purpose of this work is the definition 
of a reward mechanism for the divisions that makes following the Center's 
directives (i.e., following the rules of the DWDA) in the best interests 
of the divisions. 
There is a growing literature in economics that deals with the 
provision of incentives in various contexts (see Cohen [2] for a discussion ). 
Arrow [1] defined the problem of organizational control as consisting of two 
parts: (1) the choice of operating (behavioral) rules for the members of 
the organization, and (2) the choice of enforcement rules that induce the 
members of the organization via the division's evaluation to follow the 
operating rules. Operating rules are made up of information exchange 
(communication) and decision rules. Enforcement rules must depend on the 
divisions' actions and be such that a division maximizes its evaluation 
when it follows the operating rules. In most of the previous work on incentives, 
the operating rules have been such that communication takes place on a one- 
time only basis, and the usefulness of the specified enforcement rules relies 
on that property. 
If the DWDA is viewed as a specification of operating rules, iterative 
communication may require the definition of different enforcement rules. If 
the same type of rules are used as in the non-iterative case, the results 
obtained may be different. In devising appropriate enforcement rules for 
the DWDA, we have relied on the general theory of organizational control 
developed by Groves 14,5] where communication is non-iterative. The ex-
tension to very general programming models and to iterative decomposition 
algorithms is due to Cohen [2]. In the current work, as in [2], we obtain 
weaker results than Groves because, when communication is iterative rather 
than one-time only, the Center has much less information available when it 
makes its final decision. 
Since the results we obtain are weaker than in the non-iterative case, 
why not just redefine the DWDA so that communication takes place all at 
once? In reality, the divisions of a firm probably cannot compute and/or 
store all at once the amount of information this would require. A division 
may be able to tell the Center how much of a scarce resource it wants at 
a particular price, but to expect it to be able to do so for every possible 
price is unreasonable. In addition, since presumably the cost of calculation 
is not zero, why should the division do a large amount of what turns 
out to be unnecessary calculation? Most real world planning procedures 
have iterative communication [6] and thus we must be able to provide incentives 
in that context as well as in the non-iterative case. 
Jennergren [7] has investigated the provision of incentives for the 
DWDA. He demonstrated that a particular reward scheme for division managers 
does not work. The division managers may have an incentive to "cheat" (not 
follow the rules) and could do so in an undetectable manner. In Section II, 
we define a class of evaluation measures under which there is no incentive 
to cheat; in Section III, we view the divisions / problem in terms of an 
5 
N-person game and show that following the rules is a Nash equilbrium 
that dominates in the class of Nash equilibria. In Section IV, we 
discuss the problem of terminating the DWDA before optimality is reached. 
Concluding remarks are contained in Section V. 
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II. Incentive Compatible Divisional Evaluations  
For ease of exposition, we define the following functions: 
ir•(Y )E(MAX c.x. s.t.Ax<Bax<y 	x. 	0) 





( . ) is a concave, polyhedral and continuous 
function of its argument (Cohen [2]). 	This definition allows us to 
rewrite (1.1) as 
N 
MAX I vi (yi) 
yi i=1 
N 




1 be the initial price vector in the DWDA. If the divisions 
were following the rules they would then solve 
1 
MAX Tr. (Y . ) — P Y. 1 1 
yi 
(2.3) 
and send y.1  and iri (y.
1  ) to the Center (where y.1 solves (2.3)). At any 
 1 	 1 
iteration t, the division would solve (2.3) with p
1 




1(y.) to the Center. The Center would calculate revised i 
prices p
t+1 
by solving the following, 
N ' t 
MAX I I Ir.(Y ) iT 	i 8 
N 	t 
s.t. 	I 	e iT Yi 
i=1 T=1 
iT i=1 T=1 ( 2.4 ) 
e iT  = 1 	i=1,...,N 
T=0 
e 	> 0 iT - i=1,...,N 
T=0,1,...,t 
where /r,0 t+1,\N 	is the solution at iteration t, and p t+1 is the 
iT 
vector of dual variables associated with the first constraint in (2.4). 1 
The Center's decision consists of an allocation y.of scarce resources 
i 
to each of the divisions
2 
t 




Suppose now that the divisions don't follow the rules of the DWDA. 
At each iteration they send what appears to be the solution to (2.3) (where 
1 . 
p is replaced by pt), but is not. Let aft be division i's "resource use" 
at t and b
it  be division i's "profit contribution" at t. The Center then 
solves (2.4) where yT is replaced by a iT and 7T (y.) is replaced by b i i 1 	 T 
for all T < t, i.e. the Center believes the divisions to be following the 
rules of the DWDA and behaves accordingly. Clearly, the revised price 
vector pt+1 , the optimal weights 8 t+1 as well as the final allocation of 
iT 
resources y. are now functions of the divisions reported resource use and 










) N ' 
bi 	
_ 
E (b il ,...,b it), and b
t 








et+1 _ t+1 t t 
	
= e 	(a ,b ) 
iT 	iT t 













WecannowdefineevaluationmeasuresR.H for the divisions, where 
each division's evaluation depends on its realized profit contribution and 
the reported profit contribution of the other divisions. It should be 
noted that these evaluations do not necessarily represent real resource 
flows. One way to view then is as a scoring system for division managers, 
where the "score" is monotonically transformed into the arguments of the 
division manager's utility function. If they do represent real resource 
flows, then one must be concerned with the question of a "balanced budget". 
A straightforward transformation of the evaluation measure defined below 
is sufficient to guarantee a balanced budget in all situations of interest. 







< b. for all e T  > 0 • such that S   S 	E (a , b i ) 
  
T=1 
t 	 t 
e T  a. = 1 a. S and Ye = 1, for all s=1,...,T} IT  
T=1 	 T=1 
(2.7) 
ThesetS.contains all possible "resource allocations" and "profit 
contributions" that could be consistent with division i following the rules 
oftheDWDA.If7r.is division i's realized profit contribution, then 
t 
+1 t t + 	
um 	







 )) E 
1 1 
if (a,10) . ) E S it for all t 	(2.8) 
and 
t 
t+1 r. > lim E e. 	(at  ,b t  ) ! b. 
lt 1T t4M 
-co otherwise 
The Center must believe that division i is following the rules of the DWDA 





The R(.) appear to be a type of "profit 
T=1 
sharing" since each division's evaluation is the sum of its actual profit 
contribution and the other divisions' reported profit contribution. The 
difference between traditional profit sharing and the evaluations defined 
in (2.8) is that with these new evaluations, each division's maximizing 
behavior does not depend on the assumption of rationality of the other 
divisions. Division i's maximizing behavior is thus independent of whether 
or not the other N-1 divisions are maximizing their own evaluations. 
Given the evaluations defined in (2.8), the divisions must now decide 
how to respond to the revised prices sent by the Center at each iteration. 
The division wants to ensure that the Center's final allocation of resources 
maximizes the division's evaluation. The division chooses, for each t, a 
response rule or function uit that determines at t how division i should 
respond to the price vectors it has received from the Center. If each p t 
has L components (i.e., there are L scarce resources), then 
L•t 	L+1 
u 	: IR. 	4- 11 
it 
(2.9) 
A strategy ui is an infinite sequence of response rules, one for each 
possible t. 
ui 	iuit 17.1 
	 (2.10) 
The strategies for each division must be chosen from the following set U: 




can be expressed as a function of the response rules 
of all the divisions at previous iterations, the response rule of division 





alt . : U 	R 	
(2.12) 
bit : U 
Letting u E (ul ,...,uN), we can define al(u), a t (u), bl(u), and b t (u) 
analagously to a'F , a t , b 1 and b t where a. 	 it and b are replaced by a. (u) it 	 It 
and b it
(u) in the former; in addition a (u) and b (u) are the infinite 
dimensional strategy-dependent vectors of resource use and profit contribution, 
respectively, for all divisions at all iterations. 
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III. The Divisions f Problem as an N-person Game  
The choice of divisional strategies can be thought of in game theoretic 
terms. In order to do so we must define payoff functions W i [•] for each 
division. 
W [u] E R.(7r.(y1  . (acci (u), bc° (u))) 	(aw
(u), bw (u))) 	 (3.1) 
i 1  
These payoff functions and the set of strategies U define an N-person (non- 
zero sum) game in normal form, which we assume is played non-cooperatively. 
The following Lemma is given without proof, which follows immediately 
from the convergence properties of the DWDA. (The proof of all subsequent 
Theorems appear in the Appendix.) 
LEMMA 1  If u i , 
for all i, chooses (ab
it
) according to the 
* * 	* * 
rules of the DWDA for all t, then (x 1 (u ),...,xN
(u )) solves 
(1.1), where c ix1; (u) = ri (4. (u)). 
A dominant strategy for a player in a non-cooperative game is a 
strategy that maximizes the player's payoff no matter what strategies that 
the other players use, i.e., u
i 
is a dominant strategy if 
W.[u/iii — W.[u] for all u
i 




Ideally, one would 
like to show the existence of a dominant strategy equilibrium for a game. 
In the previously cited work of Groves, where communication is non-iterative, 
these type of equilibria do indeed exist. The loss of information due to 
iterative communication prevents the existence of such equilibria in the 
present game. Another solution concept for a non-cooperative game is the 





E U, for all i. We can show for the current game that following 
12 
the rules of the DWDA is a Nash equilibrium that dominates all other Nash 
equilibria for every division i. Any such dominant Nash equilibrium is a 
likely outcome of the game; we show that they lead to decisions that solve 
the overall firm problem. 
THEOREM 1 If ui , for all i, chooses (ait'it b ) according to the 
rules of the DWDA, then 
a) u is a Nash equilibrium 
A  i b) if u s any other Nash equilibrium the payoff for 
every division is at least as great under u
* 
as 
it is under u. 
THEOREM 2 If u is a Nash equilibrium such that the payoff under u 
is at least as great as under any other Nash equilibrium 




(1.1) where x. (u) is defined as in Lemma 1. 
Therefore, in Theorem 1, we have shown that it is possible to provide 
incentives for the divisions to follow the rules of the DWDA and in Theorem 
2, we show that such "rational" behavior on the part of the divisions leads 
to a solution of the overall firm problem (1.1). 
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IV. Terminating the DWDA  
The results in Section III depend upon the DWDA being run until the 
optimality criteria for the algorithm are satisfied. If the algorithm is 
terminated before convergence, the results we obtain are no longer 
necessarily valid in general. The divisions then face a problem of decision 
making under uncertainty, where their respective probability estimates 
about when the algorithm (i.e., communication) will be terminated determine 
their optimal strategies. Following the rules of the DWDA is no longer 
necessarily in the best interests of the divisions, since end-gaming may 
now be optimal. The solution of the problem of termination before 
optimality is beyond the scope of the present work. 
14 
V. Summary  
We have shown that when the DWDA is viewed as a decentralized resource 
allocation procedure, it is possible to provide incentives for divisional 
managers to follow the rules of the DWDA and that "rational" behavior on 
the part of the divisions leads to decisions that solve the overall problem. 
However, the results obtained here are "weaker" than those obtained 
by Groves [4] when communication was non-iterative. The difference is 
due to the different information possessed by the Center when it makes its 
decisions. In the earlier work, the Center knows each divisions' strategy 
in its entirety. In the current work, the Center has only a partial 
approximation of the strategy. The reasonableness of the results 
presented here depend upon the acceptability of the Nash equilibrium as 
an outcome concept. This, we maintain, is primarily an empirical question. 
Appendix 
Proof of Theorem 1  







 ), bco (u/u.))) = 
t 	 (A.1) 






(u/u.)) • b. (u/u.1 ) 
t-44:0 
T= 1 
1T 	 1 	'1T  
+1 
Since ffi (•) is concave and polyhedral, there exists a finite T such 
that 
T 









)) • b. (u/u.) 
1 	 1 	1T 	1 
T=1 
* co co 
Taking limits and using continuity of v.(•) and the definition of y.(a ,b ) 
we have 
T 
T+1 T 	* 	T 	* lim
iT 
(a (u/u i), b (u/ui )) • b. (u/u.1 ) = 1T  
T 




* r.(lim 5- 6T+1  (aT  (u/ui), bT (u/ui )) • a. (u/u i  )) = iT 	 1T  T-)02 T=1 
* co 	* 	m 	* 
n(y
i (a (u/u.), b (u/u ))) 
T-► 03 
T=1 
which is the desired result. 
wuisatTashequilibriumiffora/li," ] > 1.7.[u /u i ] 
for all u E U. From (A.1) and the definition of W i [u], we 




	* 	00 * 
W fu I = 	(y.(a (u ), b (u ))) •  
j=1 
From Lemma 1, 
N 
Wi fu 	> 	 j n.(y,) 	for all Y such that 	(A.2) 
j=1 
	
Y ' 	 K + 
j=1 
In particular, 









/u.)” for all U. E U 
Z••., 	J 	 1 
j=1 
Using (A.1) for all j#i, we get the desired result, 
*  




 /u.))) + 
t 
(u 	) > 
jOi t4W T=1 .17 
U. I - 
jT 	
b 




(b) From (A.2), 
N 
W.[u ] > 	77.(y
j
(acc) (141), hm (U))) 
-  
j=1 
for any Nash equilibrium u. 
For any Nash point U, it must be true that for all j 
ff.
J
(37*.(am(t), bm 01))) > lim 01-1 (a t (a), bt 61)) • b (i.1) 
i JT 	 T 




] > ff.(y.(a (u), b
co 
 (u))) + 
lim o t+1 (a t (t), bt(u)) 	b . 
	= Wi[(1], 
jT 	 j t--►c° 	 T 	❑ 
Proof of Theorem 2  
A 
(by contradiction). Let u be a Nash equilibrium whose payoff is at 
least as great as any other Nash equilibrium u for all divisions. With u 
defined as in Theorem 1 and using the results of that Theorem, we have 
W [U] = W i [u ] 	for all i 
	
(A.3) 
From the proof of Theorem 1 
N 	 N * co 	co 	 * 02A 	con 
vi (yi (a (u
* 
 ), b (u
* 
 ))) > Z 7i (yi (a (u), b (u))) 	(A.4) 








(u)) does not solve (1.1). Then strict inequality holds 
in (A.4). For every i, W i [u ] equals the left-hand side of (A.4). Therefore, 
using (A.3), 	equals the left hand side of (A.4) for all i. Using the 
iv 
definition of W[ix] and summing over all i, we get 
[ifi ( yi (a (u), b (u))) + y lim 	@t  r. t+1 tA 	tA (a (u), b (u)) • 1) .17 60] > 
t+c° 
1=1 	 jOi 	T=1 
N 
N 	lr (y*. Caw (.1) 1:3 (u))) 
1=1 
A 
Since u is a Nash equilibrium, for all i 
* 	A 
	
ir.(y i  (a
co 





Using (A.5) and (A.6) we get 








* A 	* 





N(u)) solves (1.1), 
0 
Footnotes  
1. The indices in the last two sets of constraints in (2.4) go from 0 to t 
instead of 1 to t in order to insure a feasible solution. 
2. The limits in (2.5) as well as all subsequent limits exist by the 
definition of the e
iT 
, i.e., the sum is bounded by K for all t. 
3. a and b are the infinite dimensional vectors of all the divisions 
resource uses and profit contributions, respectively, for all 
iterations. 
4. If R.(7r. a" b) is modified to K.'(r.,a,b) E X.R.(7r.,a,b) where 1 
= 1 and the X. are preditermined, budget balance is no longer 
1=1 
a problem. [See Cohen [2]]. 
5. u/ai E 
u\u i E 
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